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Abstract
A growing body of research focuses on talent identification as a critical building block in
the process of talent development. Professional baseball scouts’ level of expertise in identifying
baseball talent directly impacts organizations’ competitive success at the Major League level, yet
the performance productivity of MLB franchises’ draft selections fails to generate a positive rate
of investment return. This qualitative, phenomenological study examined how 13 veteran,
professional baseball scouts define player attributes and make decisions to identify or eliminate
prospects. My analysis of participants’ in-depth, reflexive interviews employed the theoretical
lens of reflective knowledge (Schon, 1983), talent development (Bloom, 1985; Csikszentmihalyi,
Rathunde, and Whalen, 1993), and performance expertise (Ericsson, 1993; 1996; 1998; 2007,
June; 2009). My findings outlined a three-stage talent identification model and uncovered three
trends found within professional baseball scouts’ talent identification mindsets and prospect
decision-making. First, scouts’ dispositional mindset influences comparative recall and visual
knowledge. Second, the makeup traits of competitive adaptability, extra effort, instinct and
intellect are highly valued. Third, guess, gut, and instinct integrated with visual knowledge and
valued makeup traits direct scouts’ player selection decisions. These outcomes clarify the
sources of scouts’ talent identification knowledge, their preferred prospect attributes, and their
player selection tendencies. In response to these findings, I recommended six benchmarks that
frame the cognitive fundamentals of effective baseball scouting. These fundamentals provide a
framework directed toward increasing MLB franchises’ net yield for successful Major League
player identification, selection, and development.
Key Words: professional baseball scout, talent identification, performance expertise, intuition,
repertoire, visual knowledge
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
This study concerns the player attributes professional baseball scouts utilize when they
make decisions to identify or eliminate Major League prospects. My career history spans 34
years in collegiate athletics, and my personal experiences as a former NCAA Division I baseball
coach and player fueled my interest in this topic. For 17 years I scouted the Mid-Atlantic region
as both an assistant coach and a head coach, and for 27 years I directed an instructional showcase
camp for college and professional baseball prospects. Along the way, I coached 35 former
players who received the call to play professionally and four advanced to the Major Leagues.
Although my career in baseball is lengthy, coaching over 800 collegiate games and directing
nearly 50 showcase camps, I continue to question why defining baseball talent and forecasting a
prospect’s potential to become an expert performer proves so difficult to discern.
Over a period of 13 years, I led two collegiate baseball programs that had no
championship history while scouting with scholarship pools one-fourth the equivalent of many of
my competitors. My programs did not initially have the reputations or resources of my in-state
and conference opponents, but I needed to identify and sign prospects with the potential to
become great college players and elevate team success to new heights. These challenges
prompted me to re-evaluate my talent identification schemes and style of play so I could sign
niche players for less scholarship aid while successfully competing against established programs.
This experience, much like my playing career, pushed me to look deeper into the player
attributes that lead to expert baseball performance.
My history as an aspiring professional baseball player began in Little League and
continued through college. I made my college team through a walk-on tryout (i.e. for nonrecruited players), and I became a four-year starter, batting champion, and scholarship player on
1

a perennial losing team. After graduation I played briefly oversees and later participated in a
1984 U.S. Olympic team tryout as a third baseman (the position I played in high school and
college). In that tryout my radar gun readings reached 90 mph, and I subsequently received
personal pitching tryouts with the Cincinnati Reds and the Milwaukee Brewers, reaching Major
League average velocity in both auditions. Although I did not play a day of professional
baseball, later reflections about my playing career taught me that years of intense practice
increased the speed and power ratings of my throwing arm to Major League average; however, I
failed to fully recognize the value of playing free of expectations and trusting my training until
after I completed my playing career.
Speed and power measurements are visible and easily gauged by radar guns, stop
watches, and home runs, and my scouting experiences enlightened me to how safe and easy it is
to become infatuated with these quantifiable assessments compared to making a focused effort to
investigate a prospect’s baseball instincts and mindset. This mindset might include a prospect’s
self-confidence, game intelligence, commitment to focused training, willingness to accept
performance feedback, and ability to maintain composure and make adjustments in a game laden
with low percentages of success. When presented with precise measures of physical speed and
power, how do professional baseball scouts define and what value do they place on subjective
evaluations of a prospect’s mindset? Because professional baseball scouts spend extensive time
making field observations and notes - and observation is a component of visual knowledge - I
wonder how scouts make meaning of what they see and how they forecast potential.
My study focuses on discovering how professional scouts define their tastes for talent
with the goal of mapping how scouts make decisions when identifying potential in Major League
prospects. In effect, how does a scout’s mindset interpret the mindset of a Major League
2

prospect? I plan to chronicle the decision-making processes of professional baseball scouts to
uncover how they define talent and potential when identifying and eliminating prospective Major
League players.
Problem Statement, Purpose and Significance
As human beings we crave certainty, and nearly every business and organization operates
with in-house rules. The “in-house” rules of professional baseball are referred to as “The Book,”
a term used to represent the game’s historical rules of thumb, and it serves as an anecdotal guide
outlining how the game should be played and who is best equipped to play it well. The
managerial, scouting, and instructional leadership within each Major League franchise also
subscribe to organizational philosophies regarding the factors that influence on-field success, and
one accepted belief across all Major League Baseball organizations is the importance of the First
Year Player Draft (Sabino, 2009).
Initiated in 1965, the First Year Player Draft provides all 30 Major League franchises
with the opportunity to choose new players over 50 selection rounds that occur in reverse order
of the previous season’s winning percentages. To prepare for this annual event, each Major
League franchise employs a cadre of area scouts (i.e. to identify baseball talent and potential
within a specific geographical footprint); cross-checkers (i.e. scouts who evaluate area scouts’
top ranked prospects and make comparisons across geographical regions); a scouting director
(i.e. to lead and coordinate the organization’s scouting operations); and, a general manager, who,
in collaboration with the scouting department, determines the franchise’s draft selections and
new player salary budgets.
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Professional scouts’ ability to identify baseball talent and potential directly impacts the
organization’s long-term success at the Major League level. Specifically, the First Year Player
Draft features these critical realities: (a) 90% of all draft selections who progress to the Major
Leagues do so after five years or less of additional talent development in the minor leagues
(O’Kennedy, 2013); (b) following lengthy minor league development apprenticeships, in the first
ten rounds of the annual draft MLB organizations average only one player advancing to the
Major Leagues (Burger & Walters, 2009); (c) the performance productivity of most draft picks
fail to generate a positive rate of return on salary investment (Burger & Walters, 2009); and, (d)
approximately one of six draft selections will play in at least one Major League game (Carfagna,
Farrell, & Hazen, 2006; Eddy, 2013), while only one of 20 will complete at least three Major
League seasons (Eddy, 2013). Specifically, an organization’s yield of Major League talent is
influenced by scouts’ ability to identify prospects who have the potential to develop and become
productive Major League players.
A growing body of research focuses on talent identification as a critical building block
within the process of talent development (Armstrong, 2012; Gee, Marshall, & King, 2010;
Wiseman, Bracken, Horton, & Weir, 2014). However, talent identification in sport resists a
narrow or simple definition. The concept of talent identification is complex (Durand-Bush &
Salmela, 2001; Tranckle & Cushion, 2006), elusive (Koz, Fraser-Thomas, & Baker, 2012), static
and unclear (Abbott & Collins, 2004), and lacks a shared terminology (Christensen, 2009), a
standardized working definition (Abbott & Collins, 2004; Durand-Bush & Salmela, 2001; Howe,
Davidson, & Sloboda, 1998; Regnier, Salmela, & Russell, 1993; Tranckle & Cushion, 2006;
Vaeyens, Lenoir, Williams & Philippaerts, 2008), and an affirmed theoretical framework
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(Byoungoo, 2014; Durand-Bush & Salmela, 2001; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993;
Wiseman et al., 2014).
What are the differences between potential and talent identification, and can experts
accurately forecast potential when numerous definitions of talent exist? Although the construct
of potential is closely related to talent identification, some sectors continue to hold potential at an
arm’s length in deference to time honored beliefs in innate ability (Dweck, 2008; Ericsson, 2007;
Ericsson et al., 1993; Ericsson, Nandagopal, & Roring, 2009). One camp views talent as a
collection of attributes capable of development and growth; whereas, another camp views talent
as a “natural ability” with a fixed performance ceiling. Whether one’s convictions rest with
natural talent, talent development, or some combination of the two, the world of sport universally
accepts the efficacy of talent as a component of expert performance (Dweck, 2008).
Psychological predictors for performance expertise are numerous and include motivation
(Abbott & Collins, 2004; Gee et al., 2010), the motivation to pursue challenge (Ericsson et al.,
1993; Ericsson et al., 2009; Smith & Christensen, 1995), the willingness to embrace hard work
(Christensen, 2009; Ericsson et al., 1993; Johnson, Castillo, Sacks, Cavazos, Edwards, &
Tenebaum, 2008), deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993; Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson et al.,
2009), “capacity to develop” (Abbott & Collins, 2004, p. 398), confidence (Gee et al., 2010;
Smith & Christensen, 1995), and game intelligence (Christensen, 2009). Talent is a critical
commodity, and the results of my study may shed light on the attributes professional scouts
define and identify as they make decisions regarding the Major League potential of baseball
prospects.
The competitive balance of Major League Baseball continues to rise (Horowitz, 1997),
and in the business of competitive sport a performer is typically judged to be either an asset or a
5

liability. Major League Baseball is an $8 billion industry (Gordon, 2014) comprised of 750
Major League and 6,000 minor league (ThePostGame, October 23, 2014) roster spots for
individual players. The primary input for long-term success at the Major League level is the
consistent infusion of talented players into an organization’s developmental pipeline (Bradbury,
2007), and the object of effective scouting is to make good decisions (Rosenthal, 2002). Annual
minor league operational costs can exceed $25,000,000 (Carfagna et al., 2006), and after three
years of Major League service a player is eligible for salary arbitration (Carfagna et al., 2006),
after six years free agency (Caporale & Collier, 2013), and the average salary for a 2015 Major
League player is nearly $4.25 million (Petchesky, 2015).
Clearly the search for Major League talent includes high player development costs, low
odds of advancement to the Major Leagues, and all within a narrow timeline for productive
service prior to free agency eligibility. Scouts do not talk about misses or why draft selections,
assumedly capable of advancing to the Major Leagues, did not make it. This study is important
because it attempts to understand the player talents and attributes fundamental to the
development of baseball expertise. The First Year Player Draft is a decision-making process that
hinges on the values scouts and organizations place on physical talent, psychological attributes,
and potential, and increasing an organization’s yield of Major League players positions the
franchise for long-term competitive and financial success.
Research Question
How do professional baseball scouts define player attributes and make decisions to
identify or eliminate Major League prospects?
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Definition of Terms
Actions. “Actions, refer, literally, to how a player’s body works” (Winston, p. 56).
Area Scout. An area scout is assigned a defined geographical territory and charged with
conducting comprehensive baseball prospect identification and projection within that area
(Kerrane, 1999; Story, 2000; Winegardner, 1990). Tony Lucadello, the area scout who signed
the most Major League players in recorded history, stated that being an area scout “’only
amounts to this: I found them. That’s what I’m paid to do’” (as cited in Winegarder, 1990, p.
28).
Bad Makeup. A general catchphrase used by professional baseball scouts that refers to a range
of prospect problems (e.g. crime, conduct, character, core values, confidence, et al.). Lewis
(2004) defined bad makeup as meaning, “’the kid’s got problems we can’t afford to solve’” (p.
25).
Bird Dog Scout. A part-time or commission scout mentored by and answering to an area scout
to provide prospect identification “coverage” for large cities and/or regions within an area
scout’s territory. Bird dog scouts expand a scout’s evaluation network and provide vital
reconnaissance in the coverage of large areas (Winegardner, 1990). “’The longer you scout, the
more contacts you have, the smarter you get’” (Jocko Collins, veteran MLB and NBA scout, as
cited in Kerrane, 1999, p. 280).
Cross-Checker. A cross-checker scout is charged with evaluating an area scout’s top-rated
prospects and comparing these prospects to top-rated prospects across other areas, nationwide,
and within an organization’s minor league farm system (Kerrane, 1999).
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Face. The concept of seeing within the mind and heart of a baseball player. “…I never used to
sign a boy unless I could look in his face and see what I wanted to see: drive, determination,
maturity, whatever.” (Kerrane, p. 124)
Farm System. Major League Baseball’s (MLB) talent development system of independentlycontracted community-based teams that are comprised of players and coaching staffs salaried by
a MLB franchise. A franchise’s minor league affiliates compete at the Rookie, A, AA, and AAA
levels, and these stepwise classifications reflect increasing levels of player performance
expertise. The Player Development Contract (PDC) “…specifies the terms of all affiliations
between major league teams and their minor league farm clubs….” (Weiler & Roberts, p. 147).
Branch Rickey is acknowledged for advancing the farm system as a cost-containment measure
(Monteleone, 1995, p. 62), and the 2015 average salary for single-A players averaged
approximately $6,250 (ThePostGame, 2014).
Five Tools (Position Player). Hitting for average; hitting for power; fielding; running speed; and
throwing (Kerrane, 1999; Manuel, 2015; Rymer, 2013; Shanks, 2005; Story, 2000).
Five Tools (Pitcher). Delivery and mechanics; fastball velocity and movement; breaking ball;
change-up; and control (Kerrane, 1999; Manuel, 2015; Rymer, 2013; Shanks, 2005; Story,
2000).
Future Grade. Major League franchises require scouts to forecast a future numerical grade for
the five tools evaluated in position players and the five tools evaluated in pitchers. Adding the
sum of the future grades for all five tools and dividing by five equals the Overall Future Potential
(OFP) (Manuel, 2015; Story, p. 57). A baseball prospect’s OFP is regarded as being the most
important factor in composing organizational draft lists (Story, p. 51).
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Frame of Reference (Comparison). The practice of comparing an amateur prospect’s tools to
the tools of past or present day Major League players. Story (2000) stated, “Drawing
comparisons between current and past ballplayers with similar abilities, body type and mental
makeup offers invaluable insight” (p. 28).
Instincts. A baseball player’s ability to “read” (i.e. see and understand) swings, pitches, game
situations, hops, baseball trajectories, and a variety of other baseball movements and game
strategies. To study baseball is to analyze instinct within a game of failure. “Baseball instincts
are the result of practice and game experience….” (Story, 2000, p. 156).
Major League Scouting Bureau (MLSB). Serving 17 subscribing MLB franchises in its first
year (1974) and designed to pool scouting resources as a cost-containment measure, the MLSB
established a system of centralized scouting reports with uniform numerical scales for prospects’
present and future grades (Kerrane, 1999; Rickey, 1965; Rymer, 2013).
Movement. Describes the trajectory of a pitcher’s fastball (and variations thereof): i.e. straight
(no movement); run (movement to arm side); sink (downward movement to arm side); cut
(movement away from arm side).
Numerical Grading Scale. Numerical grading scales as a talent identification system emerged
across MLB franchises in the 1970s with the introduction of the Major League Scouting Bureau
(MLSB) (Rymer, 2013). Although subjective individual differences and slight modifications
within MLB franchises exist, present and future grades for prospect tools are ascribed using a 20
to 80 scale based on one’s frame of reference regarding MLB average performance: e.g. 20
(poor); 30 (well below average); 40 (below average); 50 (average); 60 (above average); 70 (well
above average); 80 (outstanding; Rymer, 2013; Story, 2000).

9

Player History. The act of seeing a prospect perform in the field over a longitudinal period of
time while building a sight-based evaluation history of the prospect’s tools and psychological
make-up. Scouts analyze prospects, and each prospect reflects a playing history built from
scenes of purposeful watching, skill evaluation, and comparison – all for the purpose of
forecasting future performance and making decisions.
Position Player. Refers to a non-pitcher in baseball nomenclature, specifically players in the
positions of first baseman, second baseman, third baseman, shortstop, left fielder, center fielder,
right fielder, or catcher.
Present Grade. Major League franchises require scouts to forecast a present numerical grade for
the five tools evaluated in position players and pitchers. Adding the sum of the present grades for
all five tools and dividing by five equals the prospect’s overall present grade (Story, 2000).
Prospect v. Suspect. For the scout focused on physical attributes, this dilemma refers to the act
of inferring that a good athlete and/or athletic body is or will become a good, instinctive baseball
player (Story, 2000, p. 154). Conversely, for the scout focused on refined baseball tools and
instincts, this pertains to the assumption that a fundamentally sound player will continue to
develop the necessary speed and quickness of a Major League performer (Story, 2000, pp. 1556).
Safe Pic.: The concept of drafting players with good “signability” assessments and median-talent
projections (Story, 2000). “’Safe’ players might play in the big leagues but they won’t make
your team significantly better” (Story, 2000, p. 124).
Showcase Player. Today’s American baseball industry features a commercial market laden with
prospect evaluation (i.e. showcase) camps specifically designed for high school age players. The
10

“showcase player” is a label ascribed to those players who frequent prospect camps, and as a
result become defined by scouts as “’…not competing and playing the game; they’re competing
to show their skill level’” (Henninger, 2013, p. 60). Carfagna et al. (2006) stated, “Because a
showcase provides such a brief glimpse, an observer cannot measure the team concept." (p. 707).
Signability. Defined as the odds and/or conditions under which a scout projects that a draft pick
will sign a contract (Story, 2000). Specifically, “Scouts must find out if a player, once drafted,
will sign, and for how much” (Winegardner, 1990, p. 27).
Tendency. Baseball players demonstrate an inclination to perform in predictable ways, and
scouts attempt to interpret these tendencies (e.g. a “running” fastball; a consistent pitching
delivery; getting good “jumps” when fielding fly balls and/or ground balls). Will (1990) stated
the concept of tendency is “The most important and reoccurring word in the language of
thoughtful baseball people….” (p. 7). Lewis (2004) described three core tendencies of
professional baseball scouts: (1) the tendency to generalize evaluations by making comparisons
to one’s personal playing experiences; (2) the tendency to allow a prospect’s most recent
performance to influence decision-making; and, (3) the tendency to over-focus on sight-based
evaluations.
Tryout Camps. Endorsed and embraced by Branch Rickey (Monteleone, 1995), Major League
organizations traditionally conduct tryout camps as a method to assist with mass coverage of a
geographical territory and to identify prospects early in their playing careers (Story, 2000).
Rickey prescribed that tryout camps should include individual evaluations of players’ running
speed, arm strength, hitting power, and pitching command (Monteleone, 1995).
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Uniform Scout’s Contract, Clause 3(b). “The employee pledges to maintain the confidentiality
of all scouting information which he acquires hereunder, and to preserve such information for the
exclusive benefit of the Club” (Kerrane, 1999, p. 9).
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
I conducted a review of literature to summarize the available studies investigating
professional baseball scouts, their views of and methods for talent identification (TI), and for
forecasting future performance. In conducting my review, I employed the following search
terms: Professional baseball scouts, talent scouts, talent identification, baseball expertise,
baseball talent, professional baseball player attributes, Major League Baseball Draft, and
professional baseball scout decision-making. I accessed the following data bases (Academic
Search Premier, Oasis, Pub Med, Pro Quest, Psych Info, and Sport Discus), and I reviewed 53
peer-reviewed studies and reviews, 20 books, 4 unpublished dissertations, and 59 articles.
Because I found few studies directly related to professional baseball scouts, I expanded
my research to include talent identification, talent development, and expert performance in other
domains, other sports (e.g. basketball, gymnastics, hockey, soccer, swimming, tennis), and
within other countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, Dominican Republic, England, Germany, Korea).
I organized my review findings into the following categories: (a) evolution and history of
professional baseball scouts; (b) baseball talents, tools, and attributes; and (c) tastes for talent in
sport.
Evolution and History of Professional Baseball Scouts
Professional baseball scouting evolved over the past 125 years through a series of stages
influenced by the game’s changing economies and player acquisition methods (Kerrane, 1999;
Weiler & Roberts, 1998). Kerrane (1999) described the initial period as “The Bird Dog Era (? –
1919),” a time when playing careers began by signing with an independent minor league team,
and advancement to higher levels of competition hinged on good performance and word of

13

mouth. Full-time scouts did not exist during this period, and Major League owners assembled
their talent by purchasing the contracts of independent minor league players. Reluctant to assign
purchasing rights to scouts in the field, Major League owners relied on a network of friends and
former players to serve as commission scouts (bird dogs) and to point them in the direction of
potential prospects. Branch Rickey, former University of Michigan head baseball coach (19101913), served as an early 20th century bird dog scout for the St. Louis Browns (Kerrane, 1999).
Following World War I, then St. Louis Cardinals General Manager, Branch Rickey,
created a Major League franchise-owned “farm system” of minor league teams to save money
(Monteleone, 1995). Other Major League owners eventually followed Rickey’s lead, and this
transformation effectively eliminated the talent pool and profit margins for independent minor
league teams. Independent minor league teams developed players and sold them for profit.
Whereas, a well-run farm system economically positioned Major League organizations to scout,
sign, develop, and stockpile players under reserve for the purposes of “calling up” players to the
Major Leagues, selling players to other organizations for profit, and/or making trades for new
players (Kerrane, 1999). Professional baseball requires a profit margin to sustain the business of
organized competition, and the farm system proved to be both a cost-saving and a revenue
generating venture (Kerrane, 1999; Rickey, 1965).
The development of franchised farm systems combined with Rickey’s “principle of
quality out of quantity” (as cited in Kerrane, 1999, p. 24) also triggered the development of open
tryout camps (Monteleone, 1995), a movement toward signing large numbers of players, the
expansion of scouting departments, and a new commitment to fundamental teaching and player
development (Kerrane, 1999). The framework for this business plan pivoted on each
organization’s ability to identify talent, to develop talent, and to advance their prospects up a
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ladder of increasingly competitive levels of minor league competition leading to promotion to
the Major Leagues (Story, 2000). Kerrane (1999) labeled this period as “The Rickey Era (19191946)” (p. 22), describing it as a time when organizations increasingly expanded their ownership
interests in minor league affiliates and hoarded players. This evolution in the business of
baseball created a survival of the fittest culture among professional players (Kerrane, 1999),
because, once under contract, each Major League organization commanded full control of player
compensation and career mobility through the reserve clause (Weiler & Roberts, 1998).
Major League Baseball’s anti-trust exemption (Federal Baseball Club v. National
League, 1922), the only labor mobility exemption in American professional team sport, excluded
players from the protective canopy of free enterprise and operated advantageously for owners
(Staudohar, Lowenthal & Lima, 2006). Introduced in 1887 to safeguard competitive equity and
ownership assets, the reserve system empowered organizations to claim exclusive rights to a
specific number of players, and, once signed by an organization, player mobility occurred in one
of two ways: (a) the sale or trade of a player to another Major League organization; or, (b) the
release of a player from employment (Weiler & Roberts, 1998). Four foundational pillars
framed this system: (a) the institution of a uniform contract for all Major League players; (b) the
authority for each franchise to unilaterally renew a player’s contract at the end of a term and
assign a player’s salary for the subsequent term; (c) player confinement to the franchise holding
their contract; and, (d) specifically outlined conditions regarding player assignment (Weiler &
Roberts, 1998). As a result of MLB’s antitrust exemption, contracted players lacked the freedom
to negotiate employment with other Major League organizations (Staudohar et al., 2006; Weiler
& Roberts, 1998).
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Keri (2006) referred to the periods immediately following World War II as the “Golden
Age (1949-1957)” and the “Expansion Era (1958-1969).” Sparked by the escalation of postWorld War II revenues, the “re-establishment of baseball,” and the restrictions of the reserve
clause, the number of minor league teams continued to increase while the total number of fulltime Major League scouts surged and professional baseball experienced what Kerrane (1999)
described as the “Bonus Era (1946-1965).”
Implemented in 1947 as a measure to curb wealthy Major League franchises from
consistently outbidding their competitors and stockpiling players, the Bonus Rule stipulated that
any player signed to a contract over $4,000 had to remain on that organization’s 25-man Major
League roster for a minimum tenure of two years (Brent, 1996). The Bonus Rule continued until
1950, only to be revised and re-implemented in 1952 by a committee chaired by Branch Rickey.
Major League owners retroactively reversed the Bonus Rule in 1957 as the result of a 1958 vote,
and reintroduced the Bonus Rule once again in 1962 with an amended 25-man roster service
requirement of one year (Treder, 2004).
During this period Major League franchises expanded westward and increased in number
from 16 to 24 (Keri, 2006), the integration of African American players occurred and increased
the available talent pool (Monteleone, 1995), and professional scouts were now charged with
cultivating relationships and developing prospect pipelines as “salesmen” in defined geographic
territories (Kerrane, 1999). Bidding wars also intensified and signing bonuses progressively
increased, prompting several organizations to expand their scouting coverage to economically
underprivileged areas and regions such as the Negro Leagues, the Caribbean, and Latin baseballplaying nations (Kerrane, 1999).
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Professional scouts during this period focused primarily on finding and signing baseball
prospects with physical “tools” (i.e. baseball talents). Scouting reports graded physical talents
with brief word descriptions. The nonphysical attributes “had only their attitudes, habits and
hustle put under the microscope” (Rymer, 2013, p. 4), and these scouting reports summarized
professional potential with a one word response to a short question: “Is player a prospect?
(Rymer, 2013, p. 5). However, the escalation of bidding wars and signing bonuses eventually
ushered in “The Draft Era (1965-Present)” (Kerrane, 1999), removing the Bonus Rule (Treder,
2004), and resulting in revised scouting methods and reports (Rymer, 2013).
The introduction of the First Year Player Draft in 1965 (also known as the Rule 4 draft)
provided Major League organizations with the opportunity to select new high school, junior
college, and 4-year college players in reverse order of the previous season’s winning percentages
(Weiler & Roberts, 1998). Outspoken and a man of paradox (Monteleone, 1995), Branch Rickey
campaigned for a Major League amateur draft that “equalized talent” and eliminated “bonus
bidding” (Rickey, 1965; Staudohar et al., 2006). In Rickey’s view (1965), signing bonuses
disrupted the competitive balance and threatened the strength and the future of the Major League
product. In Kerrane’s (1999) interpretation, “the owners wanted a structure to discourage their
own spending in a market that was too open” (p. 184). Ironically, four wealthy Major League
franchises lobbied against the creation of the draft at the 1964 Major League Winter Meetings,
with only one eventually voting against – the St. Louis Cardinals, formerly led by Branch Rickey
(Durso, 1964). As a result, the draft initially reduced signing bonuses by eliminating bargaining
leverage and bidding wars among Major League organizations (Kerrane, 1999), and the rights
for ownership of newly drafted players occurred in one of two ways: (1) Contractually signed;
or, (2) unsigned and under reserve (Weiler & Roberts, 1998).
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The First Year Player Draft originally included three annual drafts: (1) January, for
December high school and junior college graduates; (2) June, for high school, junior college, and
4-year college players; and, (3) August, for those players undrafted in January and June and
completing their amateur summer seasons (Koppett, 1965). The August draft ceased after 1967
and the January draft in 1987 (MLB Draft History) Despite the first selection of the inaugural
June First Year Player Draft being from a 4-year college (Rick Monday, Arizona State
University), the five June drafts from 1967 to 1971 only included seven collegiate draft picks.
However, this trend reversed over the subsequent six drafts, and in 1978 the majority of June
draft selections originated from the collegiate ranks and continues today (Spurr, 2000; Staudohar
et al., 2006). Today, the following conditions determine an amateur player’s eligibility for the
MLB First Year Player Draft: (a) must be a resident of the U.S. or a U.S. territory; (b) never
before signed to a major or minor league contract; (c) a high school graduate who never attended
college; (d) a 4-year college student in his junior year or 21 years of age; (e) a junior college
student (MLB First-Year Player Draft).
The onset of the First Year Player Draft also triggered increased sophistication and rigor
in scouting reports (Rymer, 2013), and, in Kerrane’s (1999) view, the draft created a “greater
psychological distance” between scouts and prospects because “a scout’s job now would be to
give advice without making decisions” (p. 36). Prior to the draft, Major League organizations
operated with simple, qualitative scouting reports, and scouts enjoyed great independence. Predraft scouting resembled window shopping on pay day: If a scout saw a high performing
amateur player, with front office approval, he simply filled in the contractual blanks and signed
the young prospect (Rymer, 2013; Winegardner, 1990). However, as the Draft Era unfolded,
franchises began to require quantitative measurements of physical “tools” and expanded
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reporting expectations for intangible attributes (Rymer, 2013). At the same time “competition
among scouts” dissipated across Major League organizations because the draft eliminated the
open market and heightened selectivity (Kerrane, 1999, p. 36). In effect, scouts became
recommending buyers who did not begin the process of selling a prospect on the merits of their
franchise and its’ player development system until after the draft (Kerrane, 1999). Staudohar et
al. (2006) described the draft as anticompetitive and restrictive, and Kerrane (1999) quoted
former Philadelphia Phillies Scouting Director, Paul Owens, who criticized the First Year Player
Draft, “’the draft rewards mediocrity. It stifles initiative in scouting’” (p. 184).
Prior to his death in December 1965, Branch Rickey campaigned for what he termed
“pooled scouting,” making the case for transparent, dependable, exhaustive, and standardized
scouting reports across all Major League organizations to foster equal opportunity and yield
owners savings in excess of 90 percent (Rickey, 1965). Rickey (1965) believed that “close
competition is the lifeblood of any sport,” and he identified “equalizing the teams” as
professional baseball’s key complication during that time period (p. 199). Rickey (1965)
presented “pooled scouting” as a formula for reducing and/or eliminating geographic scouts
across all Major League franchises in exchange for “nonpartisan institutionalized scouts” (p.
200) commissioned to identify prospects and supply comprehensive scouting reports to all MLB
organizations. Characterizing pre-draft scouts as salesmen who operated independently,
Rickey’s (1965) proposal for “pooled scouting” integrated the “expert information of no less
than three high-class scouts on practically every prospective player” (p. 200).
Kerrane (1999) characterized pre-draft scouting as oral, mental, and filled with personal
freedom; on the other hand, he described post-draft scouting as bureaucratic and laden with overthe-shoulder cross-checking. Pre-draft scouts worked independently, identifying prospects to
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make a “hire;” whereas, the Draft Era regulated an organization’s number of “hires” (i.e. draft
selections) and the timeline in which they are made (Kerrane, 1999). As a result, the draft
intensified the organizational importance for comparing one prospect against others nationwide,
giving birth to the role of cross-checkers (Kerrane, 1999). Cross-checkers scout area scouts.
Specifically, cross-checkers evaluate the prospects area scouts identify to provide scouting
directors and general managers with “centralized comparative judgment prior to each draft”
(Kerrane, 1999, p. 170). Kerrane (1999) defined cross-checking as “an exercise in continuous
comparative judgment” (p. 172), and, quoting the Philadelphia Phillies’ Scouting Manual, he
summarized the draft’s net effect as a newfound awareness that “scouting is no longer an
individual accomplishment” (p. 170).
In 1974 Rickey’s concept of “pooled scouting” came to realization in the form of the
Major League Scouting Bureau (MLSB), as 17 franchises funded the launch of the MLSB with
individual annual payments of $120,000. The introduction of the MLSB also resulted in the
termination of nearly 250 full-time scouts as a cost-containment initiative, and it marked a
turning point in the self-perceptions of professional baseball scouts and the talent identification
business plans of Major League franchises (Kerrane, 1999). Kerrane (1999) claimed the
homogeneity and anonymity associated with the MLSB clouded the self-images of veteran
professional baseball scouts, and it served as a line of demarcation separating Major League
franchises’ scouting philosophies across a continuum: spanning from the economy-minded
organizations with few to no scouts, and extending to organizations not subscribing to the MLSB
and continuing to operate with robust scouting departments.
The First Year Player Draft and the MLSB introduced two transformative changes in
professional baseball scouting: (a) the projection of “signability” (Story, 2000); and, (b) a
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uniform scouting report (Rymer, 2013). Signability for a professional scout is defined as the
odds, terms, and conditions under which a scout projects that a draft pick will sign a contract
(Story, 2000). Although the conceptual design of the First Year Player Draft ensures parity in
player selection, it does not balance every organization’s ability to supply competitive signing
bonuses, and this budgetary reality influences and reconfigures draft order selection. For
example, highly rated prospects with low signability are bypassed (or chosen in later rounds),
and lesser rated prospects with high signability (i.e. safe picks) are drafted earlier (Story, 2000).
Rymer’s (2013) document analysis of scouting reports during this period described
signability as a prospect’s “probability of signing” (p. 9) across a three-point Likert scale that
also included “spaces for recommended signing bonus and expected signing bonus” (p. 9). Not
wanting to waste valuable draft selections, organizations hold scouts accountable for projecting
toughness and signability before the draft (Kerrane, 1999; Story, 2000). In addition, the creation
of the MLSB across 17 MLB subscribers paved the way for uniformity in scouting reports,
standardizing a 20-80 numerical scale for five tools across both pitchers and position players
(Rymer, 2013). Perhaps more importantly, these reports required quantitative grades for both
present and future abilities. However, Kerrane’s (1999) investigative analysis questioned the
value of the MLSB, stating it “symbolized anonymity, uniformity, and caution” (p. 280). In
1983 MLSB membership became a requirement for all Major League franchises, and, for some
organizations, MLSB scouting reports only served as a “nationwide bird-dog service” (Kerrane,
1999, p. 335).
Keri (2006) labeled the period (1970-1976) following the introduction of the First Year
Player Draft as the “Dynasty Era.” This timeline featured the championship dominance of the
Reds, Athletics, and Orioles, winners of nine league pennants and six World Series, prior to the
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beginning of free agency in 1977. In the midst of the Dynasty Era, Los Angeles Dodgers and
Montreal Expos pitchers, Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally in 1974 declined to sign
contract renewals with their teams, choosing instead to play the 1975 season under the Option
Clause (Weiler & Roberts, 1998). Specifically, Paragraph 10(c) of the Uniform Player Contract
provided MLB organizations with the “right to renew the old contract ‘on the same terms’”
(exception: minimum salary must equal 75% of the previous year; Weiler & Roberts, p. 241).
This grievance (National & American League Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major
League Baseball Players Association) exposed differing views between owners and players
regarding the Option and Reserve Clauses, and the issue proceeded to labor arbitration in an
effort to answer the following question: When a MLB franchise renews a player contract under
Paragraph 10(c), is the option clause perpetual or does it expire after one year thereby allowing
MLB players to become free agents who are then permitted to negotiate employment with any
MLB franchise (Weiler & Roberts, 1998)? In the end, Arbitrator Seitz upheld the grievance,
paving the way for free agency via the Option Clause. In 1976, following a labor stoppage,
MLB owners and the Major League Baseball Players’ Association (MLBPA) reached a new
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that allowed salary arbitration in years three through six
of Major League service and free agency thereafter (Weiler & Roberts, 1998).
Player identification (i.e. scouting) and development (i.e. farm system) methods and
expenses in Major League Baseball are different than and far exceed those of the National
Football League (NFL) and the National Basketball Association (NBA) (Baseball Examiner;
Kerrane, 1999). For example, nearly 100% of all NFL and NBA first round draft picks play in
their respective leagues, whereas less than two of three MLB first round selections compete in
the Major Leagues (Spurr, 2000). The introduction of the MLB First Year Player Draft also
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introduced a philosophical shift in professional baseball scouting. Specifically, scouting moved
from Rickey’s survival of the fittest, “quality out of quantity” (Kerrane, 1999, p. 24) approach to
player procurement in an open market, to a “quality only” (Kerrane, 1999, p. 143) disposition in
a landscape where the cumulative salaries of franchises’ 25-man Major League rosters now
exceeded the combined costs of its farm system, draft bonuses, and scouting departments
(Kerrane, 1999). In the past, “Rickey’s tryout camps encouraged the signing of marginal players
who might develop slowly” (Kerrane, 1999, p. 232), but the evolution of the draft, the creation of
the MLSB, and the onset of free agency made it too expensive to run farm systems in the old
Rickey-way, thereby setting the stage for the modern era of professional baseball scouting
(Kerrane, 1999).
Rymer (2013) described the modern era (1990s to Today) of professional baseball
scouting as “Got Everything Covered” (p. 11). Rymer’s (2013) document analysis of this
period’s scouting reports illustrated: (a) the extensive quantification of a prospect’s five tools
and psychological make-up on a 20-80 scale; (b) a qualitative description of the prospect from
the scout’s perspective; (c) a biographical sketch of the prospect’s background information; (d)
projections of the prospect’s future Major League production; and, for some organizations’
reports, (e) opportunities to share “Scout’s intuition” (p. 12). Gone were simple qualitative
scouting reports with one word responses, and Kerrane (1999) described today’s professional
baseball scouting as a time when “pro experience isn’t necessary anymore. What’s more
important is being analytical, organized, mobile, able to do a lot of reporting” (p. 255). In a
phrase, complexity and measurement replaced simplicity and intuition in the high stakes business
of professional baseball talent identification.
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Baseball Talents, Tools, and Attributes
“The Book” represents baseball’s anecdotal guide for how the game should be played and
who is best equipped to play it well, and as one who played and coached college baseball for 31
years, my experiences and scouting relationships exposed me to different precepts of The Book.
However, Branch Rickey’s Little Blue Book (Monteleone, 1995), a collection of his personal
papers, outlined the most prevalent scouting maxims during the early decades of professional
baseball.
Rickey spent 42 years (1913-1955) as a Major League manager and general manager
(Monteleone, 1995), and “Rickey men were trained in scouting by the master himself, and they
still subscribe to his theories of pitching, hitting, and the primacy of speed” (Kerrane, 1999, p.
95). Rickey stated “there are only three fundamental things that scouts should take a look at
when they’re judging players, the arm, the legs, the power” (Monteleone, 1995, p. 60), and he
often referred to a fourth attribute for prospective Major League players: A player’s love for
playing the game (Rickey, 1965). Compared to Major League players, Rickey (1965)
maintained that the minor leagues are laden with a greater wealth of power hitting, running and
throwing speed, and he hypothesized “aptitudes, attitudes, and effort, all capped by desire, may
count as much as differences in physical abilities” (p. 85).
The Arm
Baseball (and softball) is unique among American team sports because the defense
maintains control of the ball. A pitcher’s arm delivers the ball to opposing hitters, and, as a
result, this distinction elevates the primacy of good pitching for overall baseball team success.
Compared to assessing defensive players and hitters, Carfagna et al. (2006) described pitchers as
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the easiest prospects to evaluate in one performance, and Rickey (1965) classified pitching
prospects in three categories: (a) pitchers with “stuff;” (b) pitchers with expert control and
change of speed; and, (c) a combination of one and two. Rickey (1965) defined “stuff” as
velocity that overpowers hitters and as a result does not require pinpoint command (i.e. control).
On the other hand, Rickey identified control as the chief standard for pitching greatness, and he
theorized that a lack of pinpoint command signified an absence of mental concentration
(Monteleone, 1995).
Rickey’s (Monteleone, 1995; Rickey, 1965) most-quoted pitching maxims focused on
pitchers’ “feel” and “instinct” for deception and their competitive make-up. Rickey defined the
three elements of every pitch as velocity, direction, and speed of spin, and he loved to teach the
change-up, a pitch of deception (Monteleone, 1995). Thrown with the same body and arm speed
as a pitcher’s fastball, the change-up, thrown correctly, travels 10-12 miles per hour slower than
a pitcher’s average fastball (Story, 2000). As a result, an effective change-up disrupts a hitter’s
timing, balance, and power because the hitter swings at what he “thinks” he sees (Monteleone,
1995; Story, 2000). Rickey preached the ethics of pitching deception and stated “we fool him –
that’s the whole purpose of the game” (Monteleone, 1995, p. 25).
From a scouting perspective, Rickey admitted that change of speed pitchers (i.e. “tricky
ones”) are the easiest to dismiss from consideration as Major League prospects (Monteleone,
1995). However, he also asserted that pitchers have an unlimited capacity to adjust speeds and
add new pitches to their repertoires, allowing them to develop their talent and become more
successful – “and you then must admit you made a mistake in your previous judgment”
(Monteleone, 1995, p. 26). Rickey also claimed pitchers will not increase their fastball velocity
over the span of their adult careers; rather, pitchers’ successful improvement hinges on their
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capacity to develop pitch movement and change of speed with control (Monteleone, 1995). On
the other hand, Tony Lucadello, regarded as the most successful area scout of all time, theorized
only pitchers with correct mechanics can increase their velocity over time (as cited in Kerrane,
1999).
When identifying and making final decisions about pitching prospects, Rickey focused on
“control,” believing the ability to consistently hit the catcher’s target and change speeds are
byproducts of a pitcher’s psychological make-up (Monteleone, 1995). Specifically, Rickey had
no tolerance for anger in pitchers, declaring its appearance eroded one’s ability to perform with
pinpoint command (Monteleone, 1995), and he defined control as “’throwing a strike when you
have to’” (p. 29). Rickey did not accept wildness in pitchers (i.e. an inability to consistently
throw strikes), and he hypothesized wildness springs from poor concentration and a lack of
personal commitment to constructive feedback and focused improvement (Monteleone, 1995).
Rickey also theorized a pitcher’s inability to deliver the right pitch at the right time is the result
of a “fear complex” and symptomatic of a pitcher’s lack of experience and/or self-confidence
(Monteleone, 1995). Stated differently, Shanks (2005) defined a pitcher’s most valuable
advantage as the absence of fear when making pitches to hitters.
Rickey defined “character of the delivery” (Monteleone, 1995, p. 35) as the most vital
fundamental for pitching success, and Story (2000) compartmentalized this concept in two parts:
(1) mechanics; and, (2) delivery. For Story (2000) mechanics represented the learned
fundamentals of the pitching motion; whereas, a pitcher’s release point and arm swing comprised
his hereditarily determined delivery. As a scout, Story (2000) identified “durability” as the most
vital attribute for identifying talent in pitching prospects, and he described durability as
comprised of consistent velocity, pitch command, delivery, and mechanics. Consistent with
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Rickey’s viewpoint, Story (2000) emphasized the superiority of pitch command for overall
pitching effectiveness, and he specifically underscored its critical importance for pitchers of
average Major League velocity.
Today’s baseball scouts have the advantage of the radar gun to measure pitch velocity in
real time, and Story (2000) characterized this tool as a great “equalizer.” Specifically, veteran
professional baseball scouts possess extensive prospect memory banks, and as a result they
demonstrate a stronger tendency to evaluate a pitcher’s ability to get hitters to make outs with
less reliance on radar gun results (Story, 2000). On the other hand, Story (2000) described
younger, less experienced professional baseball scouts as more inclined to over-focus on
quantifying pitchers’ velocity because their prospect “memories” are less developed.
The Legs
The radar gun and stopwatch represent the only objective measurement tools for physical
talents in the professional baseball scout’s arsenal, thereby minimizing the prevalence of
subjectivity in the cases of exceptionally fast pitchers and fast runners (Story, 2000). Believing
that hitting alone cannot win, Branch Rickey took personal credit for the presence of running
speed on all of his teams, and he campaigned for the preservation of the stolen base as a vital
baseball strategy (Monteleone, 1995).
Not unlike the change-up, Story (2000) maintained good running speed in an individual
player offsets deficiencies in other offensive and defensive tools while also compensating for
weaknesses in teammates’ running speed. Grove (2001) hypothesized objective talent
identification measures can successfully predict baseball potential, and he experimentally applied
tests of sprint speed, arm strength, and power over multiple trials and compared performance
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results across groups of junior college, NCAA Division I, and minor leagues baseball players.
However, sprint speed results failed to distinguish players between competitive classifications.
To this end, although good running speed is important for baseball position players because it
represents the only physical tool that transfers both to offense and to defense (Monteleone, 1995;
Story, 2000), Story (2000) maintained “speed without baseball instinct doesn’t do much good”
(p. 61).
Rickey claimed getting a good jump in a stolen base attempt is one part genetic and
another part learned instinct (Monteleone, 1995), and Story (2000) contended Major League
organizations experience intense prospect identification pressures regarding running speed.
Specifically, Major League Baseball continues to experience a scarcity of speed because fast
runners in youth sport more often choose to play football or run track, and this reality presents
franchises with draft day decision dilemmas related to selecting fast runners with poor baseball
instincts (Story, 2000). As a result, Story (2000) claimed, because speed is both rare and vital,
Major League franchises are more inclined to exhibit greater patience and extend more minor
league development time to fast runners.
The Power
Branch Rickey (Monteleone, 1995) claimed the chief distinction between Major League
hitters compared to minor league hitters is the maturity and advancement of strike zone
knowledge. Specifically, Rickey maintained MLB hitters have a more refined understanding of
balls and strikes, when to swing, and when not to swing. Making a similar comparison, Story
(2000) asserted the greatest difference between major and minor league hitters is their “ability to
adjust” (pp. 73-74) and, in the absence of an adaptive, competitive, and training mindset, all
strengths of hitting form, power, and bat speed are nullified.
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As the architect of tryout camps, Rickey (1965) required his scouts to focus closely on
hitters in two areas: (1) form; and, (2) power. Rickey (1965) simplified prospect evaluations to
include scouting grades for only these two categories, and he believed a hitter’s courage flowed
from good form and that a hitter’s power is genetically instilled. Paradoxically, Rickey (1965)
proclaimed a stalwart belief in batting practice and instruction, declaring “most players do
improve on batting as time goes on” (p. 111). Story (2000) defined “raw power” as the distance
a player can hit a baseball, and when evaluating power Rickey (1965) held to the conviction that
“power is inborn, and its control and explosive use is instinctive” (p. 111). Although Rickey
(1965) submitted that increasing the consistency of a hitter’s power output is subject to training,
he also declared “you either have power or you don’t have it. It is not acquirable” (p. 111).
As a scout, Story (2000) insisted hitting a baseball is among the most difficult of all sport
skills to master, and he argued projecting a hitter’s ability to become an expert is perhaps the
most complicated talent to identify. Story (2000) identified “competitiveness, natural ability and
hard work” (p. 73) as the critical ingredients for hitting expertise while underscoring the vital
importance of self-confidence. Like Rickey, Story (2000) asserted a fundamental belief in
deliberate, focused batting practice while also theorizing, specific to hitting, “excellent hand
speed and aptitude are natural abilities” (p. 73). To this end, Story (2000) defined power as
directly correlated with a hitter’s ability to generate bat speed through contact with the baseball.
The Fourth Attribute: Love for playing the game
Rickey (1965) tentatively hypothesized aptitude, attitude, effort, and desire “may count as
much” (p. 85) as physical abilities when identifying talent and developing baseball prospects
who can advance to the Major Leagues. Comparatively, Winegardner’s (1990) investigation of
veteran scout Tony Lucadello described scouting as a combination of a baseball prospect’s head,
29

heart, and baseball talent, and Lucadello disclosed the most problematic element of a scout’s
decision-making is “’projecting if a player’s mind is ahead of his body or if his body is ahead of
his mind, and guessing when they’ll get together’” (p. 62).
Lucadello classified professional baseball scouts in four categories: (a) poor; (b) pickers;
(c) performance; and, (d) projectors (Winegardner, 1990). Lucadello also defined himself as a
projector: that is, as a scout who identified prospects by projecting what type of players they will
become in two to three years (Winegardner, 1990). Lucadello believed projection is a scout’s
most important responsibility but that only five percent of professional baseball scouts are
“projectors,” compared to the 85 percent he characterized as “performance based” scouts
(Winegardner, 1990). More definitively, Lucadello viewed performance based scouts as those
exclusively focused on the measurements and results of a prospect’s physical abilities and
performances; whereas, Lucadello described his prospect decision-making process as an
equation: specifically, his decision regarding a prospect’s projection equaled the net sum of the
player’s pluses and minuses (Winegardner, 1990). In contrast, Lucadello defined “pickers” as
scouts who cannot foresee a prospect’s development beyond the discovery of a performance
weakness, even in the presence of identified pluses (Winegardner, 1990).
Story (2000) outlined the non-physical elements of prospect identification as “extras,”
and he stated “the many variables each player presents in the make-up department complicate the
process of deciding” (p. 115). Similarly, in Shanks’ (2005) investigation and analysis of the
Atlanta Braves’ rise to dominance, Roy Clark, Braves’ scouting director from 2000-2009,
insisted “the most difficult thing to define is ‘what is makeup?’” (p. 58). Clark situationally
described “makeup” as the summation of seeing a prospect’s competitive confidence in crucial
game situations, his responses to adversity, and his best and his worst performances over
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multiple observations (Shanks, 2005). Lou Gorman, a veteran MLB general manager and
scouting director for over 30 years, believed “makeup drives great ballplayers” (Shanks, 2005, p.
177), and he listed the ingredients comprised in makeup as toughness, drive, ambition, work
habits, and baseball knowledge and ability. Sustained passion for the game and focused training,
according to Lucadello, are found in “players who keep improving” (Winegardner, 1990, p. 86),
and, for veteran professional baseball scout Al Kubiski, if player development and progression to
the Major Leagues is to occur “’it’s all about makeup’” (Shanks, 2005, p. 211).
The Atlanta Braves won 15 of 16 National League Division Titles from 1991 to 2005,
and Paul Snyder served as a key architect in their successful rise to dominance while performing
in the roles of scouting director, assistant general manager, and director of player development
(Shanks, 2005). Snyder’s scouts and direct reports recalled his persistent talent identification
question, “’which players are going to seek their level?’” (Shanks, 2005, p. 338). Snyder’s
answer to this question focused on the prospect, “’how they handle adversity’,” and seeing
beyond what a player cannot do (p. 338). Snyder maintained “’in order to seek your level you
have to have good makeup’” (Shanks, 2005, p. 338), and he defined one’s “level” as the full
realization of personal potential. Similar to Lucadello, Snyder taught his scouts to see prospects
“’for everything they can do. The positives. It separates you from the industry when you look at
that’” (Shanks, 2005, p. 338). Separation in Snyder’s context described talent discovery beyond
what is immediately evident to the naked eye (Shanks, 2005).
Mentored by Paul Snyder, former Braves’ scout Paul Kohlscheen reflected on Snyder’s
descriptions of prospects’ optimal makeup and realized these depictions closely compared to
Snyder’s personal makeup (Shanks, 2005). In other words, Snyder preferred a makeup
approximating his own. On a deeper level, Michael Lewis (2004), in his account of Oakland A’s
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general manager Billy Beane’s re-engineered approach to baseball talent identification, analyzed
scouts’ biases across three tendencies: (1) the tendency to grade and project prospects through
the lens of one’s personal experience; (2) the tendency to allow a prospect’s most recent
performance to influence a scout’s decision-making; and, (3) the tendency to over-focus on
sight-based prospect evaluations. Thaler and Sunstein’s (2003) response to Lewis’ work
hypothesized the prevalence and influence of the “availability heuristic” in baseball scouts’
decision-making paradigms. Specifically, heuristics function as a rule of thumb, and,
availability, in this context, describes a “reliance on the ease of memory search” (Kahneman,
2011). In effect, while heuristics often serve a powerful and positive role in making quick
predictions, an over-reliance on heuristics in the absence of statistical thought can also result in
“predictable biases” (Kahneman, 2011). Thaler and Sunstein’s (2003) analysis stated “reliable
statistical evidence will outperform the availability heuristic every time” (p. 29), or, in the case
of baseball scouts, intuition is less reliable than the statistical validation of talent identification
when forecasting baseball potential.
Identifying amateur talent and predicting potential are both difficult and financially
critical in professional sport. The NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL all make player selections via a
first-year player draft, and Koz et al. (2012) investigated the statistical correlation between draft
order and player performance over the course of a decade. Koz and colleagues (2012) chose
total games played as a measure of realized potential and identified a linear relationship with
selection round across NFL, NBA, and NHL draft picks. In brief, early round football,
basketball and hockey draft picks played in more games than later round draft picks. However,
MLB draft selections deviated from this trend, yielding no statistically significant differences
between draft round and playing time for pitchers and marginal effects for position players (Koz
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et al., 2012). Koz and colleagues’ (2012) results suggested the presence of ineffective talent
identification and development systems within MLB, and Spurr’s (2000) earlier longitudinal
analysis found “no statistically significant difference between clubs in terms of their ability to
find major league prospects” (p. 66).
MLB organizations generally average two players per First Year Player Draft (i.e. 50
rounds) advancing to major league careers, and this low percentage of productivity prompted
Nyman (2008) to question MLB organizations effectiveness in talent identification and
development. Nyman (2008) doubted MLB’s acute knowledge of the player attributes that foster
performance expertise, and he pointed to MLB’s inability to diagnosis why a high percentage of
assumedly talented minor league players never advance to major league careers. Nyman (2008)
acknowledged an organization’s confidence in prospect decision making is influenced by their
scouts’ depth of player history, and he stated “the actual bottom line for drafting and developing
players is ‘perception of talent’” (p. 10). Extending upon this logic, Nyman (2008) rhetorically
asked, “How does one measure scouting expertise” (p. 18)?
After interviewing scouts across 15 MLB organizations, Kerrane (1999) surmised
scouting intuition is “maybe simply the scanning of images in well-stocked memory banks” (p.
324). Veteran NBA and MLB scout Jocko Collins defined talent identification as “getting a
feeling for a guy” (Kerrane, 1999, p. 295) and then comparing that “feeling” to your visual
recollection of past scouting successes with the understanding you also will make mistakes.
Veteran Baltimore Orioles’ executive, Jim McLaughlin, underscored the importance of scouts’
instinctive talent recognition. Describing the detection of baseball talent, McLaughlin stated a
scout “can’t make the recognition unless he already has some structures in his mind” (Kerrane,
1999, p. 165). Succinctly, Kerrane (1999) explained the essence of baseball scouting as “a
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business of intuitions” (p. 135), and Burger and Walters (2009) stated “scouts often use analogies
linking prospect’s traits to those of established major leaguers” (p. 486).
Lewis (2004) described the Oakland A’s 2001 draft as an “expensive disaster,” and this
result in combination with Oakland’s low payroll and losing records moved general manager
Billy Beane to radically redefine the organization’s philosophical framework for prospect
identification. Frustrated by scouts’ traditional independence, decision-making autonomy, and
shallow scientific methods for prospect identification and projection, Beane limited his scouts’
draft selection power and considered removing all of the franchise’s field scouts in order to
eradicate “being victimized by what we see” (Lewis, 2004, p. 37). Faced with the challenge of
leading a low-payroll organization during a period (1995-2001) when high-payroll teams won
nearly 100 percent all MLB post-season games (Krautman, 2009), Beane recalibrated the
concept of “performance scouting” through the use of statistical analysis (Lewis, 2004).
Beane set aside The Book’s reverence for sight-based scouting customs and intuitions
and searched for ways to identify and sign good players cheaply (Armstrong, 2012, Spring;
Caporale & Collier, 2013; Lewis, 2004; Roberto, 2005). In his review of 20th Century MLB
statistics, Beane’s assistant, Paul DePodesta, identified the positive correlation between team
winning percentage, on-base percentage (OBP), and slugging percentage (SLG) (Lewis, 2004).
In brief, teams that frequently win score the most runs (Keri, 2006). OBP measures a hitter’s
frequency for getting on base “via hit, walk, or hit by pitch” (Keri, 2006, p. 5), or, said
differently, OBP reflects a hitter’s skill, makeup, and instinct for getting on base without making
an out for his team. SLG “measures a player’s power” (Keri, 2006, p. 5) by calculating the
percentage of total bases a batter earns when hitting safely (i.e. an out is not recorded). For
example, a double (two total bases) counts for twice the slugging percentage of a single (one
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total base) divided by the same number of official at bats, and “more bases” ignite more run
production.
Similar to the economic rationales leading to the implementation of the Bonus Rule, the
First Year Player Draft, and the Major League Scouting Bureau, the large bonuses associated
with signing new players pushed Beane to identify “the qualities in a baseball player that the
market undervalues” (Lewis, 2004, p. 292). This search led to the discovery of the
unfashionable and undervalued attributes associated with a “player’s ability to get on base”
(Lewis, 2004, p. 128). Unfashionable in baseball lore, yet business management experts
applauded Beane for questioning MLB’s traditional scouting perspectives and the game’s
misguided habits for measuring offensive productivity (Wolfe, Babiak, Cameron, Quinn, Smart,
Terborg, & Wright, 2008).
For Beane, OBP signaled and substantiated the presence of makeup and baseball instinct.
The writings of baseball statistician Bill James also influenced and challenged Beane’s traditioninfluenced interpretation of offensive baseball and the accuracy of scout projections (Lewis,
2004; Roberto, 2005). James denounced scouts’ reliance on visual talent identification as well as
MLB organizations’ incomplete understanding of which statistics define and maximize offensive
baseball success (Lewis, 2004; Roberto, 2005). For example, baseball purists customarily
defined a walk as a pitcher’s failure to command the strike zone instead of a hitter’s ability to
compete and force pitchers to throw more pitches within the strike zone. Questioning the
rationality of offensive baseball statistics triggered new insights and a shift in Beane’s talent
identification paradigm, and he embraced James’ conviction that scouts “absolutely cannot tell,
by watching, the difference between a .300 hitter and a .275 hitter” (Lewis, 2004, p. 68).
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The Oakland A’s began to view baseball “as a game of skill, not an athletic event”
(Lewis, 2004, p. 150), and Beane grounded his strategy for identifying hitters in OBP statistics.
Specifically, high OBP is the result of the combined discipline and patience of fundamentally
skilled hitters and thereby increases a team’s opportunities for run production by placing more
players on base and forcing opposing pitchers to throw more pitches (Hakes & Sauer, 2006). As
a net effect, this statistical tool realigned the A’s’ talent identification methods and resulted in the
selection of high-performing, affordable, and overlooked hitting prospects who consistently
demonstrated high OBP. In turn, Hakes and Sauer (2006) applied econometric tests and
confirmed Beane’s theory of mispriced baseball tools and the undervaluation of OBP, while
Staudohar and colleagues (2006) stated this application of statistical analysis in draft decisionmaking “diminished the importance of team scouts” (p. 39).
Beane maintained that “a young player is not what he looks like, or what he might
become, but what he has done” (Lewis, 2004, p. 38), and he noted the most difficult aspects of
statistical talent identification for professional scouts are the discomfort and peer scrutiny
associated with drafting a player with an impressive OBP and a far lesser amount of raw
athleticism, size, running or throwing speed. Candidly, Beane’s analysis confirmed that all
shapes and sizes of baseball players are capable of developing the physical skills and the mental
attributes that result in consistently high OBP. Beane stated, “you take a guy high no one else
likes and its uncomfortable” (as cited in Lewis, 2004, p. 3). Lewis (2004) judged this response
to be a byproduct of professional baseball’s tendency to align “itself less as a business and more
as a social club” (p. 287), and he praised Beane for transforming prospects’ lives by discovering
“hidden virtues [that] otherwise might never have been seen” (p. 280).
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For Oakland, the game pivoted around the strike zone and a belief that the greatest
impediment to team run production occurs when a hitter strikes out. Hitters with high OBP
strike out less frequently, command lower salaries (Lewis, 2004), and “OBP and SLG represent
the two essential ingredients of creating offense” (Keri, 2006, p. xxxix). Paralleling Rickey’s
(1965) conviction regarding the efficacy of a hitter’s strike zone knowledge, Oakland’s executive
leadership placed a high value on hitters’ patience, pitch selection, ability to adapt, and absence
of fear when hitting with two strikes (Lewis, 2004). For the A’s, OBP revealed deeper clues
about the “whole” player, and they pondered their origins: i.e. “were they learned skills, or part
of a guy’s character? Nature or nurture?” (Lewis, 2004, p. 172). Instead of answering these
questions, Oakland questioned baseball’s customary sight-based scouting practices, “the
meaning of its statistics” (Lewis, 2004, p. 133), and professional scouts’ tendency for biases and
an over-focus on physical athleticism.
Tastes for Talent
Nature v. Nurture Debate
Talent is a valued commodity, and the perspectives regarding talent identification and
performance expertise are divided across two polar belief systems commonly labeled “nature v.
nurture.” In this dichotomous debate, the first pole (i.e. nature) defines talent as a “natural
ability” with a fixed ceiling of expertise, while the opposite pole (i.e. nurture) views talent as an
inventory of attributes capable of continual development and improvement. In summary, the
nature v. nurture debate considers whether the cause and effect product of expert performance is
the result of natural talent, talent development, or a combination of both, and Simonton (1999)
described the enigma as “practically important as it is theoretically significant” (p. 454).
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Sir Francis Galton’s seminal work, Hereditary Genius (1892/1914), surveyed and
analyzed the generational lineages of 19th Century men of scholarly and political reputation as
well as sporting renown. From his results, Galton (1892/1914) theorized genius (ability) and
physical prowess (sporting talent) are hereditarily “endowed by nature” (p. 2), and even in the
presence of training and learning opportunities performance development has limits. In a phrase,
Galton (1892/1914) submitted noteworthy performers are most frequently the offspring of
eminent bloodlines. In turn, Galton (1892/1914) described peak sporting performance as a
“rigidly determinant quality” (p. 13), and he theorized “there is a definite limit to the muscular
powers of every man, which he cannot by any education or exertion overpass” (p. 13). Deeper
still, Galton (1892/1914) defined natural ability, manifested in expert performance, as “a union
of three separate qualities – intellect, zeal, and power of work” (p. 41).
Although Galton’s theory of inherited talent continues to be embraced, reinforced, and
debated among groups of researchers and practitioners today, a growing body of sport and
educational research is also focused on the triad of talent identification, talent development, and
expert performance (Durand-Bush & Salmela, 2001; Ericsson et al., 1993; Ericsson, 1997;
Ericsson, 2008, June; Ericsson & Lehman, 1996; Ericsson, Roring & Nandagopal, 2007;
Ericsson & Ward, 2007; Howe et al., 1998; Simonton, 1999). From the perspective of talent
development, Howe et al. (1998) argued heritable “giftedness” is likely unfounded due to the
following factors: (a) inadequate supporting evidence; (b) sufficient counter-evidence; (c)
empirical results demonstrating talent development as a result of deliberate practice and training;
(d) evidence substantiating training as a required ingredient in achieving expertise; and, (e)
verification of high-level performances from previously low-performing individuals as a result of
proper training and mindset. On the other hand, Hyllegard, Radlo, and Early (2001) compared
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the nature v. nurture beliefs of 138 collegiate women’s sport coaches. Specifically, Hyllegard et
al. (2001) surveyed collegiate coaches to determine how their perceived value of innate talent
compared to their belief in the developmental effects of deliberate practice when they assess the
source of superior athletic performance. In this study (Hyllegard et al., 2001) coaches
principally attributed athletic achievement as a byproduct of innate talent “followed by intrinsic
motivation and effort” (p. 203). Plainly stated, coaches viewed deliberate practice as secondary
to natural talent when they defined the source of athletic achievement. In sum, whether an
individual’s convictions rest with natural talent, talent development, or a hybrid of the two,
professional scouts continually describe the “cause” or “source” of baseball performance
expertise with phrases and words such as “talent,” “natural ability,” “potential,” “gifted athlete,”
and “you can’t teach that.”
Defining, Identifying, and Probing the Presence of Talent
Although the term is commonly used with varied meanings across many domains,
scientific attempts to conclusively define “talent” resist consensus and acceptance. When
individuals witness exceptional performance, Ericsson (1998) claimed a common societal
tendency is to explain unexplainable expert performances with innate or natural talent
attributions. Stated differently, Simonton (1999) claimed that perception of hereditary natural
talent “is firmly engrained in everyday psychology” (p. 435). Vaeyens et al. (2008) underscored
the lack of agreement regarding “how talent should be defined” and the absence of an “accepted
theoretical framework to guide current practice” (p. 703). Howe and colleagues (1998)
conveyed their desire for an exact definition of talent as well as their belief in the impossibility
of this objective due to “domain-specific” boundaries, all of which require different types and
quantities of traits and skills.
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Howe et al. (1998) also professed references to “innate talent” are fraught with
inexactness, and people who “believe that innate talent exists also assume that early signs of it
can be used to predict future success” (p. 399). From another perspective, Csikszentmihalyi,
Rathunde, and Whalen (1993) claimed “diversity is the built-in creative potential of our species”
(p. 25), and the mysterious distribution of talent “originate[s] with the genes of some ancestor”
(p. 24). However, Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues (1993) also characterized talent as a
developmental phenomenon, instead of an all-or-none byproduct of heredity.
Ericsson and colleagues (1993; 1996; 2007; 2007, June) refuted the Galtonian notion of
heritable talent because science has yet to identify the existence of DNA gene patterns that
confirm the presence of innate ability. Ericsson (1996; 1998) stressed the absence of empirical
links that confirm a relationship between innate ability and the display of expert performance.
Said differently, heritable genetics, with the exceptions of body size and/or height, does not
prove or negate the possibility of developing expert performance in healthy individuals. To this
end, Ericsson (2007) rebutted the “talent account,” defined as the belief that expert performances
“depend on the special biological potential that can be identified in some young children” (Howe
et al., 1998, p. 399), and the concept’s inference that human talent is hereditarily bestowed and
not the result of training and experience (Ericsson, 1998).
In contrast to Ericsson, Freeman (1998) stated random selection combined with practice
never in itself produced an individual of “world-class achievement,” and, without evidence that
innate ability is unnecessary for producing expert performance, the “’talent account’ will remain
in force among researchers” (p. 415). From yet another perspective, Csikszentmihalyi and
colleagues (1993) defined talent not as something comprised of elements only found or observed
in nature; rather, they described talent as a socially constructed stamp of recognition that unfolds
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when good traits with social value are displayed and acknowledged. Although Tranckle and
Cushion (2006) later reinforced this theory and claimed “talent can only be talent and recognized
as such where it is valued” (p. 266), Tesch-Romer (1998) summarily defined talent as “a
powerful myth in the development of expertise” (p. 427). More specifically, Tesch-Romer
(1998) questioned the existence of innate talent and stated “’attributed talent’ resides only in the
minds of the observers” (p. 427).
Describing talent as an inferred construct, Howe et al. (1998) cautioned that signs of
youthful ability do not imply or confirm the presence of innate talent when found in
environments where learning or practice opportunities exist. Howe and colleagues (1998)
suggested one’s belief in the nature debate can be a roadblock for uncovering the origins of
talent, and they proposed a standard framework for qualifying talent’s existence. Specifically,
Howe et al. (1998) presented five filters to apply when attempting to empirically qualify the
presence of innate ability (natural talent): (a) it is genetically conveyed; (b) it transmits early
signs of existence; (c) it supports a method to forecast expertise; (d) it exists only in a few
individuals; and, (e) it has unequivocal effects.
Viewing talent identification and development as an integrated and perpetual dynamic,
Regnier et al. (1993) stated the “ultimate goal” of talent identification research is performance
prediction. To this end, empirical attempts to predict sport performance are laden with
methodological limitations because “prediction is first based upon accurate description and
explanation” (Regnier et al., 1993, p. 290). Specifically, Regnier et al. (1993) described “topdown” talent identification research as classical a priori hypothesis testing and “bottom-up”
talent identification research as qualitative investigations focused on uncovering insights and the
“language of the sport performers themselves” (p. 291). Deeper still, Regnier and colleagues
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(1993) advocated for “bottom-up” inquiry in the study of sport talent identification because of
the inherent complexities and reductionist tendencies associated with the quantitative
methodology of “top-down” research. Paralleling this research paradigm preference, Tranckle
and Cushion (2006) espoused a phenomenological approach for defining talent in sport in order
to “explore the essence of human experience by preserving the perspectives of the participants”
(p. 279).
Durand-Bush and Salmela (2001) questioned the accuracy of talent identification
research in light of science’s inability to clearly diagnose the origin of talent and/or its
components. Pankhurst and Collins (2013) also doubted the evidentiary basis of current talent
identification and development systems, and they implied athletic potential is often unrealized or
wasted because of the misuse and/or absence of viable theory applied to daily practice. Citing
low success outcomes for talent identified junior athletes later developing into expert adult
performers, Pankhurst and Collins (2013) stated “the evidence is that current methods of TI
[talent identification] and TD [talent development] do not develop world class performers” (p.
93).
Schneider (1998) registered opposition against models that do not recognize the existence
of innate talent, but he also acknowledged affinitive effects between deliberate practice and
performance expertise. As a result, Schneider (1998) identified “the need for alternative models”
(p. 424), and he called for an integrative construct “that considers both basic abilities/aptitudes
and deliberate practice as determinants of exceptional performance” (p. 424). Conceptually,
Schneider (1998) espoused a talent identification system that distinguishes above average
domain ability while at the same time he professed “noncognitive variables such as commitment,
endurance, concentration or motivation determine peak performance” (p. 424).
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For Weiss and Shanteau (2014) judgment represented the foundational core of talent
identification, and judges, metaphorically, serve as “measuring instruments.” The authors
theorized that improved judgment (e.g. talent identification) correlates with discriminate and
consistent assessment of specific behaviors. In addition, Weiss & Shanteau (2014) disregarded
the notion of experts as outliers and viewed performance expertise along a continuum of
capability. More specifically, Weiss and Shanteau (2014) identified three properties of expert
judgment ( i.e. discrimination; consistency; and, validity), and from these properties developed
the Cochrane-Weiss-Shanteau index (CWS) to calculate “judgmental proficiency.” In
calculating this statistic, discrimination and consistency represent observable measures.
Specifically, discrimination identifies the strength of performance behaviors while consistency
approximates performance “test-retest reliability” (p. 449). Validity, however, represents a
nebulous property because accurate talent assessment hinges on the existence of “ground truth”
and “appropriate information,” both of which are typically unknown and/or ill defined (Weiss &
Shanteau, 2014, p. 449). As a result, although the CWS does not “guarantee accurate judgment”
in talent identification, in the absence of ground truth it is designed to calculate judgment
discrimination and consistency (Weiss & Shanteau, 2014, p. 450).
Tastes for Talent in Sport
Abbott and Collins (2004) highlighted the “essential role of psychology in the ability of
individuals to fulfill their sporting potential” (p. 395), and they appealed to talent scouts and
researchers for the adoption of a “formative as opposed to a summative assessment approach” to
talent identification and development. The authors (Abbott & Collins, 2004) maintained true
potential is easily missed when talent identification fails to recognize the spiraling and adaptive
dynamics of psychological skills in the “conversion of potential into achievement” (p. 396).
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Emphasizing the existing literature’s “insufficient consideration” of psychological factors
and advocating for the “reconceptualization” of talent identification and development as a
dynamic, multidimensional process fueled by the interdependency of mind and body, Abbott and
Collins’ (2004) review argued for reducing the division between the theory and the practice of
talent identification and development. Abbott and Collins’ (2004) integrative model for talent
identification and development focused on the “interplay” between: (a) mind and body
performance determinants; (b) environmental opportunities for training and learning support;
and, (c) “self-regulatory learning strategies/psycho-behaviors” (pp. 399-400). In sum, Abbott
and Collins (2004) identified “capacity to develop” and “psycho-behavioral strategies” as the
missing perspectives and the empirical bridge for understanding the interrelation between
potential and achievement (p. 398).
Abbott and Collins (2002; 2004) targeted the costly mistakes and missed opportunities
associated with limited evaluations (e.g. “one-off”) and/or unidimensional (e.g. height) systems
for talent identification. In addition, Abbott and Collins (2004) promoted movement away from
static predictive models of talent in favor of empirical approaches that investigate the
“psychological determinants” (p. 397) of potential and performance and embrace “change as a
function of time” (p. 396). Time in this context referred to the formative effects of physical
maturity and experience, and static in this frame of reference illustrated the limitations and
implications associated with stationary measurements of performance variables in successful
athletes.
The nexus of Abbott and Collins’ (2002; 2004) case is grounded in the differentiation
between the “determinants of performance and determinants of potential” (2004, p. 405) as well
as their belief in the transformational role of psychological skills in the process of talent
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development. To this end, Abbott and Collins (2004) underscored the synergistic impact of
attitude and ability and stipulated “the motivation to commit high training loads over an extended
period is a (if not ‘the’) crucial determining factor in acquiring and maintaining expertise” (p.
399). Focused on extracting a deeper understanding of performance expertise, Johnson and
colleagues (2008) investigated the phenomenological differences between elite and non-elite
swimmers through the lens of coaches who simultaneously coached both athlete groups. In this
study, coaches identified “commitment and willingness to work hard of their own volition”
(Johnson et al., 2008, p. 424) as attributes that separate elite and non-elite performers, but
coaches also identified the prominent role of innate talent and qualified “it is necessary but not
sufficient” (p. 426).
Although previous efforts to empirically isolate the personality attributes of elite athletes
failed to be conclusive (Friend & LeUnes, 1990; Morris, 2000; Williams & Reilly, 2000), studies
have confirmed that “only psychological factors are able to explain the performance of athletes
who are looking to maintain their success” (Abbott and Collins, 2004, p. 397). For example, in
their investigation of 17 world champion athletes, Kreiner-Phillips and Orlick (1993) reported
declining performance proficiency and failed attempts to repeat as champions when prior
championship performers became results-focused and entangled in perceived and/or external
expectations. On the other hand, prior championship athletes who successfully continued to
repeat as champions positively embraced the process of training and competition with detailed
performance plans, balanced perspectives, a fine focus on task objectives, and a sense of
enjoyment related to the challenge.
In a longitudinal examination of chess players, Howard (2012) investigated the potential
correlation between persistent effort and players’ views regarding innate talent. In this study
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(Howard, 2012), nearly all international master level players surveyed self-defined as entity
theorists. Entity, in this context, characterized a performance perspective that “depends at least
partly on innate ability (the entity), an ability which cannot be altered” (Howard, 2012, p. 95).
However, master chess players’ also self-disclosed their belief in the primacy of innate chess
ability had minimal effect on their “performance and motivation” (Howard, 2012, p. 102). In
contrast to Howard’s (2012) results, MacNamara, Button, and Collins (2010) applied a grounded
theory approach to explore the psychological attributes of seven elite athletes across six sports.
The content analysis of their athlete interviews “de-emphasized the significance of physical
attributes in attaining excellence” (p. 62). Revealingly, MacNamara and colleagues’ (2010)
subjects also self-disclosed a vivid awareness of their physical weaknesses, acknowledged the
superior physical strengths of rival opponents, and conveyed belief in the efficacious role of
psychological attributes leading to expert performance.
In a study designed to determine the predictive power of psychological and physical
skills to forecast professional baseball performance and survival, Smith and Christensen (1995)
investigated 104 minor league players. Smith and Christiansen’s (1995) results revealed four
potentially interdependent dynamics between psychological and physical talents: (1) coping and
physical skills equally explained variance in batting average; (2) physical skills accounted for
less variance in pitchers’ earned run average compared to coping skills; (3) psychological skills
reliably forecasted future professional baseball survival; and, (4) confidence and achievement
motivation proved to be the most consistent psychological performance predictors for baseball
hitters and pitchers. Further substantiating the efficacy of psychological talents in high
performing athletes, Gee and colleagues’ (2010) personality profile analysis longitudinally
tracked the careers 124 NHL draft picks and acknowledged “top performers possess an above
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average competitive disposition, are motivated by challenge and reward, confident in their ability
to succeed, are open to coaching and feedback, and can operate both independently and as part of
a group” (p. 31).
Christensen (2009) explored Danish soccer coaches’ talent identification processes to
diagnose the rationality and the objectivity of their decision-making paradigms.

Similar to

other researchers (Abbott and Collins, 2004; Lewis, 2004; Morris, 2000; Williams & Reilly,
2000), Christensen (2009) stressed the importance of talent identification in limiting missed
opportunities for discovery so “that clubs or national teams do not lose time, money, and prestige
by investing in the ‘wrong’ players” (p. 366). In turn, Christensen’s (2009) qualitative analysis
mapped three elements of talent identification evident in Danish soccer coaches when they scout
prospective players. Specifically, Danish soccer coaches: (a) systematically employed personal
preferences to “their visual experience to recognize patterns of movement among the players;”
(b) displayed partiality for players they perceived to “exhibit a potential to learn, practice, and
improve;” and, (c) they socially influenced the identification of talent in Danish soccer players as
“arbiters of taste” (Christensen, 2009, p. 365).
Christensen (2009) labeled coaches’ personal preferences as their “practical sense” (p.
366), and he defined a coach’s practical sense as implicit soccer knowledge and a “feel for the
game” that primarily results from “hands-on and incorporated knowhow” that is “founded on
practical intuition or habitus” (p. 368). This practical sense is born of a body of soccer training
and experience at high levels of competition (Christensen, 2009). Morris’ (2000) review of
talent identification in soccer provided further insight and stated “scouts and coaches appear to
make judgments based on their own experience of the game, as former players, trainers, coaches
or spectators” (p. 721). Deeper still, Jones, Armour and Potrac (2003) employed an interactionist
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methodology in a case study of an elite soccer coach and defined coaching “know how” as
adaptive thinking born of experience and developed “as you go along” (p. 219).
Christensen’s (2009) qualitative investigation also identified coaches’ “classificatory
schemes,” described as “categories of perception that become a particular taste” (p. 368). For
example, these schemes serve as triggers that signal soccer coaches when a prospect’s
performance looks right and when it does not. In a classic study, Chase and Simon (1973)
investigated what master chess players “see” in their mind’s eye when they view a chess
position. The results of this experiment (Chase & Simon, 1973) revealed that superior players
demonstrate the “ability to encode larger chunks of information” and make “right” moves more
quickly and frequently compared to less experienced players (p. 80). Nash and Collins (2006), in
an examination of expert coaching, described coaching wisdom as tacit knowledge evidenced
when “certain distinct cues appear to link current situations to past experiences, which may
explain the coach’s seemingly instinctive behavior” (p. 471). Christensen (2009) depicted
coaches’ talent identification knowledge as a sight-based byproduct of their “constant
observation of players” (p. 372). Similarly, Day (2011) acknowledged the existence of skilled
coaches who, as a result of extensive experiential knowledge, have the ability to “see” talent and
predict potential, while Starkes and Helsen (1998) reported “highly skilled coaches maintain that
they can ‘see’ talent” (p. 425).
Christensen (2009) theorized “the logic of sight is transferred to the logic of knowledge”
(p. 372), and soccer coaches’ aptitude for talent identification reflected “something that
originates from intuition” (p. 371). In sum, Christensen’s (2009) interpretative analysis of soccer
coaches’ talent identification processes traced visual observations that over time developed into
schemas of pattern recognition based on a personal preference for specific player attributes and
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then became the foundation for confident decision making when selecting new players. In a
phrase, Christensen (2009) referred to “the glimpse that is recognized as an entirety” (p. 373),
and he described coaches’ talent identification logic not as a process “based on evaluations of
isolated elements” (p. 373) but rather as an “interaction of knowledge and memory” (p. 367) that
“builds on a practical sense of visual impressions as a whole” (p. 373).
Christensen (2009) also questioned soccer coaches’ “image of talent” to uncover their
“individual tastes and preferences” (p. 375). In response to his query, coaches identified “soccer
skills,” comprised of “game intelligence” and “peak competences,” and “personal qualities” as
their focal targets in identifying talent in prospective players (Christensen, 2009, p. 375). Game
intelligence in this context referred to a soccer player’s ability to “read and predict” the flow and
movement of the game, and peak competences signified the physical and technical soccer skills
(e.g. tools) the pace of the game demands for competitive play. All elements of soccer talent
considered, “personal qualities predominated” (p. 375) as the key elements for talent
identification among Danish soccer coaches, and they pointed to “attitude” as “a dominant
category in the classificatory scheme that distinguishes one highly skilled soccer player from
another” (Christensen, 2009, p. 376).
Although Christensen (2009) identified a process of sight-based scouting knowledge, he
also declared recognizing talent is altogether different from describing talent. Additionally,
Christensen’s (2009) analysis stipulated soccer coaches evaluated both a prospective player’s
“present makeup” and his “presumed potential to learn, to practice, and to improve” (p. 377). In
turn, soccer coaches affirmed their belief in the “preeminence of hard work and commitment” (p.
374), and they routinely tested the validity of their first impressions by conducting individual
prospect meetings.
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Christensen’s (2009) investigation exposed a synergistic attraction between psychological
makeup and sport-specific skills in Danish soccer coaches’ “eye” for talent identification. To
this end, Christensen (2009) concluded “the power and the expertise to judge observable skills”
is highly valued and socially conferred upon Danish soccer coaches thereby making them
“arbiters of taste” (p. 377). Specifically, coaches own what Christensen (2009) labeled the
“’doxical’ (cf. doxa) knowledge” of Danish soccer, and he theorized this social construction
restricted the dissemination of talent identification knowledge “by an unwillingness to include
different viewpoints” and magnified “the possibility of mistakes” (p. 378). As a result,
Christensen (2009) reasoned talent identification becomes a “self-perpetuating cycle of
construction and reconstruction” (p. 378). Comparatively, Lewis (2004) also revealed the
possible orthodoxy of professional baseball scouts talent identification knowledge and decision
making when he described scouts as those who “decide who gets to play and, therefore, how it is
played” (p. 15).
Summary
In my review, I investigated applied literature and scholarly research focused on
discovering how professional baseball scouts define talent, identify talent, forecast potential, and
make player selections in the high-risk financial industry of Major League Baseball (MLB). I
assembled my findings in a three-part framework, beginning with the role transformations of
professional baseball scouts and how MLB’s legal, contractual, and economic history shaped
scouts’ talent identification responsibilities and methods. In section two, I conducted a four-part
investigation of the fundamental talents, tools, and attributes scouts described as antecedents to
expert baseball performance, and I concluded my review with a scientific summary of talent
identification. This scientific summary of talent identification explored the nature v. nurture
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debate; empirical definitions and methodologies for talent and talent identification; and, tastes
for talent among sport experts. In sum, my review integrated scholarly talent identification
research across sport and other domains and aligned it with the applied talent identification
practices and decision making patterns exhibited by professional baseball scouts.
The role of the professional baseball scout developed and transformed in response to
MLB’s shifting economies, player acquisition methods, and contractual guidelines (Kerrane;
1999; Keri, 2006; Monteleone, 1995; Rickey, 1965; Rymer, 2013; Spurr, 2000; Staudohaur et al.,
2006; Story, 2000; Weiler & Roberts, 1998). In the early years, Major League Baseball featured
family-owned franchises that exerted ownership control over large farm systems in an affordable
player salary market without the strictures of a First Year Player Draft, the Major League
Scouting Bureau, or free agency. However, today’s MLB talent identification landscape is
bounded by unionization and contractual guidelines designed to protect ownership interests
while allowing labor mobility for tenured players. These realities, combined with average Major
League player salaries exceeding $4 million (Petchesky, 2015) and a talent development system
(i.e. minor leagues) that typically only yields 10 percent success (Burger & Walters, 2009),
present an opportunity for talent identification and decision-making exploration in a high stakes
climate.
The early periods of Major League Baseball masked talent identification uncertainties by
operating large, low-cost farm systems designed to yield quality from quantity (Kerrane, 1999;
Story, 2000). Branch Rickey, the father of professional baseball scouting, framed and focused
the identification of baseball prospects’ physical talents into three areas: (1) the arm; (2) the
legs; and, (3) the power (Monteleone, 1995). Rickey (1965) also implied that a fourth “talent,” a
player’s love for playing the game, is perhaps the most important attribute of all. These talents,
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tools, and attributes continue as elements found in professional baseball scouting reports today
(Kerrane, 1999; Nyman, 2008; Shanks, 2005; Story, 2000; Winegardner, 1990), and scouts’ roles
maintain sight-based prospect evaluations and future projections of performance potential.
In the late 1990s while faced with losing records, ineffective draft picks, and a low
payroll, the Oakland A’s questioned the essence of winning baseball as well as the social
dynamics, biases, and future focus prevalent in Draft-era professional baseball scouts
(Armstrong, 2004; Hakes & Sauer, 2006, Summer; Keri, 2006; Lewis, 2004; Roberto, 2005;
Staudohar et al., 2006; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). In their analysis, Oakland evaluated
longitudinal MLB statistics to develop a predictive model for winning baseball that ultimately
pivoted on strike zone control and highlighted the efficacy of on-base-percentage (OBP) - an
undervalued attribute in the baseball talent market (Lewis, 2004; Roberto, 2005; Thaler &
Sunstein, 2003). As a result, Oakland used OBP as an objective talent assessment measure
because it substantiated the presence of baseball skills and psychological attributes that foster
winning baseball and reduced the complexity of future performance projections. In addition,
some authors suggested professional baseball scouts can be influenced by biases and
overestimate future performance (Burger & Walters, 2009; Lewis, 2004; Roberto, 2005; Thaler
& Sunstein, 2003). As a group, scouts typically rely on instinct and intuition for talent
identification, and when they “see” prospects’ psychological attributes they commonly use the
term “makeup” (Kerrane, 1999; Shanks, 2005; Story, 2000; Winegardner, 1990). Scientifically,
if “makeup” can be more reliably identified then talent identification and expert performance
potential are assumedly less frequently misjudged.
Talent, although difficult to define, is a valued commodity and debates regarding its
origins and “causes” (i.e. nature v. nurture) are long-standing (Durand-Bush & Salmela, 2001;
52

Ericsson, 1998, June; Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson et al., 1993; Ericsson
et al. 2007, June; Ericsson & Ward, 2007; Freeman, 1998; Howard, 2012; Howe et al. 1998;
Johnson et al., 2008; Schneider, 1998; Simonton, 1999; Tesch-Romer, 1998). On one hand,
scholars have yet to substantiate a scientific relationship between natural ability, genetics, and/or
expert performance (Ericsson, 1998, June; Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson
et al., 1993; Ericsson et al. 2007, June; Ericsson & Ward, 2007). On another hand, some
scholars contend deliberate practice applied to random subjects does not ensure the development
of expert performance (Freeman, 1998; Regnier et al., 1993). In the end, the ultimate goal, of
professional baseball scouts and essentially all domains in pursuit of expertise, is accurate
performance prediction. However, identifying talent and forecasting potential expertise are
difficult in the face of uncertain definitions, antecedents, and methods (Csikszentmihalyi et al.,
1993; Ericsson et al., 1993; Howe et al., 1998; Pankhurst & Collins, 2013; Regnier et al., 1993;
Simonton, 1999; Tranckle & Cushion, 2006; Vaeyens et al., 2008).
Over nearly the past four decades, an emergent body of research included
multidimensional, integrative, and adaptive theories for talent identification and development,
and these works described and explored how expert performers think and train differently than
non-experts (Abbott & Collins, 2002; Abbott & Collins, 2004; Chase & Simon, 1973;
Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993; Durand-Bush & Salmela, 2001; Ericsson, 1998, June; Ericsson,
2007; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson, 1993; Ericsson et al. 2007, June; Ericsson & Ward,
2007; Howard, 2012; Howe et al. 1998; Johnson et al., 2008; Kreiner-Phillips & Orlick, 1993;
Simonton, 1999; Smith & Christensen, 1995; Williams & Reilly, 2000). These works identified
the tendency to over-focus on anecdote and intuition in sport talent identification (Christensen,
2009; Ericsson, 1998, June; Ericsson et al., 2007, June; Jones et al., 2003; Morris, 2000; Nash &
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Collins, 2006; Starkes & Helsen, 1998; Tesch-Romer, 1998), highlighted the dynamic (as
opposed to static) nature of talent development (Abbott & Collins, 2004; Bloom, 1985;
Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993; Regnier et al., 1993), and illuminated the efficacy of motivational
factors, support networks, and focused training in expert performers (Abbott & Collins, 2004;
Bloom, 1985; Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993; Ericsson, 1998, June; Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson &
Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson et al., 1993; Ericsson et al. 2007, June; Ericsson & Ward, 2007; Howe
et al., 1998; Schneider, 1998).
Athletic talent and potential are often unrealized, undiscovered, or wasted (Lewis, 2004;
Pankhurst & Collins, 2013), and limiting these missed opportunities saves professional sport
organizations time and money (Abbott & Collins, 2004; Morris, 2000; Williams & Reilly, 2000).
Time and money reflect the socially constructed value of sport expertise, but sport science is
only beginning to empirically uncover the spiraling and adaptive dynamics involved in
transforming talent and potential into achievement. Many of these studies are environmentally
focused, embrace the scope of developmental capacity, and underscore the interdependency of
mind and body (Abbott & Collins, 2002; Abbott & Collins, 2004; Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993;
Ericsson, 1998, June; Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson et al., 1993; Ericsson
et al. 2007, June; Ericsson & Ward, 2007). Across several studies, this interdependency is
portrayed as a synergy between attitude and ability and highlights the efficacy of: commitment
and hard work (Johnson et al., 2008); motivation and discernment (Howard, 2012; MacNamara
et al., 2010); and confidence and coping skills (Kreiner-Phillips & Orlick, 1993; Smith &
Christensen, 1995).
Although empirical investigations of sight-based talent identification are minimal, the
results of these works highlighted the confluence of domain-specific experiential memory (Chase
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& Simon, 1973; Jones et al., 2003; Morris, 2000), sight (Christensen, 2009; Day, 2011; Starkes
& Helsen, 1998), and the logic of perceptual knowledge (Chase & Simon, 1973; Christensen,
2009). To this end, a gap for analysis opens for examining the decision-making realm of
professional baseball scouts. Specifically, if sight-based baseball talent identification is born of
experiential preferences, then forecasting potential is possibly a byproduct of personal taste. An
exploration of these experts’ tastes for talent potentially illuminates how information is assessed,
interpreted, and decisions are made in Major League Baseball. In the subsequent section I
outlined key gaps within the applied and empirical literature to guide this specific study.
Gaps in the Literature
Most talent research is focused on defining the construct or exploring talent development,
not on how talent is identified and prospects selected (Christensen, 2009). In the business of
professional baseball, scouts’ talent identification effectiveness pivots on two realities: (1)
nearly all players require minor league development; and, (2) most minor league players never
appear in a Major League game. However, despite baseball scouts’ influential role in identifying
talent to lay the foundation for franchises’ competitive success (Lewis, 2004; Thrift & Shapiro,
1990), research exploring their decision-making judgment and how they define talent, attributes,
and potential is minimal and includes a number of gaps. Two gaps appeared meaningful for
understanding how these experts assess talent and make judgments in competitive, high-finance
professional baseball. The first gap involves the scarcity of studies analyzing how baseball
scouts make meaning of what they see and forecast potential. The second gap concerns the
absence of qualitative studies examining how a scout’s mindset interprets the mindset of a MLB
prospect and the value scouts place on psychological attributes.
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Gap #1: Visual Talent Identification and Forecasting Expertise in Baseball
Scouting wisdom is passed on by word of mouth and the dialogue of experiences
(Kerrane, 1999; Shanks, 2005; Story, 2000; Winegardner, 1990). To this end, questioning the
Book’s validity requires a willingness to uncover performance clues with your eyes and interpret
what others may not see (Armstrong, 2012; Lewis, 2004; Roberto, 2005).
The legendary scouts tell us that each play and player are unique (Winegardner, 1990),
and behind every draft pick are scenes of scouts’ personal observations, comparisons, and future
projections (Kerrane, 1999; Shanks, 2005). Scouts build a player history from purposeful
watching, evaluation, and comparison, all for the purpose of forecasting future performance and
making decisions (Kerrane, 1999; Shanks, 2005; Story, 2000; Winegardner, 1990).
While some scholars challenge the effectiveness of professional baseball scouts’ talent
identification and judgment (Burger & Walters, 2009; Koz et al., 2012; Lewis, 2004; Nyman,
2008; Roberto, 2005; Spurr, 2000; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003), only a fraction of talent research
explores talent identification through the eyes of scouts or coaches (Christensen, 2009; Jones et
al., 2003; Morris, 2000; Nash & Collins, 2006). My review of literature did not uncover studies
that examined how professional baseball scouts interpret what they see as they forecast future
performance potential and make decisions. In this respect, my study will chronicle professional
baseball scouts’ decision-making processes to reveal how they define talent and potential when
identifying and eliminating prospective Major League players.
Gap #2: Assessing Psychological Attributes in Baseball
Although verifying physical measures of baseball talent can create feelings of judgment
security (Lewis, 2004), professional baseball scouts are employed to forecast future performance
56

expertise (Kerrane, 1999; Story, 2000). Optimally, scouts search for prospects with great
physical talent and psychological mindset (Kerrane, 1999; Monteleone, 1995; Shanks, 2005;
Story, 2000), but this complete prospect package seldom develops with parallel timing
(Winegardner, 1990). Said another way, all prospects with exceptional physical measures of
baseball talent do not exhibit exceptional mindsets, and all prospects with exceptional mindsets
do not demonstrate exceptional physical measures of baseball talent.
Some scholars in my review underscored the synergistic impact of psychological
attributes and physical ability (Abbott & Collins, 2002; Abbott & Collins, 2004; Schneider,
2008), and other researchers highlighted the value of this interdependency in the display of
expert performance (Ericsson, 1998, June; Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson
et al., 1993; Ericsson et al. 2007, June; Ericsson & Ward, 2007; Howard, 2012; Johnson et al.,
2008; Kreiner-Phillips & Orlick, 1993; MacNamara et al., 2010, Smith & Christensen, 1995).
Although my review of applied literature stressed the impact of a prospects’ mindset as a
harbinger for advancement to the Major Leagues (Kerrane, 1999; Monteleone, 1995; Rickey,
1965; Story, 2000; Shanks, 2005), talent identification research does not include qualitative
studies examining how baseball scouts value and interpret prospects’ psychological attributes.
Talent is highly valued, and my investigative results may shed light on how professional baseball
scouts value and interpret the interdependency of physical and psychological attributes.
The gaps identified expose an opportunity to explore talent identification knowledge and
interpretative decision-making through the lens of professional baseball scouts. My study
focuses on talent assessment and judgment within a sport industry that exhibits low odds of
advancement and a narrow timeline for productive service, and I aspire to advance the literature
to better understand the baseball talents and attributes fundamental to performance expertise. In
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the subsequent section, I described the four theories I selected to analyze and to interpret the data
that I collected from professional baseball scouts.
Analytical Theory
Interpreting talent identification and decision-making through the lens of talent
development and reflective practice theorists redirects our sight to the bottom-up perspectives of
expert and potential expert performers’ experiences in action. From this perspective, I selected
four theorists to create a scaffold for viewing and illuminating the essence of how professional
baseball scouts define player attributes and subsequently make decisions to identify or eliminate
Major League prospects.
I chose talent development and performance expertise theorists because nearly all MLB
draft selections spend lengthy minor league apprenticeships developing their talent and only 10
percent receive the call to advance to the Major Leagues (Burger & Walters, 2013; O’Kennedy,
2013). Inductively, 90 percent of MLB draft selections are potentially the result of scouts’
misjudged talent identification, and, in the event heritable talent remains empirically
unconfirmed and/or insufficient to predict performance expertise, talent assessment is plausibly
best diagnosed from the vantage of talent development and performance expertise theorists. In
addition, I selected the theory of reflective practice to analyze scouts’ “intuitive processes”
(Schon, 1983, p. 49) with regard to talent identification and prospect decision-making.
Two theorists I selected, Bloom (1985) and Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993), conducted
exploratory studies to collect talent development insights from gifted and expert performers.
Bloom (1985) embraced human potential and investigated talent development through the lens of
world class performers, their parents, teachers, and coaches. Bloom’s (1985) landmark work,
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Developing Talent in Young People, used structured interviews to retrospectively diagram the
process of talent development within expert pianists, sculptors, swimmers, tennis players,
mathematicians, and neurologists. I selected Bloom (1985) and his analysis of the characteristics
and career stages of world class performers to analyze how professional scouts define baseball
prospects’ attributes.
Following Bloom’s work, Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) employed the Experience
Sampling Method (ESM) to diagnose the longitudinal talent development of gifted high school
students in art, music, math, science, and athletics. Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) explored what
drives high school students to (and not to) develop their talent, and, like Bloom (1985),
Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues (1993) defined talent development as a product of favorable,
nurturing environments. In addition, Csiskzentmihalyi et al. (1993) identified “psychological
complexity” as the catalyst for talent development, and I selected this theorist to analyze how
scouts value and interpret prospects’ psychological attributes.
In his seminal work, Ericsson et al. (1993) presented a theoretical framework outlining
the role of deliberate practice in the development of performance expertise.

Like Bloom

(1985), Ericsson’s empirical stance resonated belief in the capability of talent development for
all healthy individuals, and I selected Ericsson’s theory of performance expertise and deliberate
practice to analyze how professional baseball scouts make meaning of what they see and forecast
baseball performance potential.
Ericsson depicted the realization of performance expertise as the result of prolonged
deliberate practice. Schon (1983) pioneered the theory of reflective practice defined as a
“special expertise” (p. 49) that is revealed through the “tacit knowing-in-action” (p. 49) of
proficient practitioners. In this context, Schon exposed both the limitations and the tendencies of
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academia to lean upon science and technology for all answers associated with problems and
dilemmas related to professional practice. More importantly, Schon illustrated and defined the
“know-how” skilled practitioners develop and exhibit as a byproduct of their experiential
reflections. I chose Schon (1983) and his concept of experiential “knowing-in-practice” to
analyze how veteran professional baseball scouts employ their reflection and intuition when
making decisions to identify or eliminate Major League prospects.
Bloom: Development of Talent
Bloom’s publication (1985), Developing Talent in Young People, paved the oft-cited
groundwork for subsequent researchers’ environmental talent development explorations and
reviews (Abbott & Collins, 2004; Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993; Durand-Bush & Salmela, 2001;
Ericsson et al., 1993; Howe et al., 1998; Pankhurst & Collins, 2013; Regnier et al., 1993;
Tranckle & Cushion, 2006). More specifically, Bloom’s investigation (1985) culminated a fouryear retrospective exploration of the talent development process in 120 world class performers
under the age of 40 across four fields (i.e. psychomotor, aesthetic, musical, artistic) and six
domains (Olympic swimmers, tennis champions, concert pianists, artists, research neurologists
and research mathematicians). In addition, and to comprehensively capture retrospective data,
Bloom and his University of Chicago research team also mined the narrative responses of
subjects’ parents and significant teachers/coaches.
With the assistance of experts and scholars, Bloom (1985) defined talented subjects as
those who “demonstrated an unusually high level of demonstrated ability, achievement or skill”
(p. 5). Deeper still, Bloom’s (1985) preliminary assumption detailed the consideration that each
society contains a large collection of potential talent “that can either be developed or neglected,
depending in large measure on the environmental conditions” (p. 5).
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Although seemingly detailed, Bloom (1985) designed his interview methodology to
uncover the developmental processes that equipped his subjects for expertise across seven areas
of inquiry: (1) special talent(s) evident in subjects’ childhood; (2) childhood family support and
talent direction; (3) quality and characteristics of teaching, coaching, and mentorship across
subjects’ talent development; (4) the genesis and type of subjects’ motivation and selfsatisfaction; (5) the amount of subjects’ learning/training time invested in talent development; (6)
other relevant individual elements of talent discovery and development; and, (7) values and
habits that fueled subjects’ increased commitment to talent development in pursuit of expertise.
While lengthy, these categories served as interview question topics, and the results thereof
formed Bloom’s (1985) framework for the characteristics and career stages of talent
development.
Bloom’s (1985) stages of talent development, gleaned from both expert performers and
their mentors and models of significant influence (e.g. parents, teachers/coaches), provided
common ground generalizations and insights about how experts learn and spend their time. In
addition, the inclusion of mentors and models revealed the prevalence of a significant finding:
that is, “no one reached the limits of learning in a talent field on his or her own” (Bloom, 1985,
p. 509). Talent development spanned over a 10-15 year period, and Bloom (1985) labeled his
talent development stages the early, middle, and later years, or, in Regnier et al.’ (1993)
depiction, the stages of initiation (early years), development (middle years), and perfection (later
years).
Bloom (1985) characterized the early years of talent development as a playful
introduction to a talent field when subjects were initially mentored by a local, learning-oriented
teacher/coach, and mutually supported by parents. Parents typically modeled encouragement, a
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strong work ethic, and reinforced the virtues of giving best effort and achieving goals. The
middle years featured a devotion to developing technical skills, fundamentals, and “a long
sequence of learning activities that involve high standards, much time, and a great deal of hard
work” (Bloom, 1985, p. 508). During the “development” period, parents made supportive
commitments of time, finances, and personal sacrifice, while the profiles of teachers/coaches
featured increased experience, dedication, skill, and training demands. The later years, or stage
of perfection (Regnier et al., 1993), signified a tipping point when subjects’ significantly
intensified hours and commitment to their talent field and assumed the realization and personal
identity of an expert performer. In this stage, parents moved to the background as supportive
fans, while teachers/coaches stepped to the foreground in a bond of mutual respect and
accountability partners focused on high achievement.
Bloom’s (1985) stages are not hereditarily directed. Rather, these characteristics and
career stages of talent development represent generalizable patterns informed by world class
performers and their support networks. In turn, Bloom’s (1985) summative deduction defined
the ground truth result of his talent development theory: “what any person in the world can
learn, almost all persons can learn if provided with appropriate prior and current conditions of
learning” (p. 4).
Bloom’s (1985) incremental steps of talent development closely paralleled professional
baseball scouts’ persistent talent identification question, “’which players are going to seek their
level?’” (Shanks, 2005, p. 338), and scouts defined “level” as the full realization of potential.
Similarly, Bloom (1985) mapped the characteristics of talent development stages, and,
comparatively, professional scouts identified “makeup” as the attributional characteristic and
catalyst for baseball talent development.
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I designed my investigation to fill a qualitative research void and explore how
professional scouts interpret the mindsets of MLB prospects and forecast their future
performance potential. I selected Bloom’s (1985) theory of talent development and his analysis
of the characteristics and career stages of world class performers to provide a framework to help
me chronicle the decision-making processes of professional baseball scouts and uncover how
they define talent and potential. In the next section, I explain Csikszentmihalyi et al.’ (1993)
theory of complexity and talent development, and I describe the relevance of this framework to
help me understand the precursors of peak baseball performance and their value in talent
identification.
Csikszmenthalyi, Rathude, & Whalen (1993): Complexity & Talent Development
The publication of Talented Teenagers by Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, and Whalen in
1993 detailed a four-year, longitudinal, mixed methods exploration of why some teenagers
persist with talent cultivation and others do not. With the support of a University of Chicago
research team, Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues (1993) focused on the “experience of talent” (p.
42) across the high school careers of 208 students nominated by their teachers to possess “the
potential to pursue talent development to superior levels of proficiency” (p. 43). Specifically, the
authors (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993) examined how adolescents “become committed to the
development of their talent” (p. 5), and they posed the unanswerable question of how often do
potential expert performers escape our discovery because of external roadblocks? External
roadblocks in this context referred to the absence of support networks and personally challenging
opportunities to develop, learn, and perform. Deeper still, Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993)
embraced an optimistic view of talent development, and they refuted the myth that “talent will
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out” (p. 25), defined as the assumption innate talent will never fail to surface regardless of any
environmental, opportunity, and/or relational roadblocks.
Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues (1993) characterized talent not as something comprised
of elements only observed or found in nature. Rather, Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) defined
talent as a socially constructed stamp of recognition that surfaces when good traits with social
value are displayed and acknowledged. More specifically, Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993)
conceptualized talent as comprised of three elements: (1) individual traits; (2) cultural domains;
and, (3) social fields. Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) explained individual talents as one part
heritable and one part developmental, and they characterized cultural domains as socially
meaningful performance benchmarks. In addition, social fields represented people and societal
groups who judge and determine desirable performance levels (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993).
Focused on how teenagers’ committal or noncommittal to talent development is effected
by “daily experiences and self-perceptions” (p. 48), Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) employed a
two-phase data gathering strategy. The primary component of phase one featured the Experience
Sampling Method (ESM), a naturalistic, self-report channel for capturing subjects’ internal
thought and emotional expressions to comprehend optimal experiences, and phase two examined
students’ committal or noncommittal to talent development and the nature of their
accomplishments. These details are noteworthy because the genesis of the ESM originated with
the flow model of optimal experience, and Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues (1993) grounded
their hypothesis in “the notion that complex systems are related to optimal experience, which in
turn is related to growth in talent” (pp. 15-16).
Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues (1993) defined flow as “a subjective state that people
report when they are completely involved in something to the point of losing track of time and of
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being unaware of fatigue and of everything else but the activity itself” (p. 14). Csikszentmihalyi
et al. (1993) also mapped the prevalent conditions present in flow states from over 7,000 ESM
reports: (a) clear goals and feedback; (b) close alignment between an activity’s challenges and
one’s ability to act upon or perform the challenges; (c) when learning, training, or performing the
activity and actor simultaneously become one, as if flying on automatic pilot. In turn,
Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) described an optimal system as complex, and they explained a
complex mindset as two-dimensional thinking which embraces the interdependent opposites of
constancy and change, or, in their words, complexity is the “simultaneous presence of
differentiating and integrating processes” (p. 255). To this end, flow begets complexity because
continual embrace of challenge on the boundary of one’s current talents bridles boredom and
apathy. Complex mindsets are therefore consistently striving for performance improvement in
pursuit of flow. This complexity, according to Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993), is both “cohesive
and stable yet able to adapt and change when necessary” (p. 13), and “the balance of challenges
and skill is never static” (p. 15).
Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) identified “psychological complexity” as the foundational
organizing principle for understanding their theory of talent development. In this model, the
poles of complexity (represented by constancy and change) are reconciled and the personalities
found in talented teenagers are defined. As a result, Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) pointed to the
importance of first identifying psychological complexity when assessing and judging talent and
potential.
Although infrequently cited, Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) summarized eight factors
associated with talent development in teenagers: (1) to develop talent, teenagers first need to be
socially recognized with talent; (2) talented teens focus their concentration with an openness to
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achieve, endure, and experience; (3) talented teens devote greater focus on and openness to
developing their talents; (4) talented teens practice conservative sexual attitudes and better
navigate relational distractions; (5) most talented teens reside in families that support the
challenges of talent development; (6) teachers who support, enjoy, and stimulate talent
development positively influence talented teens; (7) talent development in teens exudes selfsatisfaction in current practice and an affinity for future rewards. The eighth factor potentially
stands alone and serves as a guidon for talent identification: “a talent will be developed if it
produces optimal experiences” (p. 252).
Baseball talent assessment is easiest when measures of physical performance (e.g.
running time, throwing speed, hitting power) are Major League average or better. However, the
low odds of advancing from the minor to the major leagues cast doubt on the notion that physical
talent is the center against which baseball performance expertise can be reliably forecasted. That
is, physical talents may reflect an incomplete picture of prospect potential.
Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues’ (1993) flow state conditions of goal clarity, focused
feedback, and open embrace of challenge correlates with scholars’ empirical analyses of peak
performance in sport (Kreiner-Phillips & Orlick, 1993). In addition, Csikszentmihalyi et al.
(1993) profile of talented teenagers aligned closely with scouts’ affinity for and descriptions of
competitive makeup (Shanks, 2005; Winegardner, 1990).
My study seeks to understand how professional baseball scouts value and define
prospects’ attributes, and I selected the Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) lens of psychological
complexity to help me analyze how scouts’ mindset interprets the mindset of MLB prospects.
In addition, flow theory integrated with talent development (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993)
provides a framework for diagnosing the environmental and psychological elements of peak
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performers in baseball. In the next section, I discuss the components and relevance of Ericsson’s
theory of deliberate practice in the development of performance expertise.
Ericsson: Deliberate Practice and Performance Expertise
Ericsson’s theoretical framework explained the development of performance expertise
leveraged by the efficacy of prolonged deliberate practice, and he grounded his explanation in an
empirical stance of environmental determinism. In plain talk, Ericsson described what it takes to
become an expert performer, and he pivoted this process on two components: (1) deliberate
practice; and, (2) the 10-year rule.
Ericsson et al. (2007, June) pointed to an over-reliance on anecdote and intuition as
research limitations in the study of expert performance, and a key question in Ericsson’s quest to
define expert performance included determining if “some healthy individuals have an innate
advantage” (p. 6). Although Howe and colleagues’ (1998) review enlarged the radius of the
nature v. nurture dialogue, Ericsson (1998) stated their reexamination “leads us away from the
original theoretical question: Can the lack of innate immutable talent preclude healthy, normal
individuals from attaining expert performance?” (p. 413). As a remedy, Ericsson et al. (2007,
June) defined expert performance as “reproducibly superior performance,” capable of empirical
verification “by designing standardized representative tasks, which can capture this
performance” (p. 9). Specifically, Ericsson and colleagues (2007, June) introduced a science of
expert performance capable of achieving three evidentiary criteria: (1) identification of
observable, measurable performance behaviors; (2) reliable test-retest of performance behaviors
under controlled conditions; and, (3) the demonstration of reproducibly superior performances
when compared to “motivated control groups” (p. 14).
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Ericsson’s (2007) core thesis stated “experts continually engage in deliberate practice”
(p. 12), and, similar to Bloom (1985), Ericsson et al. (2009) mapped the development of
deliberate practice as a progression of three stages: (1) introduction to a skill, its fundamentals
and feedback cues; (2) continued practice, skill acquisition, and skill automation; and, for those
“who are committed to attaining expert levels of performance,” (p. 204) (3) constructive
feedback and adaptive training challenges designed to improve performance. In sum, Ericsson et
al. (1993; 2007, June; 2009) defined talent development leading to expert performance as a
process of deliberate practice (DP), progressing over a minimum period of 10,000 hours and/or
10 years or more.
Ericsson (1998) separated normal talent development (e.g. skill acquisition) from the
development (e.g. deliberate practice) of expert performance. In addition, Ericsson et al. (1993;
2007, June) also differentiated deliberate practice from routine repetition of pre-existing skills
and described deliberate practice as premeditated, highly structured training designed to elevate
performance, while conducted at the edge of one’s competencies with no guarantee of enjoyment
and the initial likelihood of frequent failure.
With similarity to Csikszentmihalyi, Ericsson et al. (1993) claimed “individuals are
motivated to practice because practice improves performance” (p. 368). To this end, Ericsson et
al. (1993) outlined three environmental and human restraints that require optimization for the
products of deliberate practice to surface. Namely, deliberate practice that produces performance
expertise is reconciled by navigating resource, motivational, and effort restraints (Ericsson et al.,
1993). Resource restraints envelope time, energy, training opportunities, facilities, and
teachers/coaches; whereas, and in contrast to Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993), motivational
restraints tap the personal will of the individual because deliberate practice is not always
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enjoyable or instantly rewarded (Ericsson et al., 1993). Effort restraints speak to the negative
byproducts of over-focused deliberate practice, specifically injury and/or burnout avoidance
(Ericsson et al., 1993). These adaptive challenges also bear resemblance to the environmental
interactions identified by Galton (1892/1914) – “zeal, and power of work” (p. 41) – and
hypothesized by Rickey (1965) – “aptitudes, attitudes, and effort” (p. 85).
Compared to “everyday skill acquisition” (p. 413), Ericsson (1998) highlighted three
developmental effects of deliberate practice that accelerate expert performance. Specifically,
deliberate practice generates the development of: (1) “desirable physiological adaptations”
(Ericsson, 1998, p. 413); (2) “predictive perceptual cues” (p. 414), and (3) an enhanced mental
ability to “plan, control, and monitor their performance through continued improvements” (p.
414). In turn, Ericsson and colleagues’ (2009) claimed the “distinctive characteristics of
exceptional performers are the result of adaptations to intense practice activities that selectively
activate dormant genes that are contained within all healthy individuals’ DNA” (p. 199).
Deeper still, Ericsson (2007) identified “the arrested development associated with
automaticity” (p. 17) as the critical boundary blocking the limits of talent development leading to
expert performance, and stated (Ericsson et al., 2009) explanations of elite performance are
incomplete in the absence of accounting for “how elite performers develop the complex
cognitive mechanisms and improved physiological adaptations that mediate superior
performance” (p. 204). Ericsson et al. (2009) described automaticity as a “stable plateau of
performance” (p. 200), and this definition approximated Galton’s (1914) hereditarily applied
“law of deviation from an average” (p. vi). Specifically, Galton contended performance ceilings
are byproducts of genetic lineage and incapable of breakthrough beyond. In opposition to
Galton’s theoretical stance, Ericsson and colleagues (2009) stated, “expert performers counteract
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automaticity by developing increasingly complex mental representations to attain higher levels
of control of their performance” (p. 200). In turn, Ericsson et al. (2009) identified the
combination of deliberate practice mixed with “challenges that demand concentration and effort”
(p. 213) as the solvent for unlocking automated performance.
Similar to Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993), Ericsson (1998) identified “motivational
factors” as the key element to understanding talent development leading to expert performance
“because of the complex cognitive structure that experts acquire through extended, deliberate
practice” (p. 414). In sum, the process of deliberate practice develops “refined mental
representations,” “advanced preparation and anticipation,” and superior speed resulting from
“acquired cognitive representations” in the long-term pursuit of performance expertise (Ericsson
et al., 2009, p. 203).
Although documented effects of deliberate practice are positive and plentiful, Ericsson
and Charness (1995, September) skeptically questioned the possibility of an answer to the
nature-nurture debate via logical reasoning; rather, they appealed for longitudinal measurement
and observation of deliberate practice and its effects on domain-specific performance. However,
Weiss and Shanteau’s review (2014) contended that Ericsson’s definition of “expertise” is laden
with limitations, specifically: (a) it is ambiguous (e.g. how much training and skill is required to
become an expert?); (b) it overconfidently claims origins endemic to personal will; and, (c) its
absolutism creates a dichotomy of two types of people, experts and non-experts. The
impediments above are grounded in the authors’ (Weiss & Shanteau, 2014) apprehensions about
the evolving direction of expert performance research, namely: (a) the operational definition of
expertise negates both/and thinking; (b) the disciplines of study are relegated to domains most
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easily measured; (c) the investigations focus on a limited scope of skills; and, (d) the results and
conclusions reflect incomplete data interpretations.
Talent identification and the psychological attributes required to develop baseball
performance expertise are not unequivocally or theoretically understood. To this end, Ericsson
et al.’ (1993) theory of deliberate practice presents a framework for analyzing how professional
baseball scouts make meaning of prospects’ training and performance improvements (or lack
thereof). In a distant way, Ericsson et al.’ (1993) theoretical paradigm, designed to overcome
weaknesses through prolonged and deliberate practice, also aligns with Rickey’s farm system
model and “principle of quality out of quantity” (as cited in Kerrane, 1999, p. 24). In turn,
minor league farm systems’ concept of step-wise competition of increasing difficulty also align
with Ericsson et al.’ (1993) three stage progression of deliberate practice. In sum, I selected
Ericsson et al.’ (1993) theory of deliberate practice and performance expertise as a lens to
interpret professional baseball scouts’ judgment when forecasting performance potential.
Schon (1983): Knowing and Reflecting in Action
Schon’s publication (1983), The Reflective Practitioner, critically assessed the limitations
of technical rationality and illuminated the routine existence of reflective practice among
proficient practitioners. For Schon (1983), the ingredients of technical rationality, or
“professional knowledge,” are demonstrated through “instrumental problem solving made
rigorous by the application of scientific theory and technique” (p. 21). However, Schon (1983)
established that competent practitioners do not solitarily lean on the premises of science and
technology as the keys to their knowledge, actions, and problem solving. Rather, Schon’s (1983)
study and resultant theory championed the concept of expert “know-how” as a form of reflective
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knowledge intelligently revealed in the midst of action and manifested as “intuitive
performance.”
Schon (1983) exposed the generally accepted tendency to avoid deeper inquiry into the
“intellectual rigor in professional practice” (p. viii). He challenged the positivist epistemological
belief that “craft and artistry had no place in rigorous practical knowledge” (Schon, 1983, p. 34).
In effect, he affirmed a both-and perspective for knowledge creation and “emphasized the
importance for professionals of tacit/experiential as well as theoretical knowledge” (Mintz, 2016,
September, p. 277).
Schon (1983) hypothesized that proficient practitioners understand more than they can
clearly verbalize. That is, everyday “spontaneous, intuitive performance” (Schon, 1983, p. 49),
while often undefined or unexplainable, reflects a form of knowledge and recognition of
phenomena that are “ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and in our feel for the stuff
with which we are dealing” (p. 49). Hebert (2015) described these behaviors as a form of
situational intellect “based on an intuitive feeling that has been cultivated through experience”
(p. 364). Schon (1983) further described knowing-in-action as a form of “gut instinct”: “In his
[competent practitioner] day-to-day practice he makes innumerable judgments of quality for
which he cannot state adequate criteria, and he displays skills for which he cannot state the rules
or procedures” (pp. 49-50).
Technical rules and knowing-in-action occupy opposite poles in Schon’s (1983) theory of
reflective practice, but when uncertainty or surprise surfaces in the gap separating these factors
reflection-in-action is triggered. Schon (1983) identified reflection-in-action as “central to the
‘art’ by which practitioners sometimes deal well with situations of uncertainty, instability,
uniqueness and value conflicts” (p. 50). More specifically, Schon (1983) outlined three
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distinctive characteristics and principles of knowing-in-action: (1) spontaneous movement,
signal recognition, and decision-making often occur without preplanning or forethought; (2)
intimate awareness of how practitioners learn these responses is frequently unknown; and, (3)
conscious understanding of the deeper knowledge behind these actions is often absent.
While Schon (1983) acknowledged the equivocation the term “practice” engenders in
scholarly settings, he defined a practitioner as “a specialist who encounters certain types of
situations again and again” (p. 60). In turn, he explained that although frequent repetitive
practice can produce spontaneous knowing-in-practice, this level of routine also establishes a
potential downside effect: “the practitioner may miss important opportunities to think about
what he is doing” (Schon, 1983, p. 61).
Experimentation is inherent to the process of reflection-in-action when routines face
uncertainty or surprise. However, Schon (1983) stressed “experiment in practice” is an amalgam
of “several different kinds of experiment” and unfolds much differently than controlled
experimentation or empirical observation (pp. 144-145). Experimentation for practitioners is
most frequently operational when posing the question “what if?” (Schon, 1983, p. 145). Within
this process practitioners situationally determine the relevance and application of “the three
levels of experiment – exploration, move testing, and hypothesis testing” (pp. 152-153) with a
first order goal of “changing the situation” (p. 153). Specifically, the reflective practitioner
“plays his game in relation to a moving target, changing the phenomena as he experiments” in
pursuit of a desirable modification (Schon, 1983, p. 153). For Schon (1983), this level of “knowhow is in the action” (p. 50), and proficient practitioners “turn thought back on the action” (p.
50) and create “a new theory of the unique case” (p. 68) independent of “established theory and
technique” (p. 68).
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The consequential findings of Schon’s research (1983) include a dissection of the
“distinctive structure” of reflection-in-action (i.e. reflection in the thick of action) and reflectionon-action (i.e. after action reflection). Schon (1983) illustrated the processes of reflection-inaction and reflection-on-action through case analyses and characterized these responses as
frequently occurring “without conscious articulation” (p. 139).
Closely aligned with my study, one of Schon’s (1983) case examples featured a Major
League pitcher “finding his groove” as context for answering the question: “What is ‘learning to
adjust once you’re out there’?” (p. 55). Both Schon’s (1983) question and response in this
instance emphasized the efficacy of adaptation: “Presumably it involves noticing how you have
been working, and on the basis of these thoughts and observations, changing the way you have
been doing it” (p. 55). Schon (1983) described this interactive reflection as a focused process
targeted on three stages of action: “the outcomes of action, the action itself, and the intuitive
knowing implicit in the action” (p. 56). Explained differently, Johnston and Fells (2017)
described the formation of adaptive change through reflection in this way:
As a practitioner engages in an activity, there may come a moment where the
practitioner’s understanding of the activity is challenged – ‘this isn’t working’. This
surprise (in Schon’s terminology) causes the practitioner to draw upon prior knowledge
and experience to ‘see’ a new solution that overcomes the challenge and so enables the
activity to continue (p. 69).

Schon (1983) also identified a reflective practitioner as a researcher who “constructs a
new theory of the unique case” (p. 68), and this form of research unfolds through a process of
“reframing.” Reframing sets the boundaries of decision-making and reinforces perpetual
reflective dialogue while engaging the practitioner’s “repertoire of examples, images,
understandings, and actions” (p. 138). Schon (1983) submitted that the whole of this experiential
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mental catalogue (i.e. repertoire) functions as a comparative lens (i.e. “precedent”) “for
understanding and action” (p. 138). In sum, Schon (1983) summarized the process of how
professionals think in action in this way:
It is our capacity to see unfamiliar situations as familiar ones, and to do in the former as
we have done in the latter, that enables us to bring our past experiences to bear on the
unique case. It is our capacity to see-as and do-as that allows us to have a feel for the
problems that do not fit existing rules. (p. 140)

The practitioner’s repertoire then serves as a guide for making meaning of the unique and
“Seeing this situation as that one” (p. 139) while potentially influencing decision-making and/or
action to “also do in this situation as in that one” (p. 139).
Schon (1983) noted that the stressors associated with managing atypical situations and/or
situations that necessitate rapid response(s) tend to suppress calculated analysis and lead to
discussions of “instinct.” Instinct (“feeling for phenomena”) and skill (“for action”) comprise
one aspect of Schon’s (1983) two-part definition of “art,” or in his terminology, knowing-inaction (p. 241). The second element represents “a manager’s reflection, in a context of action, on
phenomena which he perceives as incongruent with his intuitive understandings” (Schon, 1983,
p. 241). Irrespective of stimulus, Schon (1983) depicted reflection-in-action as consisting of
“on-the-spot surfacing, criticizing, restructuring, and testing of intuitive understanding of
experienced phenomena” (pp. 241-242). He stated these in the moment adaptive responses tend
to be manifested as a “reflective conversation with the situation” (Schon, 1983, pp, 241-242).
Paradoxically, however, managers inadequately chronicle their reflection-in-action, and as a
result are unable to instruct others in their method of reflection. Additionally, Schon (1983)
emphasized the influence of the “learning system” of “organizational life” for managers – as

75

both represent a source of knowledge and an environment that “may promote or inhibit
reflection-in-action” (p. 242).
While Schon (1983) addressed organizational forces and their effects on reflective
managerial leadership, he also described the “variety of virtual worlds on which all professions
are dependent” (p. 162). He defined these virtual worlds as situational experiments that allow
practitioners to “suspend or control some of the everyday impediments to rigorous reflection-inaction” (Schon, 1983, p. 162). Specifically, a practitioner’s capacity to develop and adapt virtual
worlds is integral to generating experimental precision and artistic performance. This form of
reflection pauses the pace of action, sets the stage for hypothesis testing, and “develops a
capacity for accurate rehearsal” (Schon, 1983, p. 158) in a medium where “No move is
irreversible” (p. 158). The end goal for implementing reflective virtual worlds is accurate
transference to the practitioner’s real world problem, pursuit, or dilemma. These methodologies
can additionally take the form of “interpretative inquiry” (Schon, 1983, p. 160) and employ
storytelling as a form of personal illustration, “slow down phenomena which would ordinarily be
lost to reflection” (p. 161), and/or become a tool for strategic intervention. In sum, virtual
worlds for Schon (1983) depict a “double sense of ‘practice’” (p. 162) that enlarges a
practitioner’s scope of reflection and magnifies his/her artistry.
A professional baseball scout’s ability to “see,” to reflect, and to employ “gut instinct”
based on a repertoire of lived experiences represents empirically unexplored parameters with
regard to talent identification and decision-making. In addition, prospects’ adaptive instincts in
action potentially reflect both a level of performance artistry and a battery of attributes valued by
professional baseball scouts. As a result, I chose Schon’s (1983) theory of reflective
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practitioners as a framework for analyzing scouts’ intuitive instincts, reflective knowledge, and
gut feel for baseball talent identification and decision-making.
Bloom’s characteristics and career stages of talent development, Csikszentmihalyi et al.’
theory of psychological complexity within expert performers, Ericsson’s theoretical framework
for deliberate practice in the development of performance expertise, and Schon’s theory of
reflective practitioners create a platform for exploring the seen and unseen realities of baseball
talent assessment and judgment. The dynamic nature of talent development, performance
expertise, and reflection-in-action illuminate the motivational factors, psychological attributes,
and intuitive artistry that I applied to my analysis and interpretation of talent identification and
decision-making in professional baseball scouts. In the next chapter, I outlined and explained the
methodology I conducted in my qualitative study.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
To explore the perceptual knowledge of professional baseball scouts’ talent identification
assessments and decision-making I selected a phenomenological methodology from the tradition
of qualitative research (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Creswell, 1998; Moustakas, 1994; Taylor &
Bogdan, 1998). This chapter describes the phenomenological approach to qualitative research
methodology and my application to professional baseball scouts’ firsthand experiences and
perceptual knowledge. In the subsequent section, I explained the setting of my home office, my
methodology for recruiting and interviewing professional baseball scouts, and I described how I
will safeguard the confidentiality of my subjects, collect, and analyze my data. Last, I mapped
my approach for ensuring optimal methodological reliability and validity.
Qualitative Research
I chose qualitative inquiry because the definition and discovery of talent are not clearly
understood, and qualitative research places the investigator in the natural field of action as a data
gathering agent to employ inductive analysis of participant views and interpret the meaning of
lived experiences (Creswell, 1998). Talent is difficult to define, and the philosophical and
empirical debates regarding its origin(s) are extensive. In turn, the ultimate goal of professional
baseball scouts is accurate performance prediction, but the scientific method presupposes
prediction is “based upon accurate description and explanation” (Regnier et al., 1993). As a
result, the ambiguous nature of talent identification is not well-suited to a priori hypotheses;
rather, qualitative research frequently begins with the question “how,” and my study explores
how professional baseball scouts describe and explain talent identification and prospect decisionmaking. To this end, I selected the qualitative research tradition as the most effective approach
to understand scouts’ knowledge and judgment of prospective professional baseball players, and
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I based this strategy on the sensitivity of qualitative research to participant perceptions and
perspectives.
Qualitative research produces rich descriptive data in a natural setting by staying on the
leading edge of participant narratives, behaviors, and responses (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975;
Cresswell, 1998; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Professional scouts are employed to conduct
observational discovery in the field and interpret the attributes and potential of baseball
prospects. Comparatively, qualitative researchers capture the voice of participants to conduct
inductive reasoning and interpretative analysis (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Creswell, 1998;
Regnier et al., 1993; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Additionally, the transparency and rigors of
qualitative research fully disclose any potential researcher biases and/or distortions to safeguard
validity and ensure data is holistically presented and analyzed from all vantages (Bogdan &
Taylor, 1975; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998).
Sensitive to participants’ frame of reference, qualitative researchers do not enter the field
with a priori hypotheses; instead, they embrace a flexible design (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998).
Baseball scouting, like qualitative research, is a craft, and the available research suggests expert
performers think and train differently than non-experts. Analogous to this concept, Taylor and
Bogdan (1998) characterized qualitative researchers as focused and “concerned with how people
think and act in their daily lives” (p. 8).
Critics of qualitative research often question the generalizability of results, but qualitative
research seeks to uncover emergent truths and make meaning that is often “lost in other research
approaches” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975, p. 5). Emergent truth rises from participant perspectives
as qualitative investigators code data, identify themes, map processes, and develop hypotheses
from focused discovery (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Creswell, 1998; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). In
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turn, qualitative research features two primary theoretical perspectives, and in the following
section I explain the perspective I selected for my study, phenomenological methodology (Taylor
& Bogdan, 1998).
Phenomenology
This investigation seeks to more clearly understand how professional scouts define player
attributes and make decisions about Major League prospects. Public assumptions about scouts
(and/or coaches) presume their knowledge is instinctive and typically list judgment as a key
attribute in successful job performance (Christensen, 2009; Jones et al., 2003; Nash & Collins,
2006). Descriptively, phenomenological research embraces the study of lived experience
(phenomenon) through participants’ first-person descriptions of cognitions (Cresswell, 1998),
and this philosophical stance maintains “knowledge based on intuition and essence precedes
empirical knowledge” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 26). Phenomenologically, and in the context of this
study, when scouts visually assess baseball prospects, what scouts “see intuitively constitutes its
meaning” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 70), and this intuition exposes the opportunity for gleaning
deeper understanding about the essence of professional scouts’ understanding of baseball talent
identification.
Phenomenologists view human science and the creation of knowledge as a perpetually
ascending ladder of experiential understanding (Moustakas, 1994). In brief, one’s internal,
conscious experience is secured by intentionality, and intentionality of consciousness describes
how one perceives an object or experience (Moustakas, 1994). Specifically, perception is an
intentional action, and “intentionality” is comprised of the two-part dynamic of what one
perceives (noema) and how one makes meaning (noesis) of their perceptual experience
(Moustakas, 1994). That is, the noema represents the textural view of what our mind’s eye
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perceives, and it is subject to the variances of vantage points, such as timing, prior experiences,
aspirations, and angle of view (Moustakas, 1994). In turn, noesis denotes one’s structural
interpretation of perception, and the dual elements of this internal dynamic are mutually
dependent (Moustakas, 1994).
Phenomenological research stresses the importance of intentionality and examines the
implicit meaning or “essence” of lived experiences (Cresswell, 1998). Lived experiences are
typically mined from statements and responses collected from long interviews, and
phenomenological researchers group these statements in thematic bundles to reflectively search
for meaning in participants’ textural descriptions (what they experienced) and structural
descriptions (how they interpreted their experience). Moustakas (1994) defined the goal of
phenomenological research as the discovery of experiential meaning making, and he stated this is
accomplished when participants descriptively disclose their experiences and from this data
researchers extract meaning, described as “the essences or structures of the experience” (p. 13).
The philosophical foundations of phenomenological research are grounded in four
principles, namely: (1) the search for wisdom; (2) the elimination of prejudgments; (3) the
intentionality of consciousness; and, (4) the conviction that reality is a product of consciousness
(Cresswell, 1998). In addition, phenomenological research pivots on four operational truths: (1)
the centrality of epoche (or, bracketing); (2) the efficacy of researcher questions that fully
explore participants’ experiences; (3) the “reduction” of data analysis; and, (4) achieving
understanding (“essence”) of the participants’ experiences (Cresswell, 1998). The synthesis of
these principles and procedures begins with the disposal of researcher prejudgments,
accomplished by bracketing (“epoche”), or the dismissal of one’s preconceived notions, biases,
and fears, followed by the transparent trusting of intuition and imagination to interpret the
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essence of participants’ experiences (Cresswell, 1998; Moustakas, 1994). The essence of these
experiences is made clear through reduction, described as “the analysis of specific statements
and themes, and a search for all possible meanings” (Cresswell, 1998, p. 52), or, as Moustakas
(1994) described, “the essences of experience are the invariant meanings” (p. 51). In the
following section I detail the specific plans of my research design.
Research Plan Details
Setting
The empirical base of my study is the phenomenological analysis of in-depth, in-person
interviews with thirteen veteran professional scouts currently or formerly employed by Major
League Baseball franchises. Interviews began in March, 2016 and concluded in July, 2016. I
interviewed participants at ball parks, in hotel rooms, and at restaurants in the states of Florida,
Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
Recruitment and Selection of Participants
The 13 participants in this study are males currently or formerly employed by MLB
organizations, and I assembled my prospect list based on two criteria. One, participants had to
have at least six years of experience as an MLB area scout. Two, participants had to have a
minimum of 18 years of combined scouting experience at the professional and/or NCAA
Division I baseball levels.
Taste for true talent is potentially the byproduct of extended years of high-level baseball
experiences, and, as Kerrane (1999) detailed, the development of intuition from “well-stocked
memory banks” (p. 324). I selected the range of minimum years and level(s) of experience
because of its alignment with Bloom (1985) and Ericsson et al.’ (1993) frameworks for the
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duration and intensity of talent development, as well as the potential influence of extensive highlevel baseball experiences on scouts’ decision-making tendencies (Kahneman, 2011; Lewis,
2004; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). Phenomenologically, if what professional baseball scouts “see
constitutes its meaning” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 70), then the collection of scouts’ narrative data is
potentially enriched when the range and diversity of participants’ prior experiences are enlarged.
My participants consisted of thirteen men, 12 Caucasian and one African-American, who
are currently employed as scouts by Major League organizations. These men ranged in age from
51-68 years; their average length of service as scouts with Major League franchises exceeded 28
years; and the length of their professional scouting tenures spanned from six to 43 years of
service. To further protect the anonymity of my participants, I refrained from creating a tabular
description that listed their pseudonyms, ages, scouting roles, and years of service. MLB
organizations routinely employ only one area scout per region. The states where I interviewed
my participants are clearly portrayed, and a columnar depiction of this study’s participants likely
compromises their identities through the context and content of their narrative stories and
statements portrayed in my data chapter.
My participants represent a stellar group of veteran professional scouts who amassed in
excess of 250 years combined service with Major League organizations. The lifework
accomplishments of my 13 scout participants included the following professional benchmarks:
Five advanced to become scouting cross-checkers; two participants progressed in their careers to
assume the role of scouting director on three occasions; one served as an international scout;
three became special assistants to the General Manager; two ascended to the position of Major
League advance scout; four spent the entirety of their professional scouting careers with the same
MLB organization; seven conducted minor league coverage as professional scouts; two
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previously managed minor league baseball teams; seven played professional baseball; six
previously coached college baseball; one advanced to become a Major League player; and, two
participants are members of scouting Halls of Fame.
I am a former collegiate baseball coaching veteran (Mid-Atlantic Region); I previously
met 11 of the 13 participants in my former coaching roles; and, I coached with and/or against
three of my 13 participants. My professional and relational communications with all prospective
participants virtually ceased when I simultaneously departed from coaching and the Mid-Atlantic
Region in 2000. As a result of my lengthy coaching tenure, I am well-versed in the language of
baseball, fluent in the terminology of baseball scouting, and as one who previously signed and
developed professional baseball draft selections I enjoy a measure of respect and rapport with
professional scouts in the areas of talent identification and development.
In February 2016, I collected mobile phone numbers and e-mail addresses for prospective
participants from three of my former players who served as Division I head baseball coaches.
These coaches served as resources for securing potential scout participants’ contact information.
It is customary for area scouts and Division I baseball coaches within that area to share contact
information.
I sent twenty-nine prospective participants a personal electronic letter with a summary
description of my study and an invitation to participate. When I received an affirmative
response, I telephoned or emailed each prospect and informed them that the purpose of my study
is to understand how professional baseball scouts define prospect attributes and make player
selections. I scheduled a date, time, and location to conduct an in-person interview with each
participant. I discussed the necessary elements of consent, confidentiality, risks, and benefits inperson with each participant, received their signatory approval, and provided them with a copy of
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the consent form. Participant interviews averaged nearly forty-two minutes and ranged from
sixteen minutes to almost seventy-five minutes. No conflict of interest threats existed, and
consent to interview, professional collegiality, and conversational freedom unfolded without
episode.
Ethical Considerations and Confidentiality
Empathy is both intentional and integral for effective qualitative research (Moustakas,
1994). In turn, relating to participants’ experiences hinges on the researcher’s ability to build
“an atmosphere of freedom, openness, and trust” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 39), and this climate of
integrity is hedged by confidentiality (Cresswell, 1998). As a result, I transparently secured
participant consent, fully informed each participant of my study’s risks and benefits, and I
ensured each participant’s confidentiality. In the forthcoming sections I mapped the processes I
employed for conducting an ethical, confidential study.
Protection of participants. I am no longer a certified NCAA baseball recruiter, my
study did not ask questions about specific baseball prospects, and this separation assured
professional baseball scout participants that no competition in scouting prospects or conflict of
interest existed. I stressed to participants the freedom to withdraw from this study regardless of
timing or reason prior to the publication of my study’s results. In the event a participant chose to
withdraw from the study, I assured each participant that all data collection regarding their
participation will be deleted and shredded. I also informed participants of their freedom to
abstain from answering any specific question during the interview.
Confidentiality is a critical foundation of this study, and I did not reveal participants’
names, MLB organizations, and contact information. I ascribed pseudonyms for each participant
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and coded their responses with this label. As the principle and sole investigator, the actual
names of the participants and their assigned pseudonym are stored as objects in my memory.
I stored electronic data in two password protected computers that require double
authentication, and I singularly maintained the collection and access to all collected data. I
stored audio-taped and written narrative data in a locked filing drawer in my professional office,
and, while traveling, the same data sources remained in my briefcase and on my person or
securely locked in my hotel room safe. My faculty research advisor did not request access to my
unidentifiable research data.
Risks and Benefits. I clearly and comprehensively informed all participants about the
risks and benefits associated with their involvement in my study. I maintained anonymity, and
risk of participant response recognition among MLB franchise employees and/or collegiate
baseball coaches is remote.
The implicit benefit of involvement for participants is the self-satisfaction associated with
chronicling one’s talent assessment knowledge and playing a personal role in the advancement of
the talent identification and decision-making literature specific to professional baseball. Scouts
seldom have formal opportunities to explain their insights and judgment processes outside the
cloistered realm of professional baseball, and scout participants demonstrated sincere interest in
the opportunity to tell their story and explain their talent identification knowledge.
Consent. When securing consent, I addressed the specific procedures, risks, benefits,
confidentiality, and voluntary participation with each participant in-person. Within this
informational session, I explained the meaning and the details of the University of St. Thomas
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IRB consent form (Appendix E) to determine each scout’s full understanding and signatory
approval.
Data Collection Methods
Qualitative research is distinctive for and typically occurs in natural settings (Bogdan &
Taylor, 1975; Creswell, 1998; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Professional baseball scouts’ stories
represent the data collection of this investigation. Scouts annually evaluate hundreds of amateur
baseball players, and this study endeavored to interpret the concepts that scouts employ in
making assessments and forecasting potential. In turn, professional baseball scouts conduct their
work and live large percentages of their lives “on the road,” and I interviewed participants at a
timing, site, and setting conveniently combined with their travel schedule. I personally funded
my data collection travel, and participants did not receive any financial benefits for participation
in this study.
Prior to traveling to conduct each interview, I electronically sent a reminder of our
appointment, my mobile phone number, and a brief, general interview guide to each participant.
The framework for the interview guide focused on two themes: (1) how scouts define, describe,
and perceive baseball talent and attributes based upon their personal experiences and
preferences; and, (2) scouts’ fundamental philosophy for judging performance potential and
making decisions to identify or eliminate Major League prospects. I designed the in-depth, inperson interviews to be reflexive in nature, and the purpose of the pre-interview communication
served to help participants stimulate recollections and reflections in advance.
As principle investigator I personally conducted each interview. Upon arrival for each
in-person interview, I re-introduced myself to each participant and allowed each participant to do
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the same. This mutual re-introduction focused on mapping our career movements and
professional roles over the past 15 years, and this conversational period established a setting of
ease, comfort, and trust.
Prior to recording each interview, I re-stated the purpose of my study and reinforced the
elements of confidentiality, the process of audio-taped responses, and answered any questions. I
positioned the microphone in front of each respondent and announced when audio-taped
responses began.
In the in-depth interviews I prompted scouts with open-ended questions to share their
narrative beliefs about baseball talent identification and their understanding of how they assess
talent, attributes, and judgments. I encouraged participants to tell their story of professional
baseball scouting as it related to my research question.
Scout participants determined the path of each interview, and I shepherded their
responses with the following list of thematic questions to ensure that connections pertaining to
talent identification and decision-making were disclosed in the narratives: (1) how do you define
baseball talent and attributes?; (2) how did you develop your scouting intuitions and instincts?;
(3) how do you ensure what you see and interpret is accurate?; (4) how do you determine a
prospect’s value to your organization?; (5) how do you forecast a prospect’s future performance?
The thematic questions served as a topical dashboard for exploring how scouts perceive
baseball talent, attributes and decision-making. Christensen (2009) stated “telling tales and
recounting anecdotes is a fundamental human way of giving meaning to experiences” (pp. 368369), and the form of my interview plan concentrated on drawing out scouts’ narrative
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recollections that are fundamental to their knowledge of talent identification and forecasting
performance expertise.
Successfully drawing out scouts’ narratives and insights required that I fully engage as an
active listener (Moustakas, 1994). In addition, I recorded descriptive notes during each interview
to capture body language and comparative, anecdotal, and/or metaphorical expressions.
Christensen (2009) stated “body language punctuates verbal language’s deficiency in describing
the expert knowledge coaches have” (p. 371), and I recorded these behaviors and language forms
to gain deeper understanding into scouts’ talent identification and decision-making insights.
I personally recorded and transcribed the audio text of each in-depth interview session.
While tedious and lengthy compared to employing a transcription service, I preferred to
personally transcribe interviews because it reinforces my intimate awareness with and reflections
about participants’ narrative responses and readily triggered reflective notes for later theme
development (Creswell, 1998). Upon completion of every transcription, each participant
received an electronic copy to verify the accuracy of his narrative account. In turn, participants
had the opportunity to make corrections, and, in an effort to preserve anonymity, modify or
delete any specific responses. In the subsequent section I explained my data analysis
methodology.
Data Analysis
Upon verifying the accuracy of all transcriptions, I analyzed in-depth interviews
employing Moustakas’ (1994) modification of the Van Kaam method for phenomenological
research. In my data analysis, I followed Moustakas (1994) seven-stage, stepwise process
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culminating in “a composite description of the meanings and essences” (Moustakas, 1994, p.
121) of how professional baseball scouts define player attributes and make decisions.
In step one, I re-read participants’ narratives, my reflective and observational notes and
created codes for the statements relevant to my research question. Moustakas (1994) defines this
“preliminary grouping” as “horizonalization,” and in step two he provides two screening
questions to ensure the data extracted (e.g. statements) “are the invariant constituents of the
experience” (pp. 120-121). In the subsequent step, I assembled the coded statements in
“clustered” bundles that reflect “the core themes” scouts expressed when describing their
perspectives regarding baseball talent identification and judgment (Moustakas, 1994, p. 121).
Step four involved the validation and conclusive identification of scouts’ meaningful expressions
as filtered through two screening questions. During this step, I re-evaluated themes and
expressions for completeness and relevance. I consistently updated my dissertation chair, and,
while maintaining participant confidentiality, solicited his feedback, insights, and interpretive
counsel regarding my thematic interpretation of scouts’ statements. The culmination of this
initial four-step data identification, reduction, and labeling process delivered clear thematic
expressions of participants’ core experiences (Moustakas, 1994).
Incorporating transcribed expressions, steps five and six resulted in the textural and
structural descriptions of “how” scouts define and experience baseball talent assessment and
decision-making (Moustakas, 1994). Step seven followed with a “Textural-Structural
Description of the meanings and essences” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 121) of baseball talent
assessment and decision-making for each participant, and I developed a conceptual map based on
the comparative differences, similarities, interdependencies, and potential cause-effect
relationships.
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Validity and Reliability in Qualitative Research
Phenomenological investigations are not intended to yield broad generalizations, but
rather “to determine what an experience means for the persons who had the experience”
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 13). This determination pivots on methodological reliability and validity,
and a principle focus of my data analysis was the establishment of sound protocols for data
synthesis and reduction to ensure strength of internal validity (Creswell, 1998; Moustakas,
1994). In the subsequent section I explain the processes I employed for ensuring internal
validity, and I disclose researcher reliability considerations.
Internal Validity. Qualitative research is not initiated with the development of a priori
hypotheses in search of cause-effect relationships. Rather, comparative differences, similarities,
interdependencies, and/or cause-effect relationships often unfold in the process of qualitative
data analysis and interpretation (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). As a result, methodological protocols
that ensure high quality data synthesis are critical for conveying internal validity in qualitative
research.
My study employed several simple structures to foster strong internal validity. First, I
conducted my study within the borders of a limited scope. Specifically, I designed this
investigation to explore how thirteen veteran professional baseball scouts define player attributes
and make decisions to identify or eliminate Major League prospects. To this end, my results can
only directly apply to the context of these phenomena within the confines of my participants. In
addition, I transparently disclosed my prior experiences and relationships. No unanticipated
threats to internal validity surfaced in the process of data collection.
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Second, my prior experiences served as a strength to validity regarding access and data
analysis. My tenure in baseball provided me access to a sector of society that operates nearly
invisible to public awareness and my background as an applied sport psychologist served to
broaden my cognitions. More importantly, my participants’ statements directed the thematic
elements of their core perspectives, and my stepwise data analysis employed screening filters
that promoted reflective exploration of alternative connections and explanations. In turn, my
results include participant statements conveyed in a fashion that engage the reader as a cointerpreter.
Third, although my research question and setting are unique, prior empirical
investigations and theoretical frameworks regarding talent identification, talent development, and
performance expertise potentially create an opportunity for cross verification of results through
triangulation (Creswell, 1998). As a result, data triangulation may prove instrumental in building
a conceptual model incorporating the talents and attributes fundamental to the development of
baseball expertise and increasing an organization’s yield of Major League players.
Generalizability. Qualitative research limits generalizations by the very nature of
participant selection and naturalistic design (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). My phenomenological
study is no exception. However, Taylor and Bogdan (1998) stated the “goal of qualitative
research is to examine how things look from different vantage points” (p. 9), and the talent
identification and judgment components of my research question hold limited transferability to
other performance disciplines and settings.
My interest in talent identification and decision-making deepened as I worked with
search consultants to identify prospective presidents, vice presidents, and head coaches over the
past decade. This study investigated the “hiring process” (i.e., amateur draft selections) of
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prospective baseball players and the methodology professional baseball scouts employ to project
performance success at the next level of play. This study uncovered meaningful insights that are
marginally applicable to forecasting performance expertise across other contexts and settings.
Researcher Bias. My prior professional and scholarly experiences positively sway my
biases toward the efficacy of talent development, the synergistic impact of psychological
attributes and physical ability, and the wonder of unrealized, undiscovered, and wasted
performance potential. However, while these personal experiences predominate, like
professional baseball scouts, I misjudged talent on many occasions throughout my professional
career. In turn, my deeper inclination is found within a sincere personal pursuit to explore
scouts’ “tastes” for talent and player selection while holistically exercising an analytical
perspective from all vantages.
My methodology explained my case for employing the qualitative research tradition
through phenomenological methods, and I detailed my research process. My research plan
described the setting, recruitment and selection of participants, ethical considerations and
confidentiality, data collection methods, data analysis, and validity and reliability.
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CHAPTER FOUR: TALENT DEFINITIONS AND PROSPECT JUDGMENTS
The goal of professional baseball scouting is to make good talent identification decisions
that increase an organization’s yield of Major League players. Skillful judgment in talent
identification influences talent development and the pursuit and realization of performance
expertise. My personal scouting experiences inspired me to explore the insights of veteran
professional baseball scouts and to learn how their “taste for talent,” visual talent recognition,
and attributional definitions advise and inform their prospect decisions. Professional scouts
conduct field observations and evaluations of prospective players. I interviewed 13 veteran
baseball scouts to learn the essence of what scouts see, examine, and judge when they identify
and eliminate prospective players.
To isolate and examine veteran professional scouts’ processes for talent identification
assessments and decisions, I conducted in-person, in-depth, reflexive interviews. Through this
progression I gained a sense for how scouts’ dispositions channel their appraisal of baseball
tools, physicality, and competitive movements. In addition, scouts disclosed their interpretive
research methods, how they detect, value, and define psychological makeup traits, and, in the
end, how they project expert performers and resolve their draft choices.
In this chapter, I depict how my participants’ narrative expressions revealed textural as
well as structural descriptions regarding how scouts define and identify prospect attributes and
make player decisions. I employed Moustakas’ (1994) modification of the Van Kaam method
for phenomenological research, and the thematic expressions of my participants’ core
experiences are extensively presented here to engage the reader as a co-interpreter.
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Based on my participants’ core experiences, I introduce five the key themes emerging
from the data. These themes are: (1) scout dispositions; (2) field observation; (3) prospect
research; (4) expert performance forecasts; and, (5) player selection. Within the context of this
thematic framework, I map the components of visible talent recognition, and I outline the traits
of psychological makeup professional baseball scouts identify in prospects. In the end, I identify
how scouts define physical and psychological attributes, forecast performance expertise, and
make player judgments.
Scout Dispositions
The first theme emerging in my study is scout dispositions. The launching point for
understanding baseball talent identification begins with descriptions of these prevailing
dispositions. In brief, amateur players train and compete while professional baseball scouts
observe, compare, and project players’ tendencies. To this end, Manny summarized the general
function of a professional baseball scout in this way:
Scouting is all about observation. You’re sitting there. You’re observing. You’re not an
active participant. You’re not someone with a uniform on. You’re not throwing BP.
You’re not coaching ‘em. You’re not on the field. You’re just back there watching.

However, participant narratives also revealed two distinct classifications of scouting
dispositions: (1) open consideration; and (2) narrow mindset. Sam metaphorically framed these
branched mindsets by sharing the attitudinal perspective he learned when trained by his first
scouting cross-checker:
You take a funnel. You know how a funnel goes out? You look through that hole.
Everybody’s a prospect, everybody in that funnel is a prospect. So everybody on the
field is a prospect until they show you that they’re not. What some scouts do is they turn
the funnel the other way, and they look at that one player at shortstop. That’s the only
guy they’re looking at, nobody else they’re worried about. So they miss the other guy.
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Deeper still, Sam practiced this frame of mind through the application of three questions: “You
have to go ‘all these guys are good, but who’s special? Who’s gonna’ play above their tools?
And who’s on a decline?’” Joe characterized a similar perspective as “an open mind because
every kid changes,” and his self-reflections revealed a comparable sequence of questions:
Now we all get into the habits of ‘that guy can’t do that.’ It’s every year you’ve got to
adjust your sights and say ‘okay, I’ve gotta’ give this kid another shot.” Is he gotten’
better? Has he made himself into something where, ‘you know what, I can send him out
and he’s going to be a good part of the organization and he’s going to get to the Big
Leagues.’
Similar to Sam, Joe’s mindset reflected a personal, experiential teaching point about cumulative
training: “I kept improving and every kid does that.” Joe also highlighted the possible talent
identification oversights that can occur when scouts’ over-rely on visual evaluation and adopt a
narrow mindset: “You know that’s why you can’t take what you see on the field for everything.
Because we don’t know what they’re gonna be seven years down the road.”
The reality that nearly all players require minor league development and most never
advance to the Major Leagues potentially influences scouts’ talent identification conclusions, and
Joe described talent forecasting as a reciprocal relationship between sight and experiential
instinct: “So you’re seeing it with your eyes, and your gut’s saying ‘oh let’s see what this kid’s
gonna’ be like in a couple years’.” In addition, Joe pointed to a third inherent reality in
professional baseball talent identification – the prevalence of differing, individual perceptions:
So, you know your question ‘taste for talent’ is a hell of a question because there’s
different tastes for everybody. I’ll have a guy on my list this year that 27 other clubs
won’t, but they’ll have a guy on their list that I won’t have on my list. So we’re all
different, we’re all seeing something different.
Jeb illustrated perceptive differences through a scouting lesson learned when he
evaluated Dustin Pedroia, a prospect who later developed into a four-time Major League All-Star
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(2008-2010, 2013), American League Most Valuable Player (2008) and Rookie of the Year
(2007):
The tools weren’t obvious because he didn’t run very well. He didn’t throw very well.
He had a long swing, but he always seemed to get the barrel to the ball, come up with a
key hit in a key situation. But you kind of overlooked those things because you had a
5’9”, kind of chunky kid who could play the game.
Reflecting 12 years back, Jeb confessed: “Once you started to peel back the layers on Pedroia
there was a lot more underneath that kid than just his on field grit that was obvious.” At 5’9”,
175 pounds Pedroia represented an evaluation dilemma as an undersized player who, despite his
stature, visibly displayed valued makeup traits.
You saw that kid and the way he went about his business over a weekend series, you
knew he had toughness. You knew he had grit by the way he went about his pre-game,
by the way he went about his on-game preparation. Everything told you this kid loves
the game.
Dissecting the influence of nature’s impact on talent identification perspectives, Jermaine
depicted prospect height as a preferential focal point and a representative sixth physical tool in
the minds of some scouts:
The size, that’s another – you’re looking at five tools, the sixth tool is ‘how big is this
guy?’ He’s big, you can project him. Little guys gotta do it all the time; big guys only
gotta do it some of the time.
Six participants highlighted the influence of heritable size in talent identification, and Ted
characterized genetic height as a primal element and evaluative lens across several members of
the scouting community:
…but I know there’s cross-checkers that come in, you’re an amateur scout, and they’re
gonna come in – as soon as they see this guy’s a 6’ and under guy they’re probably not
even gonna watch. They’re just gonna eliminate because some of ‘em had, have always
got to the point where they don’t want to sign anybody unless he’s big – especially with
pitchers.
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More intensely, Ted reported: “I’m just saying that they’re bypassing guys on size, especially
pitchers – that’s a fact.” Jermaine also shared personal bewilderment with height infatuation –
“You look down a roster and right handers 6’4”, 6’5”, 6’3”, 6’6”. Very rarely do you see a 6’,
6’1” right hander – why? That puzzles me.” Illustrating his case, Jermaine pointed to the valued
makeup traits exemplified in previous undersized Major League All-Stars and questioned the
relevancy of height:
Bob Gibson was like 6’1” – he wasn’t a big dude. But they were fierce competitors.
They were fierce competitors. They had that internal instinct to win. They had ability.
They were undersized. Why can’t that guy be a guy today?
Jermaine challenged the height-centric focus of narrow mindsets and stated: “We go see guys in
these workouts that are 5’10”, 5’11” that are really good players. I think we overlook ‘em.”
These narratives described genetic height as a fulcrum that can turn the scope of the
funnel or lens through which scouts observe and judge prospects. However, Jermaine declared
that undersized prospects actually “can still get to the promised land,” and Ted theorized that
undersized Major League stars often serve as an antidote for height-driven, narrow mindsets:
The only thing that you can say about baseball is you got Altuve [shortest – 5’6” –
current MLB player] – that’s the only thing that stops us from being so overwhelmed
with size – at least there’s some guys, a Pedroia. So these guys are emerging in the Big
Leagues and at least it kinda puts a damper. Wait a minute now, a small guy can do it
too, in baseball.
While presumably both optimal and optional, evaluating height as a sixth tool draws a
boundary between nature and nurture, or, more specifically, between tools and makeup.
Jermaine described this borderline in the perspective of an “either/or” struggle:
So much of it is genetics. We have nothing to do with it. It’s what mom and dad gave
us. Either you’re 6’3” and 210 or you’re 5’10” 160. If you’re 5’10” and 160 you’ve
gotta overcome a lot of things.
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Jermaine shared this perspective as a byproduct of his personal experiences – both as a scout and
as a former late round draft pick who became a MLB pitcher.
I would be considered the small right hander, the undersized right hander at 6’1” 190,
200 pounds. I’m an undersized guy. In today’s world, I could be throwing 92, 93 –
probably what I was… – alright, pretty good, but not a lot of projection. Now 6’3”, 6’4”,
210 pounds, we’re gonna take that guy over this guy – because of body, genetics. Is that
right or wrong? I hated it when I was a player.
For area scouts, time is an observational luxury in meager supply, and Mack measured
the effects of open consideration and narrow mindset as a function of attentional frequency when
he recounted his evaluation of undersized, 5’6”, 160 pound, former MLB All-Star David
Eckstein:
You have to see him four or five games to appreciate him. You know, ‘ahhh, pretty good
player.’ Second game, ‘pretty good little player.’ Third game, ‘what’s this guy do?’
Well, he makes all the plays. Arm is average. He’s a 55 runner, a good situational hitter,
and then by the time you’re walkin’ outta the ballpark you go, ‘you know what? This
guy’s a pretty f___in’ good little player.’ Because he can execute.
Talent identification is influenced by quality and quantity of observational and research time, and
Mack’s example extolled the reflective benefits of repeated evaluations. Sam also described the
limitations of observation and prospect research: “we ask the guy [area scout] from basically the
middle of January to June 1st to know everything about his area he can possibly know. You can’t
do it. There’s too much information.” On the other hand, Joe depicted prospect evaluation as a
developmental progression spanning, in many cases, five to seven years as scouts build
observational histories with prospects across multiple seasons:
Every year is a new year, and some of those kids are now becoming freshmen and
sophomores at junior colleges, or you’ve seen ‘em now for five, six, seven years. So,
sophomore, junior, senior in high school we’ve been following ‘em for that long. Then
all of a sudden they get to college and it’s freshmen, sophomore, junior – so six years.
Joe summarized his observational disposition this way: “You know I think it really comes down
to keeping an open mind on all of them.”
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Keeping an open mind can be challenged by quantifiable physical tools. For example,
throwing velocity today is easily measured by the use of radar guns, and Ted stated, “As soon as
they started passing out guns to everybody, everything came down to the velocities for
everything.” In this context, Jermaine compared optimal velocities over time and how
measureable expectations experienced change and narrowed mindsets:
If you were a high school guy 20 years ago, when you were throwing 88 to 90 you were
throwing hard. Now if you’re 88 to 90 you’re getting overlooked. You better be
throwing 94, 96. We can see that, evaluate it.

Perspectives and expectations change in a competitive climate that values performance
improvement, and Sam shared: “Sometimes, old scouts, old veteran scouts say ‘this is the way it
used to be.’ Whoa, hold on. We can’t judge him on what it used to be. We gotta’ judge him on
what it is now.” Although quantifying performance measures for physical tools can provide
scouts with feelings of talent identification confidence, Sam stipulated that open consideration of
visual evaluations is a function of self-reflective questions, specifically the utility of repeatedly
asking the question “why?”: “The kids are the kids, and the players are the players, but we still
have to continue to ask the question ‘why?’ If we continue to do that, then you can continue to
see it, continue to notice it.” For Jeb, asking the question “how?” precipitated visual analysis of
baseball tools:
So, I’ve just kind of learned that there’s a lot more than just picking it up, throwing it
across the diamond, putting a good swing on a ball - it’s how the body moves. How
athletic is he? How much aptitude does he have?

The preeminence of a questioning mind, in Sam’s words, begins with embracing failure
as an inherent element in the never-ending development of professional baseball scouts.
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Well, part of it is that you’re gonna’ fail, and the failure forces you to ask the questions.
Because when you miss on that one guy you thought you had right, then you get humbled
very quickly. Then you go “okay, I gotta’ do more because I missed it. How did I miss
that?” As a scout, you always ask yourself, “how did I miss it?”
Gary echoed the inherent fallibility of scouting decisions as he underscored the importance of
owning this perspective as a stimulus for continued learning: “You gotta learn by your mistakes,
and I don’t care who you are, how good a scout you are, you’re gonna make mistakes.” In sum,
11 of 13 scout participants described the path to baseball talent identification expertise as a
journey that requires the consistent confirmation of humble uncertainty, specifically: evaluative
failures fuel internal reflections and open consideration of prospects is the product of consistent
questions.
A baseball scout with a narrow mindset is relatively devoid of humility and reticent to do
the work of asking continual questions. Sam described this mindset as the outgrowth of saying
“no” when baseball talent is not immediately, visually recognizable and reflective of the talents
of current Major League players:
And guys will drill…’what he can’t do, can’t do, can’t do that.’ ‘Hey, but he has plus
power. Hey, this guy can hit a fastball. Hey, this guy’s an 80 runner. Hey, this guy, you
know, he’s a really intelligent baseball player.’ But, because if you say ‘no,’ I don’t have
to go find makeup. I don’t have to go back and see him play again. I ain’t’ gotta’ talk
with mom. I ain’t’ gotta’ talk to the coach. I ain’t’ gotta’ talk to the athletic director. I
don’t have to talk to the news guy. I don’t have to talk to anybody.
Said differently, open consideration reflects a positive mindset and a passion for doing the work
and asking the questions associated with prospect research. In this regard, Bart measured
scouting effort as the sum of observational evaluations: “So you see a guy over and over, it takes
work ethic. You have to have a work ethic to do this.” More poignantly, Sam conjoined
inattentive scouting with the tendency to say “no,” and he explained it this way:
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Because the easiest thing for scouts to say is “no.” You know why? Because you don’t
have to do anything when you say “no.” This kid’s not a prospect. Go to the next guy. I
don’t like this guy. Move on to the next guy.

Narrow mindset scouts view their talent identification skills as a previously arrived destination in
lieu of embracing the process of their role as comprising perpetual learning and growth. Sam
characterized this approach to baseball talent identification as a point of view devoid of humility
and passion for prospect research:
And see, when scouts get to the point where they go, ‘I’m good. I got it figured out.’
Then they’re screwed, because now they don’t want to learn anymore, they don’t have a
desire to go out and ask the questions ‘why?’ Now they walk in the ballpark and go,
‘he’s a guy, he’s a guy, he’s not a guy.’ No!
Professional baseball scouts are tasked with evaluating thousands of prospects in an
industry laden with low odds of success and comprised of only 6,000 minor and 750 Major
League players. In reality, most baseball prospects will never be drafted and far fewer will reach
the Major Leagues. This climate, from Sam’s experiential vantage point, can occlude the open
consideration of prospects:
So what happens with scouts they become negative because our job is to tear people
apart. What they can’t do – he can’t do this, he can’t do that, he can’t do this. So after 10
years, 15 years, 20 years, nobody can play because your mindset has gone to what guys
can’t do.

Mack acknowledged the existence of this mindset and shared: “There’s certain guys that I think
we overlook. I think we’re as scouts, we’re more interested in what guys can’t rather than what
guys can do.” Sam provided an illustration of how the open consideration of prospects optimally
unfolds:
Well, the good scouts, the guys that understand what they’re doing, they go ‘he does this
well, he does this well, this is a weakness but we can improve it.’ You can’t take a guy
that’s a three and make him a six. You can take a guy with a three make him a four. He
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has a six, which is positive, we can make it a seven. So finding things he does well, and,
if we can take the weakness and make them not major weaknesses, then we’re okay,
because they get to the Big Leagues because of the things they do well, not because of the
things they can’t.

Breaking away from the search for polished performance expertise and adopting instead a
talent development mindset focused on identifying positive baseball tools increases clarity in the
midst of uncertainty. Joe portrayed the antithesis of open consideration in his critique of college
baseball scouts: “The college coaches. They’ll see a kid as a sophomore, ‘can’t play.’ When he
comes back that next year it’s like ‘well, he couldn’t play last year, why’s he gonna’ be able to
play this year?’” Sam also described the absence of open consideration and adaptive thinking in
collegiate baseball scouts:
You sit there, you college coaches do the same thing – ‘not for me. Not for me.’ Worst
statement ever by anyone that evaluates players: ‘not for me.’ Now he can’t get better.
Everybody can get better with work. Everybody can get better – they may not be
extremely much better, but you can take a four and make it a five.
In turn, Bart summed his assessment of narrow mindsets and minimal research effort in stating:
“You can’t say go in there one time ‘I saw him, this is what he is.’ Really?” Sam shared a
similar thread of constructive criticism and outlined the perpetual nature of prospect research:
“’I saw three games. I met with the family. I’m good.’ No you’re not! There’s more work that
has to be done.” Perhaps most powerfully, Sam framed the essence of effective scouting
dispositions in the following principle: “Well, my biggest thing for scouts is just like players,
don’t be negative – like players, because somebody has to play.” In turn, good baseball scouting
is both deliberate and perpetual, and, in Sam’s perspective, the necessary information is in the
field and available to all: “So we have to continue to keep watching: watching makeup,
watching players, because it’s all there. You just have to sit back and watch it, and if you can get
it, it’s good.”
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Although a narrow mindset evaluates a smaller array of prospects and inordinately relies
upon genetic and quantitative tools to assumedly enjoy elevated levels of talent identification
confidence, this disposition tends to be negative, conduct cursory research, over-focus on talent
deficiencies, and overlook performance expertise in the making. Conversely, an open
consideration disposition embraces the reflective benefits of repeated observations and a
questioning mind, owns failure as a stimulus for perpetual learning, identifies prospect strengths,
employs adaptive thinking and a talent development mindset, and acknowledges the humble
uncertainty associated with talent identification in human performers.
In my data from veteran professional baseball scouts I uncovered three themes of talent
identification leading to prospect selection. My findings reflect a sequential process influenced
by scout dispositions indicating a framework of: (1) field observation; (2) prospect research;
and, (3) projecting expert performers.
In the subsequent sections I define and describe the core elements of the talent
identification and player selection process through the narrative perspectives and experiences of
my research participants. In turn, I relate how players perform, scouts observe, and how the
inductive process of professional baseball talent identification and judgment is revealed.
Field Observation
The second theme arising from my data is field observation. Participant findings
revealed a sequential process for professional baseball talent identification. Scouts channel field
observation through three coordinated lens of judgment: (1) physicality and tools; (2) confident
movements; and, (3) comparative recall. This integrated three-part series of actions lays the
foundation for determining the feasibility of conducting deeper prospect research.
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Physicality and Tools
Position players and pitchers are first evaluated and graded on the presence of five
baseball tools. For position players, these tools consist of hitting for power, hitting for average,
running speed, fielding, and arm strength (Rymer, 2013; Story, 2000). The five tools evaluated
among pitchers consist of delivery and mechanics, fastball velocity and movement, breaking ball
spin, change-up, and control (Rymer, 2013; Story, 2000). In turn, scouts individually attribute a
numerical grade to prospects’ tools for reporting purposes. Specifically, scouts employ a 20 to
80 point grading scale with 50 representing Major League average: 20 (poor); 30 (well below
average); 40 (below average); 50 (average); 60 (above average); 70 (well above average); 80
(outstanding) (Rymer 2013; Story, 2000). This Likert grading scale emerged in the 1970’s with
the arrival of the Major League Scouting Bureau, and, despite individual differences, its’
intended goal is to standardize and quantify tools evaluations (Rymer, 2013).
All scout participants classified tools identification as both the first and the most
straightforward stage in the process of baseball talent assessment. Jeb stated that “as far as the
evaluation goes that hasn’t changed a lot about identifying tools,” and he later shared: “You start
there [5 tools], and once you see that – when you see a kid that’s got that, alright ‘how’s the
body?’ ‘Where’s the body?’ You kind of check your boxes.”

In effect, identifying tools

precedes and determines if deeper prospect research is warranted. Additionally, Joe praised the
tools scale for its clarity, simplicity, and purifying properties:
The talent’s easy. We’ve got a scale – most of the time he’s out. He’s out. I mean that’s
all there is to it, he’s out. You know, if he doesn’t run fast enough or throw hard enough
or hit the ball far enough or make enough contact, then he’s out.
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Ted also stressed the illuminating expediency of tools grading: “I’m gonna eliminate guys real
quick when I don’t see certain things, and the tools have to be there. Tools are gonna eliminate
the guy 90 percent of the time.”
Conceptually, average tool grades represent the minimum entry requirements to
professional baseball, and, in Joe’s perspective, consistent application of this scale minimizes
prospect decision-making dilemmas: “The scale as far as I’m concerned is very simple, very
easy for a reason. If we stick to the scale we don’t have problems.” Tool grades provide Major
League baseline comparisons for minimum physical abilities, and, as Mack emphasized,
requisite tools outweigh and precede the efficacy of psychological makeup:
And nine times out of 10…the kid’s got no chance and let’s face it, you can have all the
makeup and intangibles that you want – and they are important – but number one you
gotta have tools in order to play up there [Major Leagues].
Additionally, each position on the field has a weighted hierarchy of required tools. In
plain talk, a prospect’s tools need to fit the demands of each defensive position, and offensive
tools need to complement an organization’s favored style of offense and run production needs.
These weighted values can prompt adaptive analyses of prospect strengths and weaknesses, and
Joe expounded on the merits of standardized positional profiles:
We have problems when we look out there and we say, ‘well, you know, we think he’s a
shortstop, but you know the shortstop scale says he’s at least gotta’ have an average arm.’
If he doesn’t have an average arm he’s out. Now, ‘where do you move him to now?
Second base? Third base?’ Well he’s gotta’ have a better arm at third.
The deeper principle in Joe’s applied example is the reflective creativity that tool grades can
induce when a prospect’s physical attributes fail to meet the Major League average for the
position he currently plays. In effect, evaluating baseball ability is a visual, interpretative
process, and Mack explained how he dissects the component parts of whole tools: “How do I
judge you? Well, I can judge you on your BP, your approach, your bat speed, and your balance
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– I can see that. And as a fielder, I can see hands, feet, agility, arm strength.” In turn, Joe
provided a similar yet individually different example of whole-part hitting diagnosis:
The hitting – you put it into components – obviously strength, you put in hand-eye
coordination, you’re putting in balance. Then you’re looking at the ability to make
constant, solid contact. You know, once you see that kid that makes consistent, solid
contact I think he’s got a chance to hit.
To this end, several scouts identified hitting as both the most valuable and the most difficult tool
to identify and forecast. Jeb emphasized the importance of the ability to hit: “Once I find – that’s
a commodity in today’s game, is the bat. So, we finally find a bat: now, we’re going to pick it
apart.” Joe described his chief pursuit: “it comes down to the hit. You know we can do all the
drills in the world to get his arm good. Speed is kinda a God-given thing. We can make him a
better defender.” Similarly, Ted revealed the challenges associated with forecasting the
transference of hitting power from practice to competitive output: “Power is tougher to me
though to project because there’s the big strong, brut guy that can muscle it out in BP all day
long. May not hit in the game enough….”
Tool assessment is not only the first step for discerning if subsequent evaluations will
ensue, but, as Bart confessed, it represents the emotional fascination that moves scouts to act:
“What gets you to the ball park as a scout is talent. That’s what’s pulling us in – ‘this kid does
this, this kid does that’….” In a deeper sense, Joe combined scouts’ movements to follow a
prospect with the stimulation of visual knowledge: “He showed you something. It’s not your
gut telling ya’ whether or not you’re going to go further, but your eyes have seen something.
You’ve seen that kid.” In effect, visual confirmation of prospect tools ignites a sense of
evaluative ownership and a desire for deeper investigation, and Joe explained that “if you follow
‘em, you’re following ‘em for a reason – something, a tool has tweaked your interest, whether
it’s the arm strength, or a breaking ball, or the ability to hit and make contact.” In a related
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perspective, Manny expounded on the deeper understanding associated with visually
experiencing the physicality of prospect tools:
But you still have to see it, still have to see it – you’ve got to experience it in person.
You have to experience the physicality. You have to experience the speed, the power, the
– you know from a pitcher’s perspective – the deception, the life of the fastball.
The physicality of the game is played out in millisecond intervals and characterized by
subtle movements, deceptive actions, and constant adjustments. To this end, Manny also
explained how today’s evaluative technologies and increased demands for prospect information
can emotionally anesthetize scouts:
But in this day and age, I really think it’s changed where you really don’t have that much
emotion because you’re just an information-gatherer as an area scout. You’re just an
information-gatherer, and sometimes it’s just hard to watch a game because you’re sitting
there videoing. You know, ‘what was the pitch?’ I don’t know what the pitch was.
‘Was it a curveball?’ I don’t know. I have no idea.
Although technological advances allow scouts to video prospects’ fundamental skills, measure
spin rate, track throwing velocities, and compute the speed and distance of the ball off the bat, all
scout participants confirmed that visual knowledge in baseball talent identification is most
powerfully absorbed in person.
Confident Movements
The second element of visible talent recognition unfolds in tandem with physicality and
tools. Specifically, several scouts detailed the importance of first impressions and prospect
mannerisms – confident movements, in a phrase – as critical clues within the process of baseball
talent identification. To this end, Joe linked body language with his first observations and his
decisions to identify or eliminate prospects:
The first impression is just about everything, because a lot of times you won’t go back if
a guy gives you a bad first impression, you know? Body language I would probably say
is the one thing that first time seeing a kid, “how does he present himself?” Does he have
good body language? Does he have bad body language?
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Mack echoed this conviction and further elaborated that, in his experience, a prospect’s inner
self-confidence and baseball identity are visually perceptible through his movements:
You know certain guys have that, have that bounce. They have that walk; they have that
confidence about themselves. Body language for me is always important in a kid. How
does this kid handle himself? You know, there’s an assuredness with this kid, about ‘I
can get this done. I’m better than everybody else.’
Jermaine both acknowledged his affinity for body language – “Obviously I watch body language
on and off the field, in the dugout if you can see him” – and he described the careful study of
body language as a method for applying fine focus through a wide funnel talent observation lens:
If you’ve been around a little bit and you got pretty good eyes, you just watch how they
play catch, watch how they walk on and off the field, watch how they go about BP. You
can figure it out. I’m not saying you’re gonna be right a hundred percent of the time.
Your first glimpses are looking at bodies. You go back to that body thing, “this guy
looks like a guy.” How are they warming up?
Body language is manifested in actions, mannerisms, and movements that leave visual
impressions on scouts’ minds. In this regard, prospect movements serve as symbolic clues that
scouts intuitively interpret as reflections of confidence, maturity, leadership, and desire.
Jermaine disclosed the intentionality of his focused study of prospects’ actions, and, in the case
of arm strength, he anecdotally explained:
Actions. For a pitcher, or an outfielder or an infielder – for a guy that can throw – they’ll
show ya’ he can throw. Guys who can’t throw they’ll mess around. But a guy that can
throw, that’s got an arm, they’re gonna show you they can throw….Guys that don’t, they
won’t.
In plain talk, prospects with an above average tool will look for opportunities to display their
superiority, to showcase trust in their tools. Joe also avowed an affinity for prospects that are
perceptibly not afraid to take charge within the framework of a team:
So, you know you’re always looking for that kid that’s not afraid to go up to another kid.
I don’t know what he’s saying, but he’s talking to him in a private manner ‘hey, you need
to do it this way’ or ‘you did great on that, let’s go!’ You know so that kid in there that’s
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swattin’ asses and out there on the field doing this, he’s doing a lot more than just helping
his team. He’s the guy you’re saying, ‘shit, he’s gonna be a leader.’
In this narrative, Joe shared a personal “taste” for prospects’ specific style of play, and he further
revealed his desire to see signs of confidence and character through prospects’ body language:
“You know, it’s very difficult to – hopefully you can see it on the surface by the way he goes
about his movements, his actions, how he communicates with his coach, how he communicates
with the other players.” In a different usage, Jermaine observes prospects’ reactions to adversity
and failure as a gateway for identifying their psychological makeup:
If he has a bad at bat does he throw his bat, or his helmet? If he’s a pitcher does he slam
something on the ground? How do they communicate with umpires? You see a little bit
about their makeup there….
Professional baseball scouts observe, and their intimate awareness of confident movements
is perhaps a reflection of individual tastes and why scouts see what they see. However, in most
instances scouts observe from afar and do not enjoy proximal access to player movements
compared to coaches. Coaches observe within the action, and scouts evaluate at a distance, and
Jermaine described these observational limitations and the intuitive responses prospects can
prompt within scouts:
We don’t get a chance as a scout to have the hands on, first hand, in the locker room with
guys, to see how guys react, how they react to coaching, suggested changes. Do guys roll
their eyes on you? Or you try to suggest a change to a hitter or pitcher, do they fight you
with it or do they embrace it and go with it?
At a deeper level, Jermaine described his search for dynamic prospects – that is, prospects whose
movements demonstrate energy and direction:
Is there direction in where they’re going? You know, some guys – and I got a feel for a
couple guys here, and I got in my notes ‘now, he really doesn’t want to be out there with
‘em. He’s just playing.’
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Comparative Recall
Tool grades represent baseline baseball ability measurements and confident movements
provide impressions of psychological attributes; however, comparative recall integrates both of
these components by correlating scouts’ visible talent evaluations with historical comparisons.
To this end, conversations with all scout participants consistently included performance
examples of past prospects, and Manny shared that his professional scout training emphasized
the development of a personal prospect catalogue: “you’ve got a catalogue of what you’ve seen
of the players, all the years I’ve been on the road and seeing guys. It’s in my memory. It’s
here!” As depicted in Manny’s words, a scout’s mental catalogue represents a personal,
experiential library of visual knowledge that is used to comparatively analyze prospects’
abilities:
So, it’s that catalogue that you go to, to say ‘okay, this guy looks like this guy – his bat
speed; his swing reminds me of this; his arm swing; his breaking ball; his fastball
reminds me; his delivery reminds me of this guy.’ I think that’s a start.
Comparison is a beginning point for evaluating the combination of a prospect’s tools and
makeup at a deeper level, and, as scout participants described, this type of reflective analysis
does not end at some future time. Christensen (2009), in his study of talent identification among
high-level Danish soccer coaches who served as scouts, found that: “The main source of
knowledge of these coaches comes from their constant observation of players (p. 372).” Over a
lengthy history, professional baseball scouts did not possess radar guns, video, and other
empirical methods to identify baseball prospects; rather, scouts consistently relied on vision and
comparative recall as their primary sources of talent identification knowledge. Descriptively,
Barney reminisced about his youthful experiences with veteran scouts and how they employed
their memories as a research data base and an analytical tool for making prospect decisions:
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All the great scouts I grew up listening to, all those guys had the greatest memories in the
world. You know what I mean? Man, it’s something to behold – I think – because
you’re referencing, you’re making comparisons, you’re making judgements on guys….
On a personal level, Barney shared how he prioritizes his prospect memory in talent
identification: “You just factor all that information in, and I try to use it as reference. I try to
remember guys – ‘hey, this is what Brian Buchanan looked like’….” Mack highlighted the value
of archival data bases in veteran scouts, and, he stated, in the end, prospect judgment is a product
of comparison: “I think that in itself, that data base that you have built up over the last 40 years
bodes really, really strong. And it’s all about comparison, you know. How does this kid
compare to those guys?” More specifically, Mack outlined how he applies his experiential
recollections when he evaluates prospects in the field:
I go out and watch a high school shortstop. I go back to when I had Rafael Belliard as
my shortstop. And the guys in that league, in the Carolina League in 1980 and ’81 – Jose
Oquendo, Julio Franco, Tony Franco, Jackie Gutierrez, and Rafael Belliard.
Long-term memories are consistently utilized by professional baseball scouts, and Barney
defined his comparative recall as a questioning prompt that leads him to deeper analysis and
reflection: “The referencing you remember and you go ‘what made him different’?” More
clearly expressed, Barney shared how his comparative recollections function to validate and
provide added meaning to his prospect evaluation decisions:
…but it still goes down to ‘who’s this kid look like at the same age? Who do you
remember? What did this kid do that got to the Big Leagues….’You know what I mean?
That stuff they can’t put in a camera, or a radar gun, or anything like that. That’s why
they still need guys like me. I think.
With similar effect, Ted’s usage of memorable references triggers comparative questions he
employs to forecast prospects’ future performance capabilities: “But I’m gonna draw back and
say, ‘is this guy the kind of player that I remember from guys in the past? And is he gonna be
able to make adjustments?’” Shifting the paradigm, Gary explained how he uses his prospect
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catalogue to eliminate prospects. That is, Gary disclosed how he compares prospect talents and
attributes to minor league players who did not advance to the Major Leagues:
…because I was in the minor leagues coaching, I’ll see a kid and say to myself ‘well that
kid right there is gonna be just like this kid I had in A Ball, and he never got out of A
Ball.’ Same style, same skill…. Instead of seeing them as a Big Leaguer, see ‘em as a
minor leaguer where ‘this guy had better stuff, and he never got outta A Ball.’
The immediate nature of comparative recall serves as an ever-present interpretative tool,
and the quality and depth of one’s memorable examples influences the flexibility of scouts’
talent identification lens. Bart labeled his catalogue as a frame of reference – “because I’ve done
this 28 years, and I’ve seen them all. The Upton’s – B.J. Upton, Justin Upton – David Wright,
Ryan Zimmerman, Justin Verlander, Chris Widger, Jerry DiPoto.” – and Manny shared that he
referenced his “all” to determine a prospect’s physical potential:
So, when I see a guy, very often this guy reminds me of this guy; this guy reminds me of
this guy. And I think that will lead you in a direction from a physical perspective
whether or not that individual has a chance to play in the Big Leagues.
Similarly, Ted described his comparative catalogue as a translation device that he uses in the
field to extract meaning when he evaluates players: “So I’m using past experiences, decodes of
past players that I’ve seen come and go,… and I’m taking all that, and I’m using that when I see
players.” Perhaps most powerfully, Barney linked scouts’ comparative recollections with talent
identification confidence and stated: “You just have to trust this is what these guys look like.”
Ten of 13 scout participants explained that their comparative recall also functions in an
instructive capacity by imbedding recollections of previously overlooked prospects on their
memories. Jeb transparently illustrated how his memorable recollections of scouting “misses”
enlarged his evaluative lens and led him to a wider funnel of open consideration:
…you see a kid, and they bring back the mistakes you made over the years, ‘hey, I
missed on this one. I didn’t dig deep enough on that one,’ you know. There was more to
this kid than I saw. I kinda overlooked it because he was 5’10”, and I remembered
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Pedroia, but I just didn’t go there, you know? It’s brought a lot more guys into the draft
now. Then you can say, ‘hey, he’s very similar here.’
Comparatively, Joe acknowledged how he administers periodic self-evaluation check-ups to
clarify and strengthen his internal prospect catalogue: “It’s all about the history that you’ve gone
through, and hopefully you do a self-evaluation check every year – periodically, so
that…sometimes more than every year. You know, ‘why did I miss on that guy? What was it?’”
In brief, professional baseball is both a game of failure and a business of human
performance expertise, and Joe shared two impactful realities: (1) some prospects display
impressive tools but unexplainably fail to succeed and advance; and, (2) evaluative “misses”
instruct but not all “misses” are immediately discernable:
A lot of time, you know what, he just can’t play. It just comes down to, like the tools that
I drafted, he just couldn’t hit. He couldn’t synthesize it to the point where he could
succeed. You know? He’d succeed for a short while and then be just…it never, never
became memory for him. I don’t know, but you’ve gotta’ go off those experiences. That
one there I don’t know if I’ll ever be able to tell why that kid didn’t make it.
In addition, Jeb shared how memorable misses that instruct are instrumental in developing new
observational habits: “So what I’ve done is, I’ll see a kid that reminds me – that’s a ‘Pedroialike’ kid on his on-field preparations, and then you get to know the kid.” Jeb also added that
inserting memorable comparisons into scouting reports can increase a scout’s leverage and
expand an organization’s open consideration of prospects:
You know, get him on the board, maybe in a better spot, because you tell them ‘hey, this
kid is very similar to Pedroia, what I saw in Pedroia.’ His work ethic. His makeup. His
ability. His physical ability. They all just scream, ‘Pedroia’ to ya’. Now, once you get
to know the kid, we’ll get to see if he has the same Pedroia traits that he looks like he
exhibits on the field.
In this regard, Ted confirmed his organization’s preference for inserting a “comparison player”
in scouting reports, and Mack explained how comparison players create movies in the minds of
scouts’ direct reports: “As a scout, I think to give your scouting director or the powers to be a
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picture of what you’re seeing, you always go back to a guy this kid reminds you of.” Open
consideration casts a wider observational funnel and scouts’ long-term prospect memories
potentially elevate the odds for the inclusion of outlier prospects. Through this lens, Jeb
described a real-time, non-prototype prospect example to demonstrate how comparative
recollections prompt open consideration, adaptive thinking, and deeper research:
So, there’s a kid like [name] who’s 5’10”, 205. The body can go either way, but he can
hit. It’s a bat. I don’t know where he’s gonna play. The body’s already not moving very
well as far as defensively. It’s gonna be a challenge for him to be an adequate defender.
It would be third or right field, but his bat’s gotta chance to carry him. That goes back to
– and I’m thinking, I don’t know what John Kruk looked like as a young kid, but this
might’ve been it. So, I’m thinking, okay if this kid’s got the heart, the desire, the head
and the heart and all the things behind the scenes that’s positive, I may take a chance on
that player….
Visual talent recognition begins with physicality and tools identification and employs a
standardized numerical scale to quantify individual evaluations for reporting purposes. Scout
participants described tools assessment as clear, straightforward, and the first step in determining
if deeper research is warranted. Deeper still, tools and physicality evaluation serves as the
emotional force that draws scouts to the ball park, and prospects’ confident movements – first
impressions – provide scouts with symbolic clues of their inner baseball identities. In turn,
comparative recall correlates scouts’ visual talent evaluations with their personal data base of
observational knowledge, thereby initiating creative reflection, prompting adaptive thinking, and
launching the beginning stages of prospect analysis. I now turn to the third theme in my data,
prospect research methods.
Prospect Research
Professional scout participants identified investigative prospect research as the second
stage of baseball talent identification leading to prospect selection. Specifically, when scouts
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visibly identify prospects’ potential Major League talents, this finding activates a basis for
conducting deeper research. To this end, scout participants disclosed a three-part investigative
sequence of prospect research steps: (1) homework questions; (2) makeup reasoning; and, (3)
valued makeup traits.
Homework Questions
Former Atlanta Braves scouting director Roy Clark described makeup as “the most
difficult thing to define” (Shanks, 2005, p. 58); veteran MLB scouting director Lou Gorman
maintained that “makeup drives great players” (Shanks, 2005, p. 177); and, longtime scout Al
Kubiski believed advancement to the Major Leagues is “all about makeup” (Shanks, 2005, p.
211). Ted voiced the difficulty of balancing tools and makeup identification in the scouting
process: “First of all, the makeup is the hardest thing for any of us to do because we’re looking at
tools first – run, throw, field.” Of greater challenge, Jermaine stated that “Makeup is really hard
to put a definite answer on what it is.” Strategically, Jermaine acknowledged that the absence of
a standard definition for makeup yields measurement variances across scouts: “Makeup is really
tough in a lot of respects. I mean it’s not a numbers game where you can put a definite number
on this guy. It varies so much from individual to individual.” In near unanimity, scout
participants shared that when baseball tools are positively identified, the next phase of evaluation
requires taking the time to ask tough questions and conduct the most difficult research of all –
interpretative prospect research.
In Wes’s words, administering homework questions to discover psychological makeup is
investigative, conversational, and relational:
Once I identify a guy - that I like a guy - that’s when I want to get into makeup. The way
I like to do that, once I like ‘em I like to meet ‘em, the parents. I like to meet the kid. I
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like to know what they’re all about, where they live, how they live. You can’t do that
unless you get to know ‘em…I’m talking about getting to know the people, where they
live, and all that.
Addressing this process, Sam challenged and questioned scouts’ reluctance to make meaningful
prospect inquiries: “I think sometimes we don’t do enough research when it comes to makeup.
We don’t ask enough questions. Why?” Not unlike Wes, Sam’s remedy for this investigative
gap is to initiate exploratory conversations: “Because sometimes…just sit down and have a
conversation with someone. We don’t do that anymore. We don’t sit down, just talk to the kid,
“how you doing? What’s going on?” For Wes, visiting a prospect’s home is “the first thing –
one of the key things”, and although meaningful conversation is fundamental to identifying
makeup, so too is active listening: “Like I was tellin’ about getting in the house – you’ll find out
some stuff you didn’t know and what you want to know without running your mouth.”
Jeb described this investigative process as an excavation dig into a prospect’s identity and
developmental pedigree: “if the tools are there that’s when you start digging deeper – as far as
the background, the makeup, the family. Where’s the red flag? Is there any red flags with this
kid?” The makeup identification process is no longer “a very simple in house meeting;” rather,
in Jeb’s perspective the financial stakes are higher and makeup research “has turned into a big
process anymore.” Fundamentally, Jeb characterized prospect research as a series of checkpoints
with a duration determined by “right fit” answers: “If you keep checking boxes, you can keep
going, and if it keeps coming up clean, well let’s go – we’re in. Now let’s move forward, let’s
start scouting. Let’s do all of the work here.” All the work in this context for Jeb includes a
litany of homework questions: “what’s his family? What’s his background? Does he have two
parents? Does he treat people well off the field?” Comparatively, Jermaine underscored the
importance of getting in the home and understanding a prospect and his parents – “You need to
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know the player. You need to know the parents.” However, Jermaine also conveyed this need
with mild apprehension - “But they can fool you a little bit too.” In this regard, Ted expressed a
heightened awareness for prospect deception: “I can tell you so many different stories where the
makeup, you got fooled by guys. I’ve seen teenage alcoholics, drug addicts, and everything else
that were number one picks.”
More revealingly, Ted suggested that physical talent in combination with prospects’
correct answers to homework questions can confuse scouts’ deeper insights and interfere with
effective research:
They answered all the questions “yes, sir; no, sir,” and they fooled you all through school
– whatever school they were at – their talent overtook whatever they were doing on the
side, but then it all caught up to them in pro ball. They just went to pot once the
competition got a little tougher.
On the other hand, Sam shared an incident where exceptional tools overshadowed unfavorable
makeup research and resulted in prospect selection and eventual release due to lack of
performance development:
I go in there, sit down, and every person in that room…no one said anything great about
the kid. Lazy. He missed in one class, he missed 27 days of class. That was the most
days he missed in a class. The least amount of days he missed in any of his classes was
21 days. Not good makeup for me. Just not, and I’m getting beat over the head because
he’s got tools. But we take him in the second round. We sign him.
Transparently, Ted acknowledged the inherent uncertainty associated with makeup research and
homework questions: “Makeup is just so critical, and yet you’re never sure that your guy is
really what he says he is.” Ted diagnosed a deeper fear associated with missing on makeup as a
result of limited observational opportunities: “I’ve seen guys who ended up having horrendous
makeup, but you didn’t see it when you’re only seeing a couple of games.” To this end, Wes
associated prospects’ failed developmental advancement with inadequate makeup research: “I
can name you player after player that were failures that the makeup was not researched enough.
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You don’t know enough about ‘em, particularly the parents, particularly the background,
particularly the kid, you just don’t know enough about ‘em.”
Speaking to research effectiveness, Sam reinforced the importance of investigative depth
and persistence, and he voiced caution regarding the incomplete nature of visual knowledge:
Take the time. Sometimes it just takes that. So we don’t want to…sometimes as scouts
we walk in and it’s all about what we do visually. See tools, see this, see that. ‘I see it, I
see it, I see it, I got it.’ Sometimes we have to ask questions, and go in and dig deeper,
and realize that ‘hey, there’s more to this. There’s more to this individual, and we can’t
stop.’
In a forewarning tone, Wes underscored the importance of scouts doing their own investigative
work because of the long term organizational costs and personal accountability associated with
unverified research:
It’s doing your work. Not just hearsay, and one little visit, and this and that – research,
particularly if you’re gonna give a lot of money and put your ass on the line. Because
once you get him, you got him – it’s over, you gotta deal with it.
To this end, Wes intensely stressed the value of scouts’ individual effort and independent
judgment within the social fabric of the professional scouting fraternity:
One of the worst mistakes a scout can make is take negative makeup that you hear as fact.
It’s called rumor. I’m tellin’ ya’, if you’re interested in a guy do your own work, and
that’s not listening to somebody else. ‘Oh, this guy’s this; this guy’s that.’ It just doesn’t
work.
The commitment to dig deeper into prospect research, in Sam’s viewpoint, represents a
decisive test for identifying effective and ineffective professional baseball scouts: “So, the good
scouts that do the work, they find out the information. They find out the makeup. They find out
what happens because they said ‘yes’.” In this context, Sam also emphasized the importance of
“raising the heat” and asking “tough questions” to uncover deeper meaning because: “The
information’s always there, you just have to let it come to you.” Barry candidly described the
ever-present nature of prospect data: “Yea, the information’s right in front of ya.” Being
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personally committed to taking the time to uncover prospect data - while integral to effective
baseball scouting - is inadequate without firm conviction. Specifically, Barney addressed the
importance of scouts’ self-confidence, trust, and belief throughout the process of interpretative
prospect research: “You gotta do a lot of research. You gotta watch, and you’ve gotta trust what
you’ve seen before and believe in it.” Said differently with similar meaning, Bart stated that
“you have to have a history on a guy, and you’ve got to see him over and over and over again.”
For Justin, prospect decisions are tested and informed by personal meetings with
prospects:
I want to see what makes him tick. I want to see does he look me eye to eye? Is he
nervous? Is he confident? A kid normally will tell you, he will show you features of
what type of person this kid is.
Similarly, Wes employs personal interviews as a method for determining the quality of
prospects’ maturity and self-confidence:
In my opinion, I might be dead wrong but I don’t think so, if you take a kid and sit down
and talk to ‘em and you’re looking at him straight in the face and he won’t look at ya’ –
he looks here, he looks there, he looks down – I’m not saying you can etch it in stone, but
I’m telling you most of the time they’ve got some problems.
Justin also employs prospect interviews to identify the nature of a prospect’s personal habits and
self-discipline: “I mean, is this kid a worker? If you sit down and talk to a kid and ask him to go
through his day, or go through his week, normally he’s gonna tell you exactly what.” Jermaine
shared a preference for conducting prospect research in a tryout camp setting so he can
simultaneously view a prospect’s attitude and effort in the midst of multiple interactions: “if I
can get him in a tryout camp I can get a better feel for this guy’s work ethic, how he interacts
with other players, how interacts with the coaching staff.”
Sharing a real time example, Jeb explained the importance of identifying makeup and its
resultant influence on scouts’ decision making in light of identifiable tools: “Yea, I mean if that
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kid doesn’t have the work ethic and the love of the game to work on the things he’s not good at,
he’s going to be stuck as just a DH hitting and trying to survive in the minor leagues for me.”
Jeb further elaborated on this example and the importance of prospects’ familial influence and
support:
But all indications on that particular kid are that he’s got all the intangibles that we’re
looking for, and now we’re gonna dig a little deeper into him and really find out if what
we see on the field is behind the scenes in his family that will allow him to maximize his
gifts that he does have.
In addition to the character of prospects’ home lives, family biology can also influence scouts’
perceptions of prospects’ physical tools:
Why is he like that? Well, because his family’s like that. He was born with that type of
frame and body, and he can’t do anything about that. He can improve it, and he can
improve his agility, but it’s gonna take all (Jeb).
Culturally, Wes described how prospects’ family life can potentially derail their readiness to
embrace the developmental rigor of the minor leagues:
I’ve signed guys, drafted guys – as a scouting director and a scout – and once I got into
their house I didn’t like what I saw. I didn’t like the way the parents were. I didn’t like,
for example, the mother worked and the father didn’t do anything. I didn’t like a house
that was dirty, filthy. You say, ‘well, this is minute’ – it’s not minute because I’ve seen
so much of this stuff. The way they live, the way they act in their home – it turns out to
be a negative deal on where they’re going if you sign him.
In a similar context, Ted associated a previous signee’s unstable family background with his
inadequate capacity for coping with the pressures of professional baseball. Ted described family
background research as an impressionable and apprehensive element in scouts’ prospect
judgments:
…he had horrible background so he couldn’t handle anything. He was a mess. I’ll never
forget it. Those are things you just don’t forget. So the more you see of that, the more
you’re really worried about the makeup when you’re signing a player.
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Prospect preparedness for minor league development for Joe is signaled through actions
and responses that convey respect for teammates and family:
It really comes down to identifying what kind of a kid you got. How does he treat his
teammates? How does he treat his family? You know, ‘is it mom and dad I need this or I
need that?’ You know that guy, he’s not going to go far unless his talent is just that far.
The really good ones they’re not like that.
Jermaine noted that he appreciates prospects who demonstrate regard for their parents: “That’s
always a big thing for me – do they respect mom and dad?” On the flip side, Ted recalled home
visits where parents cast the impression of vicariously living through the earning potential of
their son, the prospect: “That’s what scared ya’ right off the bat because you could see the
parents. They were acting like they were gonna live off the kid and everything, and I’m going
‘oh my God.’” Similarly, Sam shared examples where desire for financial gain tempts prospects
and their parents to respond untruthfully to homework questions: “it’s like the other kid we had
that lied – he wanted the money. The family wanted the money. They lied. So you don’t
know.” While Bart stated first impressions and prospects’ responses to homework questions
prevail in his makeup assessments, he also expressed that his critical indicators for respect are
defined by: “how respectful they are to you as a scout. Do they think they’re entitled to be
drafted, or do they think it’s something they’ve earned?”
While scout participants described homework questions as candid, testing, and direct,
Sam attributed his investigative approach to a mentor who provided him with the following
counsel: “My first boss, Terry Ryan, he said ‘if you don’t get thrown outa’ the house at least
once you’re not asking the right questions.’” For Sam, homework questions are about reflecting
back to prospects “what they said” in order to discern truth and commitment. Experientially,
Sam emphasized the importance of asking direct questions to stimulate personally accountable
responses from prospects:
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I say, ‘okay, are you ready to do this?’ And then kids start changing. Now, all of a
sudden, you start seeing some chinks in their armor. Are they really going to do this?
You force him to talk a little bit.
Elaborating further, in order to extract prospects’ actual thoughts and motivations Sam
emphasized the importance of silencing parental comments during homework questioning.
Recalling a specific example, Sam disclosed the following scene:
‘I’m not talking to you, I need to know what you want to do because this is your life.
They’re not going to be playing. They’re going to be in the stands. Are you ready to do
this?’ And some kids will go, ‘I really want to go to college.’ ‘Okay, go to college –
let’s go.’
Embracing a similar goal with a slightly different approach, Bart ascertains prospects’ passion
and perseverance as he conveys the specific challenges, responsibilities, and comfort zone
changes associated with minor league life:
Is he gonna say ‘it aint’ what I thought?’ You gotta do your homework. You gotta know
what you’re getting into as a player. I can paint, and I’m good at this, when I paint a
picture for them I give it to them straight.
In a phrase, Bart believes in reciprocal prospect research. That is, minor league baseball is
difficult and not for everyone, and, in Bart’s viewpoint, fully informing prospects about these
realities enhances the clarity of a prospect’s occupational vision and the credibility of a scout’s
reputation:
Yea, and I have to look at it like right now, whatever kids I’m dealing with this draft ends
in a week, and once it’s all said and done with, these kids are going to be able to tell the
next group, and the next group after that, ‘I did the right thing. That guy told me the
truth. He worked with me. He gave me a pretty good picture of everything.’
For Sam, a scout’s credibility is forged through the process of homework questions, and an area
scouts’ role is to “represent the first line of contact with the players, and they have to keep those
relationships.” Sam believes this is a perpetual process throughout a player’s professional
career: “There has to continue to be contact. What’s the guy doing? ‘How you doing in the off-
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season? Did you like your first year? Like your second year?’” However, Sam also shared the
negative tendency among certain scouts is to sign the player and cease communication: “I
signed a guy – okay, done.”
Homework questions represent the direct evaluation step that prompts scouts to
investigate leads and assess prospects’ identity and support systems while building relationships
through a series of checkpoints. While scout participants acknowledged the critical importance
of uncovering answers to homework questions, scouts also disclosed the uncertainties and
deceptive responses inherent in this process. In turn, exceptional tools can occlude signs of
negative makeup, and makeup rumors can lead scouts astray from their commitment to
personally conduct research and uncover relevant prospect data.
Makeup Reasoning
Talent is highly valued among professional baseball scouts, but talent identification
research is devoid of qualitative studies that examine how scouts define, identify, and interpret
prospects’ psychological attributes. Scouts employ the term “makeup” when referring to
prospects’ mindsets, and I adopted the term “makeup reasoning” to describe how scout
participants form their definitions, inferences, and conclusions about makeup.
Scout participants overwhelmingly validated the importance of makeup, and Jeb portrayed
this elevated importance as a movement of emphasis within today’s Major League scouting
departments: “So, it’s grown as far as the makeup, identifying makeup. There are staffs now
with a lot of organizations now that that’s what their specialty is.” Barry attributed the genesis of
this trend to the Atlanta Braves and their 14-year string of consecutive Divisional
Championships: “They were assessing the makeup, and obviously other clubs were going ‘what
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are they doing?’ And so everybody started doing it”. Evaluating the ascension and success of
the Kansas City Royals, Sam stated: “The reason they’re successful: because they got makeup
guys. They got guys that, on the field, they battle. They try to beat you to death. They’re going
to battle you every game, every at bat, all those things.”
Mack traced the need for this transformational development in makeup assessment to the
changing culture and increased commercialization of amateur baseball. Specifically, Mack
described the amateur game as increasingly focused upon the marketable exposure of prospects’
tools. As a result, this organizational shift triggered an incremental erosion of the team concept
within the attitudes of many prospects: “Everything we do is not team oriented anymore. There
is no Legion ball. We gotta get to showcases. This is all about ‘me.’ ‘What am I throwing on
the gun? What is my running time?’” Extending this perspective to the assessment of makeup at
the minor league level, Jermaine inferred that the premiums placed on minor league prospects’
physical tools supplant the relevance of makeup. Specifically, Jermaine stated, “It’s so much
talent-driven and tool-driven that we’re not as concerned with what the guy’s makeup is. We
think we can change them somewhat.”
In many ways, change is synonymous with makeup, or, more clearly, makeup is often
viewed by professional scouts as a change agent - an internal dynamic that transforms the
development and impact of prospects’ physical performances. For Mack, the litmus test for
assessing the presence of good makeup is when “…someone’s makeup allows you to play above
your tools. When you can play above your tools that’s special.” In Justin’s perspective,
prospects with good makeup recognizably produce in their training and performances: “they go
the extra length to get things done, and I think the way they play the game you can tell who’s got
makeup and who’s not.” In Gary’s viewpoint, makeup is exceedingly more difficult to verify
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compared to tools, and, perhaps most importantly, he stated that makeup and tools are
interdependent. In addition, Gary highlighted both the synergistic and the self-sabotaging effects
of good and bad makeup:
We can see the tools, and I think why makeup is so important is you have players that
have marginal tools, if they have great makeup they’re gonna get the most out of those
tools. And vice versa if you have players that have great tools, their makeup is
questionable they’re not gonna utilize the tools that they have.
While all scout participants confirmed the dynamic effects of makeup, 11 participants
also acknowledged the absence of a standardized definition of this construct within the scouting
ranks. When asked to define makeup, Manny responded, “It’s a very open-ended question
because you can go on and on forever.” In similar fashion, Jermaine exclaimed, “makeup is,
whew – we could talk all day about makeup, and each guy’s gonna be a little bit different
probably.” Manny further elaborated and summarized makeup as a matter of individual taste: “I
guess what I’ve found is that everybody has a different definition of it, what good makeup is and
what bad makeup is.” Echoing Gary’s sentiments, Joe labeled makeup as “the most difficult
part.” Difficult because, in Joe’s estimation, identifying makeup requires that scouts read
prospects’ desires and “check inside their hearts – what is their intestinal fortitude?” Deeper
still, Joe measures makeup through the lens of a three-part checklist that lays a foundation for
talent development: “You know, as far as makeup – the character, the ability to learn, put that
learning into action.” Additionally, Justin established that “…makeup is a very, very important
part of it [talent identification], and everybody’s makeup is different.” When asked to describe
makeup, Wes characterized the request as a “loaded question,” and he responded that makeup is
a measure of full commitment and the understanding of one’s employment mission: “Well, how
you define it is to me when you employ somebody is how they’re gonna’ go about their business,
perceive their business, take their business to the field, outside the field.” Circling back, Manny
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associated scouts’ individual tastes for makeup with the distinctiveness of their prior individual
experiences: “Okay, and that [definition of makeup] comes from our experiences, and who
we’ve played with, who we’ve coached, who we’ve recruited, and who we’ve scouted in
determining what good makeup is.”
The absence of a standardized definition for makeup can create confusion, and Sam
described scouts’ occasional misunderstandings of makeup as both procedural and taxonomic:
“It’s a whole big process, and what people confuse for me is on-the-field-makeup and off-thefield-makeup. It’s two totally different entities.” Procedural for Sam represents a deliberate
investigation mapping a prospect’s growth and maturation beginning at the point of tools
identification:
Well, for most of us and for myself makeup starts way before you get to the ballpark. We
start doing makeup work, if you’re talking about an amateur player, when you first see
him as a ninth grader or a tenth grader. You start very early in the process, and you try to
watch how he grows from that ninth grade year to that twelve grade year, the maturity
level, the mom and the dad, the family.
Shared with a different focus but similar message, Wes exposed the false notion that makeup is
capable of quick identification; rather, makeup assessment unfolds over a longitudinal period of
time:
You can’t establish makeup on one look, on one visit, on one conversation. You can’t do
it. This is one of the fallacies of scouting today with the money factor. We’re dealing
with this right now on our staff. Either they don’t want to do it; either they don’t know
how to do it – it’s a problem. You’ve got to spend time on makeup.
On the other hand, the taxonomic classifications of on-field and off-field makeup outline the
situationally specific nature of psychological attributes. In addition to Sam, Justin qualified
makeup in this two-part fashion, and Gary defined on-field and off-field makeup with a series of
questions: “On-the-field-makeup is does he compete? Does he come through in pressure
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situations? Does he play hard? Off-the-field obviously are habits that they have. Is he a partier?
Is he into drugs or alcohol?” Employing a series of penetrating questions, Sam role-played a
dialogue with a young scout to illustrate the separation of off-field and on-field makeup:
So guys get it a little confused, especially young scouts. They get it confused. They
come in, ‘hey, I love this guy – he’s a great kid.’ Okay, well, wait a minute, ‘what does
he do on the field? Does he take the extra base? Is he in the dugout locked-in and
focused, or is he over there playing around? When coach comes out and talks to him,
what does he say, what does he not say, what’s his body language?’ All those things
come into play when you start talking about makeup.
Nine scout participants acknowledged both the difficultly and requisite time involved in
makeup assessment, and Manny believes these realities ensure a measure of job security for area
scouts: “you’re still gonna need pro scouts because they’re still gonna have to determine
makeup because that’s the most important part.” As a point of clarification and correction, Sam
questioned scouts’ tendency to operationalize makeup as a broad construct: “I don’t really think
makeup is the best word to use sometimes because the word encompasses too much. Sometimes
you need to talk about the head, the heart, how he feels, what happens.” Sam issued caution with
regard to some scouts’ inclinations to assess makeup through an all-or-none lens: “It’s not fair
because every kid’s situation is different.” Conceptually, Sam observes makeup as both
individual and situationally specific: “You look at the situation first. His makeup comes from
where his situation is as well.” More specifically, Sam illustrated the importance of empathy
among scouts, or, more clearly, walking in the shoes of the prospect when assessing makeup:
So, if a kid’s gotta’ battle to get to practice every day, doesn’t have a car to get there, he
might not be the greatest, most mature kid. But when he goes out on that field he goes
out and busts his butt and works hard. Now, when he leaves the field he’s going to a
whole different environment – his makeup has to change. It might be…his portion of
solitude might be the field. Sometimes we just have to dig deeper. Sometimes a young
scout won’t dig deeper.
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Digging deeper – taking the time to conduct thorough research – represented a
reoccurring theme among nearly all scout participants. Applied to makeup assessment, Sam
advised that makeup identification, like tools verification, is merely an assessment process to
determine readiness for minor league player development:
So a scout goes sometimes ‘I know the makeup, I know the makeup, I know the makeup,’
and we go, ‘no, you think you know the makeup.’ We’re not going to know the makeup
until we see ‘em every day. We’re not going to know the makeup until he fails. We’re
not going to know the makeup until he gets away from home. He’s gotta’ do some stuff,
and what does he do then? Mom and dad are not there. They’re not telling him what to
do. Is he gonna’ be on time, not be on time?
Justin echoed this reasoning and stated that makeup development is ongoing and born of
individual backgrounds: “I think makeup can be improved, but I think a lot of it is upbringing. I
think everybody is individual on the makeup, but in order to get to the Big Leagues I think 90
percent of the Big League players have average to above average makeup.” Average in this
context refers to average at the Major League level, and, for Bart, the strength and importance of
a prospect’s makeup predicts his resiliency and retention throughout the player development
process: “Ability brings you to the ball park, but it’s makeup and character that will keep you
there once you’re drafted and signed because it’s peaks and valleys, highs and lows.”
In Today’s MLB economy, forecasting prospects’ persistence represents a key element in
scouts’ makeup reasoning. In this light, Gary commented that makeup assessment is more
important than ever before: “Now, it’s more and more, it’s even more important because of the
money we’re giving out.” In Wes’s perspective, “missing on makeup” is the “worst thing,” and,
if given the choice between misevaluating makeup or physical tools, Wes chooses the latter
because of the low odds associated with advancement to the Major Leagues:
If I over-evaluate a player physically, under-evaluate a player physically, I’d rather do
that because baseball’s a failure business. If you don’t believe it, go in the minor leagues
and look. One thing I don’t want to miss on is makeup.
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In this respect, Manny defined a scout’s ultimate job as an exercise in answering the question,
“what’s gonna get that individual to the Major League level?” In uncovering the answers to this
question, Manny highlighted the paradox that periodically exists between on-field and off-field
makeup: “There are guys that don’t do things right off the field, but on the field amazing
makeup.” Sam’s appraisal of makeup dilemmas is to evaluate the two types of makeup:
What we don’t want: rapists, criminals, guys who do drugs. We want to stay away from
those kinds of players. So if that’s off the field, that’s not good. We want to stay away
from those guys. We don’t need those guys around any other kids. We try to develop all
these young men, and we don’t want that at all.
Although professional baseball players individually advance to the Major Leagues, baseball is a
team sport and this reality attunes some scout participants’ affinity for “right fit” makeup. For
Bart, “right fit” represents the answers to three questions: “Is he a good teammate? Does he
follow instructions? Do guys like him?” In this light, Joe equated team success with the strength
of a team’s interpersonal relationships:
You know if, if you see a bad team I’ll show you a team that doesn’t care for one another.
You know, you see a good team, and you say, ‘geez, how are they winning?’ It’s usually
because they care for one another.
For Justin, right fit and persistence are measured by resiliency in the midst of personal struggle
within the context of the team: “How are they as teammates? Do they lift the other guy up when
they’re down?”
I devised the term “makeup reasoning” to explain how scout participants formed their
definitions, inferences, and conclusions with regard to prospects’ psychological attributes.
Although absent a standardized definition, makeup is repeatedly viewed by veteran scouts as a
psychological construct that transforms the impact and trajectory of player development and the
achievement of performance expertise. In turn, scouts affirmed that makeup assessment is
difficult to accurately determine and its performance effects in combination with physical tools
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range from self-sabotage to synergy. Scout participants confirmed that makeup is incapable of
quick identification, and, while incorrectly viewed as a broad construct by less experienced
scouts, makeup is more accurately a longitudinal process branched into the categories of on-field
and off-field makeup. To this end, makeup is both individual and situationally specific, and, best
assessed, requires scouts to embrace empathy and walk in the shoes of the prospect in order to
forecast resiliency and persistence within a game of failure in the midst of high financial stakes.
Valued Makeup Traits
Average or better tools – augmented by confident movements and favorable comparative
recall – signal the need for professional baseball scouts to administer homework questioning and
begin the process of reasoning makeup. The final step of prospect research maps how
professional baseball scouts interpret prospects’ psychological attributes. More specifically, this
step delineates a trilogy of the most valued makeup traits disclosed by scout participants – in
brief, the makeup properties scouts look for, and how they find them: (1) competitive
adaptability; (2) extra effort; and, (3) instinct and intellect.
Competitive Adaptability
The trait “competitive adaptability” emerged from participant narratives that highlighted
the efficacy of competing in the midst of challenge and adversity. Sam emphasized the
unparalleled value of observing prospects when they fail as a methodology for identifying
makeup: “if you’re a scout and walk in and a guy fails, that might be your best day of scouting
for the year.” Barney echoed this conviction and shared: “The number one thing I like seeing is
whether a kid has some adversity or not.” Explained differently, Justin focuses on the quality of
a prospect’s style of play in the midst of slump or success: “You’re gonna fail a lot of times, and
how does he play when they’re up, and how does he play when they’re down? That’s a very
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important thing.” The importance of evaluating prospects in the midst of slumps for Justin yields
additional observational questions to determine effort: “Do they hustle at all points? Do they
still run out all balls? Do they dive for plays?” Bart’s questions in times of slumps seek to
identify hardiness: “How does he come back? Does he cave in? Does he keep going?” For
Jermaine, baseball is a game of failure, and the key to advancement in professional baseball is
“how you handle that failure.”
Seeing a prospect fail represents a critical moment for scouts to see what comes next, to
witness the resolve, adaptability, and competitive mindset responses of prospects. Sam
characterized these “best day of scouting” opportunities as case study experiments that test the
presence and composition of makeup:
So for me, when I start looking at kids, I love seeing them fail when I go see ‘em.
Because most of these kids are great kids, great players, they’ve never failed. So when
you really find out makeup is when a kid fails. What does he do next?
Sharing a similar affinity for evaluating makeup in the midst of failure, Barney stated that these
moments provide scouts with a mental understanding of a prospect’s passion and perseverance:
I always like to see a kid struggle – just a little bit – then see how he handles that, and
then that gives me a pretty good idea of what kind of mental makeup he has, and what
type of grit, and what type of kid he is.
Competitive failure creates opportunity for an adaptive response, and Barney stated that the
substance of “how” prospects counter in these moments reveals makeup: “When things go
wrong you want to see how they react and how they pull themselves out of it when things go
bad.” More specifically, Barney explained that he actively looks for prospects that have the
makeup to revive themselves in the midst of slumps or subpar performances: “You gotta’
reinvent yourself, and you gotta’ reprove yourself, and those are the guys I’m looking for.”
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Shifting away from radar guns and peak velocities, Justin discussed the importance of
viewing pitchers’ competitive adaptability during those outings when they do not have their best
“stuff.” Specifically, assessment opportunities such as these force individual improvisation and
strategic creativity in the moment:
When the kid pitches and don’t have his good stuff, how does he compete? For me it’s
very, very important because every time pitchers go out they don’t always have their best
stuff. If he don’t have his best stuff can he still go out and find a way to beat you, or does
he start looking in the dugout every moment for the coach to come out there?
Jermaine echoed a similar affinity for identifying how pitchers determine their pitch selection in
response to the flow of the game. Sharing a real-time example, Jermaine disclosed the signals,
evaluations, and interpretations he assessed in a pitching prospect:
This pitcher last night you could just see he didn’t trust his fastball. Had a good one,
above average fastball, 92, 93, got hit a couple times and it was changeup, changeup,
changeup. Changeup was good – that was his out pitch – but he lived on it too much. He
almost pitched backwards. To me you could see…I don’t know how tough this guy is.
He went away from a weapon that he had that was pretty good. That’s a little bit of a
key, or a sign, maybe on toughness, competitiveness.
In a similar vein, Sam painted a hypothetical pitching scenario and voiced the silent questions
that surface in scouts’ minds when they view pitchers’ responses to competitive challenge:
Like a pitcher: you go see a pitcher, he’s mowing people down all game, throws a
fastball – boom, 400 feet, home run, and he comes back with a curveball. What do you
get outa’ that? What you get with that makeup? Now, is he afraid to throw his fastball
again? Is he backed off? Is he not as tough?
Narrating a prior evaluation experience, Sam disclosed his preferred taste for competitive
adaptability and his visualization of a pitching prospect’s self-talk in response to surrendering a
home run:
I saw Justin Verlander in a game – this is an extreme case of makeup, for me – against
James Madison. A guy hits a bomb off of him. Absolute bomb. And he goes, ‘oh.’ It
was basically a grooved fastball. The next three at bats – not a shot at hitting him. He
turned it up another notch. Here you go. For me, that showed me a guy’s like ‘I’m not
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going to let you beat me again. That’s not gonna’ happen. I’m going to elevate my game
to another level.’
Conceptually, coping is the opposite of mastery, and for Joe the quality of a prospect’s
coping behaviors reflect the strength of his makeup: “You’ve got to cope, deal with success or
failure.” In a more extreme sense, Sam emphasized the perpetual necessity for coping
mechanisms in order to navigate the daily scrutiny of professional baseball and persist:
So, the makeup part of it, the maturity level of everything – it never stops, because this is
a tough game to play. It’s a game of failure. I’ve seen guys just walk away. ‘I can’t do
this anymore. I’m out, I can’t handle failure.’ Great players.
In Wes’s perspective, professional baseball is a “failure business” - not designed for ease or
comfort - and the inherent distress of the game moves many prospects to resign: “It’s a failure
business, and it’s tough. It’s hot, it’s sometimes cold, sometimes you gotta’ guy throwin’ balls
you can’t get to. You say, ‘Oh man, I think I’ll go home.’ It’s tough.” For Gary, a prospect’s
coping ability reflects his acceptance and deeper understanding of baseball’s statistical realities:
“You know players can’t understand if you fail seven times out of 10 you’re still the best hitters
in the game, but they can’t handle it.” Barney shared a similar evaluation point and he
emphasized the significance of hitters who maintain their composure over time:
…if you’re considered great you’re going to be making seven outs out of 10, so you’ve
got to learn how to….It can’t be a roller coaster for ya’, you’ve got to learn how to handle
the good with the bad.
Wes also employed the “roller coaster” metaphor when describing what competitive adaptability
in baseball is not. More specifically, adaptation to the competitive ebb and flow of baseball
serves as a foundation for developing performance expertise:
It is a tough question, but I got an answer for you. To me the key to that answer is this: a
guy that can handle the up’s and down’s and play on every day. It’s up, he handles it;
gets down, he handles it. He stays in the middle of the road. It’s not a roller coaster. I
know a lot of players, good players, one of their big problems was they couldn’t handle
the everyday up’s and down’s of it.
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For Barney, composed, competitive adaptability predicts Major League advancement and is
found in players who are exposed to professional baseball, understand the essence of the game,
and demonstrate a commitment to training: “Those even-keeled kids, they’ve been around it,
they see how it works, and they see what they need to do – those kids play in the Big Leagues.”
Baseball’s low percentages of success extend beyond hitting. Despite average Major
League salaries exceeding four million dollars, Sam detailed the daily need for competitive
adaptability: “You know we’re asking these guys to play 162 games in 180 days and we want
them to be good every day, and they’re failing – most of the time, every day. How do you wakeup every day?” Sustained passion for the game typically precedes continual performance
improvement. To this end, Jermaine stated that identifying a prospect’s “love of the game” is
indispensable when forecasting survival at the professional level: “The pro minor league, Big
League season – it’s a grind, and if they don’t love it then when things get tough they’re
probably going to go the other way.” In addition, Jermaine also described how love of the game
fuels prospects’ willingness to overcome tool deficiencies and advance through the player
development system:
There’s those guys that really love it. It’s in their blood. They’ll fight through adversity,
and they’ll make the best of it. And it’s not always the best players that make it. It’s
those that can overcome those road bumps, because there’s gonna be a lot of ‘em, and
move forward.
At a deeper level, Sam revealed that the cornerstone of coping and sustained confidence
in high performing baseball players is the ability to forget - to adjust and compete with a quiet
mind: “You gotta’ be mentally tough, mentally mature, quality makeup guys that have short
memories.” More explicitly, competitive struggle and failure for Sam serves as a crossroad
benchmark in his assessments of prospects’ makeup maturity: “But they learn it, the good ones,
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they forget very quickly and move on. The other ones it takes more time – they have to mature
to it.” Forgetting also represents an attitude that approximates “playing like you don’t care.”
That is, in Barney’s experience, competitive adaptability scorns the sentiments of others and
clutches to a belief in one’s Major League destination:
…I think for the most part the guys I signed who got there had a little prick in ‘em, or a
little selfishness or whatever. I think you gotta have a little tiny bit of that in ya’. I’m not
saying it’s a requirement, but I think those guys got a little prick in ‘em that says, ‘forget
you, I’m gonna get there. I’m gonna get there.’ A little chip on their shoulder. I always
think a little chip can go a long way.
Sam profiled prospects with a “chip” as performers with lower-grade tools who possess an
indomitable spirit to prove themselves worthy: “Then there’s the guys that don’t have the talent
but they have toughness, the grit, the ‘I’m gonna’ beat ya’ to death’ attitude, ‘I’m gonna’ prove
you wrong,’ and they exceed their tools.” In Sam’s opinion, this flavor of competitive
adaptability portrays optimal makeup because “what you want is every player to exceed their
tool level.” Exceeding one’s tool level creates a line of separation between those who do not
perform to their physical potential and those who do, and Jermaine described baseball outliers as
competitors – regardless of size and strength – who adapt and find a way to succeed: “They
compete. Those are the guys, they separate themselves because of that. They may not be the
most talented. They may not be the biggest, strongest, but they win, they find a way to win.”
Technological advances, improved training methods, and expanded performance
opportunities transformed the culture of amateur baseball over time. Barney admitted his
personal taste for the “gritty, dirty baseball player” – the player who loves the game,
aggressively competes, and consistently finds ways to adapt and win. Barney also explained
that, as amateur baseball opportunities improved, “it’s harder to find these guys anymore.”
Whether competitive adaptability is less present in amateur baseball - in Barney’s estimation
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because “those guys are so much catered to nowadays” - is beyond the scope of this study.
However, Sam explained that, in his experience, every new minor league player begins his career
with an “upside-down bell curve.” That is, drafting prospects with competitive adaptability
represents a beginning, not an endpoint, in the development of competitive adaptability:
Every kid we get, basically their bell curve starts the opposite way. They’ve never failed,
so everything goes down. It goes this way. It’s reversed for them. They go, ‘I’m away
from home. I’ve never taken’ care of myself. I gotta’ pay bills. I don’t have any friends.
Half my team speaks Spanish.’ This kid’s, ‘whoa.’
Scout participants indicated that competitive adaptability is most clearly and completely
revealed when prospects struggle or fail. This psychological attribute is particularly pivotal in
establishing a foundation for the development of baseball performance expertise in light of the
game’s low percentages of success and the cultural and competitive challenges within the minor
league system. Prospects who personify competitive adaptability – regardless of tool grades or
size – demonstrate adaptive responses to slumps and competitive challenges in ways that reflect
toughness, grit, and a personal passion for the game. Prospects with competitive adaptability
also maintain steady effort and a quiet mind as they adopt a refined ability to “forget” and “play
like they don’t care” about the opinions of naysayers. Scout participants additionally
acknowledged that prospects who demonstrate this trait better understand the essence of baseball
and consistently exceed their tools in their on-field performances.
Extra Effort
From my participant interviews I formulated the makeup trait extra effort, and this
construct signifies the uncommon drive and purpose scouts covet in baseball prospects. Joe
noted that this type of makeup is evident in a prospect “when he can go out and be a blue collar
guy, work his ass off, and get after it,” and he explained the presence of extra effort is confirmed
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when answers to the following questions are substantiated: “Do they want to work? Do they
want to get better?”
Sam shared a personal analysis taken from a five day field observation that illustrated
optimal work ethic and purposeful effort through baseball actions:
I don’t know if this guy’s ever gonna’ play shortstop, that’s my first impression, first day.
Second day, I come out, what do I see? Who’s the first player on the field? [player’s
name]. Now, I’d heard all the other stuff – great kid, great person, talked to our scout in
[location], he loves the guy. Everybody’s all in, right. And so I’m sitting there watching,
and every day he has a purpose – on the field. ‘This is what I’m working on today.’ Five
straight days of that, and he does everything you want to see in a player, in a game, in his
work, in his BP work. His purpose for being on the field. That’s why he’s in the Big
Leagues at 21 and playing exceptionally well.
From a personal scouting experience, Jermaine disclosed how he clearly “saw” extra effort
makeup through a prospect’s readiness to compete and his on-field style of play: “There’s a kid
I saw two years ago in the Cape Cod….You could just see the makeup in the kid because he
comes ready to play every day. Runs every ball out.”
In Ted’s perspective, extra effort within the team dynamic is both “infectious” and a
highly valued trait for scouts and coaches because “it lead[s] other players in wanting to do that
too.” Simply put, players with extra effort often influence other players within a team to train
and compete with greater focus, intensity, and effort. To this end, Justin believes that “the above
average guys have better work habits,” and he attributes this to their desire and commitment “to
do well with their job to be the best they can be.”
In a contrasting case history, Sam framed his rationale for why the absence of extra effort
behavior is a stimulus that can eliminate physically talented prospects from scouts’ selection
consideration: “’I’ll take him – I want no part of the other guy.’ Because he’s not gonna’ do the
extra stuff – last one to get on the field, first one off, no purpose, no reason to be there.” On the
other hand, the presence of above average tools can also overly influence player selection
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decisions and entice organizations to diminish their consideration of makeup in the prospect
identification process. In the following narrative Sam disclosed why deficient extra effort –
despite exceptional tools – can derail player development and divert organizations’ time, money,
and player development efforts in unproductive ways:
After seven years, was I right on the makeup? Yea, because he didn’t work; he didn’t do
the other stuff. We saw that a long time ago, so we missed because we wanted to stay
with the tools. Because the tools were good. I mean the tools were well above average.
You go, “well, we can work with this guy.” Well you can’t work with laziness. You
can’t work with that.
The hope, because it is a learned trait, of extra effort development also fuels scouts’ continued
interest in physically talented prospects. Mack shared his projective and possibility thinking
regarding a prospect who failed to change his perspective and makeup:
And I finally convinced our guys to draft him. He was the one guy in my heart of hearts
that didn’t really love the game – that didn’t really have the passion for the game. But he
had so much tools that I was hoping, at the age of 18, that maybe somebody could get
hold of him and change that.
Unlike other makeup traits, scout participants predominately described extra effort in the
negative. That is, scouts most often described extra effort makeup by portraying what they did
not want to see in a prospect’s style of play and training habits. In this light, Jermaine replayed a
post-draft experience and disclosed his observational interpretation of a “new employee’s”
insufficient extra effort during the first month of employment:
[Name], [MLB Organization] GM is sitting in the seats the other night, and their first
rounder hits two groundballs and runs about 80 feet, doesn’t run hard through the bag,
doesn’t step on the bag. I’m saying to myself, ‘we gave that guy a million dollars and he
can’t run 90 feet hard?’ That’s makeup. That’s makeup.
Digging deeper to illustrate the differences between physical potential and extra effort makeup,
Wes compared two first round draft selections and highlighted the behaviors in one that betrayed
his taste for extra effort and prompted him to eliminate the prospect from consideration:
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I’ve seen guys with a lot of potential. Tom Grieve’s boy. 6’3”, 6’4”, left handed hitter,
went in the first round, went before Nomar that year. I had a lot of interest in him. Now
you’re talking about a guy with ability potential, projection, as opposed to makeup – he
didn’t play the game like that. Nonchalant, just the way he perceived himself, the way he
went about his business, the way – between innings, instead of running toward the dugout
he stopped before he got to the dugout – all this type of stuff.
Sam paused to diagnose the dilemma of unfulfilled potential and its relationship with
insufficient extra effort. Specifically, Sam stated effort and ability are interdependent, but effort
is a learned behavior – a product of one’s teaching, mentors, and environment. In this regard,
Sam explained when players with “great tools” proceed through the amateur ranks and the
reinforcement and accountability of effort remains underdeveloped, then prospects’ baseball
potential is often unfulfilled:
So that guy with the great tools goes through high school without anybody telling him
anything. Never learns the value of effort. Then he goes to college, same thing. Then he
signs pro ball and everybody says ‘go play.’ Nobody’s ever made him accountable. It
goes back to that ‘hey, this guy’s got potential. Great potential.’ But we didn’t teach him
the right way.
Independently, Wes characterized baseball prospects with unfulfilled potential as lacking true
understanding of their occupational role and the decisiveness required to attain performance
expertise: “They don’t get it, they don’t feel a sense of urgency, a sense to excel, a sense to
achieve. They don’t get it.” However, and in contrast to Wes, Sam found fault for unfulfilled
potential in physically talented prospects often resides with coaches and support systems.
Specifically, Sam explained that players with “great talent” are often not pushed “to their
potential enough” because “they’re better than everybody else” and “they’ve been getting away
with it so long,” and as result “they don’t get there.” Indirectly, Sam questioned the deeper
understanding of those who hold leadership roles in amateur and professional baseball: “So, you
want the guy with great talent, who’s born with it, to exceed his tool level. Not just ‘I got these
tools, they’re great’.”
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While Sam described ineffective learning, Wes saw incomplete understanding, and Mack
insufficient passion for the game as impediments to extra effort, Barney highlighted the
prevalence of distractions and his belief that physical talent is typically not the principal road
block to Major League advancement:
There are reasons why only four guys out of a hundred make it to the Big Leagues. It
ain’t talent….It’s what have they done to let something distract them from, as I say,
getting off that Interstate. What have they done to make them get off that path?
Jermaine reinforced the conclusion that physical talent is required to play in the Major Leagues
but in itself is insufficient: “Talent will only take you so far, and to me it’s those guys with
makeup that get to the Big Leagues.” For Jermaine, this confidence in makeup as a catalyst is
born of personal experience:
I was good, but I would never have got there I think if I didn’t have the passion and the
drive and the determination to do the extra things, do the extra workouts, to fight through
adversity. Because there were a number of times I had bad games that I coulda jumped
off a building, ended it. I just don’t wanna do this anymore. It’s just too tough. But
that’s makeup to me. You’re gonna fight through that adversity, work your tail off trying
to get there.
For Joe, “getting there” is a byproduct of a prospect’s acceptance of criticism, performance
adjustments, and improved performances: “You gotta’ be coachable, teachable, and they gotta’
be able to put it into action. If you can’t put it into action it doesn’t mean much.”
Mack identified extra effort as a “certain pride” that is visually recognized “by guys
getting to the park early, guys working extra, guys staying later.” This “pride” for Justin means
“you have something you want to get better at,” and Ted pointedly stated, “Pride. That’s
makeup there. That’s a completely different makeup.”
Upon signing, Wes described the type of unwritten behavioral contract of commitment he
desires from each player. In brief, Wes views the employment relationship as a pledge to work,
develop, and produce:
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…when I sign a player and I commit to him, I want him to commit to me. If I give him a
million dollars – I don’t care what I give him – I want you to give me something back. I
want the work ethic. I want the commitment. I want you to try to be something. I want
you to try to produce. I want you to give it to me.
However, Mack characterized “kids nowadays” as embodying a sense of entitlement and a lack
of desire to “work at it.” Ted commented that today’s prospects, in a general sense, “don’t want
to have anything to do with extra,” and Sam depicted this challenge faced by scouts as a lack of
prospects’ desire to “put in the extra work” and a byproduct of the presence of “too many other
things to distract them.” For Barney, the end sum is his realization that extra effort makeup is
more difficult to find in current times: “So I think our game in a lot of ways it’s getting harder
and harder to find talent.”
Scout participants most frequently described the makeup trait extra effort by disclosing
the deficiencies they did not want to see in prospects’ work ethic, sense of pride, and decisive
purpose for training and competing in baseball. A shortage of this attribute can move scouts to
eliminate prospects from draft consideration, and participants correlated unfulfilled potential
with ineffective learning, incomplete understanding, and insufficient passion. To this end, scouts
underscored the number of distractions today’s players face and the diminished presence of extra
effort makeup identified among prospects.
Instinct and Intellect
Joe emphasized that talent development leading to baseball performance expertise
ultimately “boils down” to a prospect’s “ability to internalize and play the game. It really does.
It really does. It comes down to that.” Internalizing the game – or, specifically, instinct and
intellect – represents the third valued makeup trait synthesized from scout participants’
descriptive disclosures. Instinct and intellect in this circumstance refers to baseball prospects’
understanding and feel for their performances within the speed and the context of the game. For
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Barney, the consummate career Major League prospect embodies baseline tools but advanced
baseball instinct and intellect: “The ideal guy for me is the guy with some tools but more
baseball player in him. There are the guys for me that play 10 years in the Major Leagues.” In
turn, Sam disclosed that scouts infrequently “talk about the intelligence of players” because they
implicitly understand all Major League players are smart, but he defined “smart” in this way:
“I’m talking about game smart IQ guys that really, really know what they’re doing on the field.”
Scouts often use the word “feel” when referring to prospects who “know what they’re
doing on the field,” and Bart described how the absence of feel (baseball instinct and intellect) is
manifested when scouts observe prospects’ underdeveloped perceptual cues and performance
monitoring abilities:
A feel – a guy can really run, but he can’t steal bases. He’s got strength, but throws to
the wrong base all the time. Breaking ball – he stands in there, he’s got tremendous bat
speed, but he sees a breaking ball and he doesn’t recognize it. It’s like this, and he
freezes. He does not recognize spin. He’s got tremendous bat speed and in BP he’s
launching balls 400 feet. The Christmas package the way it’s wrapped really looks good,
but when you open it it’s not what you wanted.
In a phrase, the physicality and tools are good, but the prospect does not know how to “think
baseball” with his movements, or, in Bart’s words: “Sometimes you see guys with tools, but
they can’t play.” Mack described this type of prospect as a “carnival guy,” or, more specifically,
a physically impressive prospect with above average tools whose game performances fail to
consistently advance his team’s opportunities to win. As an illustration, Joe provided an
example of exceptional tools and makeup minus the presence of baseball instinct and intellect,
and he implied that this deficiency impedes the full development of physical potential:
Plus profile. Big Leaguer. No pot holes. Went in the second round, gave him
$750,000…. Yea, six years later he’s at the University of [name of school] working on
his degree. Just didn’t want to play the game, didn’t have the instincts for it, couldn’t
make an adjustment.
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This draft selection remained an enigma for Joe, a personal case example who reminded him of
the critical importance of baseball instinct and intellect:
But he had the body, boy. So, but – he just didn’t know how to, he made adjustments but
didn’t internalize ‘em, synthesize. Whatever it was, he just couldn’t play. He had every
tool in the world, he just could not play the game.
Wes also emphasized that the talent (tools) account does not guarantee the presence of baseball
instinct and intellect in a prospect:
I’m tellin ya’ from experience, man. I’ve signed a lot of guys that didn’t make it, had a
lot of ability. Lot of ability. They just don’t have it up here, man, it just didn’t jive. It
just didn’t register to ‘em…they don’t perceive it.
In contrast to the examples above, Mack depicted a prospect with optimal instinct and
intellect as a player who understands both how and when to elevate and/or adapt his performance
based on the game’s competitive demands:
But for me, I think the story that I told you about watching a high school kid the other
day, and seeing that with guys on second and third he’s averaging 86, 87, and goes back
and gets 90. That for me is the essence of a guy’s makeup and having an inner desire or
ability to, when needed, go back and show ya’ a little bit more. The idea of ‘how does
this kid perform when the game’s on the line or in the clutch?’
In keeping with Mack’s example, Jermaine defined baseball instinct and intellect through the
filter of the following question: “can you take what’s in here and use what you’ve got?” That is,
instinct and intellect are demonstrated when prospects find ways to succeed at baseball at the
right time. Along similar lines, Sam gave an account of a scouting observation when a highlyrated prospect chose the right time to use what he had in reserve:
He’s pitching good, groundballs, he’s pitching clean, everything’s great. No stuff. I’m
saying, ‘I need to see the stuff, at least one inning of stuff.’ The man gets on second – 92,
93, bastard breaking ball, the next four innings. Okay, that’s all I need. So, if I woulda’
stopped and went off what I saw early….I go, ‘okay, what’s he thinking? Where was the
kid at? What was going on?’ Hey, I need to make a call. Their area guy goes, ‘I think
he was just a little tired. He wasn’t trying to pitch with his great stuff. He knew he had
another game to pitch next week, and he was kinda’ conserving his energy.’
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A prospect’s feel for the game assumedly reflects the performance monitoring and
perceptual cues born from the depth and the quality of his deliberate practice. Said differently,
Jermaine emphasized the importance of discovering a prospect’s grasp and comprehension of
baseball: “That’s where makeup again is so important – that you find out is this guy really a
baseball rat? Does he watch baseball? Does he understand the game a little bit?”
Sam correlated prospects’ progression time to the Major Leagues with their
comprehension (instinct and intellect) of the game within their arsenal of baseball tools. He
explained that the great players arrive in the Major Leagues at the age of 21 years because:
“They get it. They understand it. And the college players too, a year, a year and a half and
they’re in the Big Leagues – the great ones.” However, Sam also emphasized the importance of
“time and patience” in scouts’ talent identification judgments because: “The rest of them, it’s
three years in the minor leagues, five years in the minor leagues, seven years in the minor
leagues before they get it.”
“Getting it” is not guaranteed, and Sam’s narrative underscored the interdependency of
physical and psychological performance attributes. Posed as a question, how do scouts identify
the prospects who have the capability to “play by feel” in the speed and flow of competition at
the highest level of baseball performance? Prospects with instinct and intellect understand how
to analyze the game’s fundamental elements – in part and in whole – and accomplish expertise.
For Joe, prospects with baseball intellect and instinct know how to analyze, synthesize, and
execute: “if a guy can’t internalize what we’re saying to him – he can’t put it back out. He’s got
to be able to analyze it; he’s got to be able to synthesize; he’s got to be able to go out on the
field.”
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Scout participants described baseball instinct and intellect as an understanding and feel
for performance within the speed and context of the game. Prospects with baseball instinct and
intellect know how and when to elevate and/or adapt their performances, and comprehension of
the game typically foretells the speed of a prospect’s developmental progression to the Major
Leagues. In turn, a prospect’s “ability to internalize and play the game” does not necessarily
correlate with the strength of his tool grades, and the absence of this makeup trait impedes the
development of full potential and reflects a diminished progression of perceptual cues and
performance monitoring.
Projecting Expert Performers
I now turn to the fourth theme emanating from my research, projecting expert performers.
Field observation and prospect research represent the first two stages professional baseball scouts
employ to identify physical and psychological talent in prospects. The third stage of prospect
talent identification – expert performance projection – integrates the two initial stages to evaluate
prospects’ potential for talent development leading to performance expertise. That is, expert
performance projection precedes player selection and attempts to forecast the probability of
prospects’ advancement to the Major Leagues across a three-part decision matrix consisting of:
(1) fit and readiness for rigor; (2) time to develop; and, (3) tools and makeup composite.
Fit and Readiness for Rigor
Scout participants described organizational fit and prospect readiness for the rigors of
professional baseball as pivotal predictive factors that influence draft selection and talent
development. Bart described newly drafted prospects first exposure to minor league baseball as
an “awakening,” and Sam emphasized that “some kids don’t thrive in each environment.” Wes
stressed “a lot of players don’t know what they’re getting into,” and Barry described the
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opportunity to sign professionally as a behavioral crossroad for some prospects: “My limited
research has shown me when they sign they tend to know that’s their last chance to make it, and
whatever problems they had off the field seem to go away a little bit.”
In Sam’s experience organizational fit represents a byproduct of prospect research and
not solely a result of survival of the fittest and contractual leverage: “It’s not just, ‘well, we
gotta’ always get the players in, and we’ll make ‘em fit.’ No. That’s not how it works.” For
Justin, fit extends to draft room decision-making and should reflect a selfless regard for the
overall strength of the organization’s draft selections: “We’re going to draft 40 guys. If I don’t
get one, but if everyone out there fits better, is better than my guy, that’s good.” Sam outlined
the components of organizational fit with a multi-level question: “You know, does this guy have
all the core beliefs, all the core things we look for, on the field, off the field, that fit what we
do?”
Sam’s multi-level question resembles the queries often posed by hiring committees
across a spectrum of professions. However, most professional baseball players begin their
careers as draft selections – not as free agents – and, unlike other businesses, a baseball
prospect’s employer is subject to lottery selection, not individual choice. In this perspective,
Wes confessed that he is “not solely convinced everyone should sign,” yet in Justin’s experience
and contrary to his convictions: “someone’s gonna’ give ‘em the money to buy ‘em out when
probably either physically or mentally they’re not prepared to go out.”
Justin’s prescription for player readiness begins with determining baseline tools and
makeup, projecting the prospect’s future developmental potential, and casting aside first-year
expectations:
He doesn’t have to lead the league in hitting, he don’t have to lead the league in
something, but he’s gotta be able to survive right now with what he’s got even though
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you know three to five years down the road the size he has there’s gonna be more
strength.
Sam echoed a similar approach to first-year player persistence – “Just get through it. I’m not
looking at your stats.” More specifically, Sam pointed to the importance of player adjustments
to procedural, teaching, and environmental changes: “Understand how it’s done, how we do
things, and playing every day. It’s different, even for a college player. It’s different.”
Sam’s strategy for clarifying prospect perspectives and determining readiness for rigor
focused on home interviews. Sam likened these meetings to “job interviews” that communicate
“real life,” and he shared how his questioning presentation transformed as he matured as a scout.
That is, instead of communicating the excitement, money, and prestige associated with becoming
a Major League baseball player, he learned to intensify the conversation and ask direct questions
focused on the employer-employee relationship to outline the significance of impending life
change:
It’s still alota’ money, so you have to be able to ask tough questions, make them nervous,
make them all nervous – mom and dad nervous – and then you have to go say ‘hey, this is
a job interview. You’re going to be working as an employee. You’re going to be paid by
us. We’re going to be doing your insurance, doing everything’, and mom and dad are
going ‘oh, we didn’t think about that’.
Justin’s questioning begins with the acceptance that “they’re not all playing in the Big Leagues,”
and he concentrates on forecasting a prospect’s understanding of the life changes that begin with
signing professionally:
Can they do their own laundry? Can they cook? Can they leave a small town? Can they
leave their friends? Can they leave their girlfriend? That’s always a very important
thing, but I think they’ve got to be mentally and physically prepared to go out into the
world on their own, and all of ‘ems not.
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Sam also disclosed that prospect responses and reactions to this tone of questioning
provide him with an indication of their readiness and resolve - or their unpreparedness and
indecision:
So, when you sit there and talk to kids and give them real life, ‘hey, this is a job. You’re
a professional. Yea, it’s great when you get to the Big Leagues, but there are steps you’re
gonna’ have to go through to get there. Are you ready to do that?’ The kids that sit back
in the seat and do this, I don’t want no part of that. Because he’s not ready to go. The
guy that sits on the edge of his seat, and he’s locked into me, and I’m locked into him,
that’s the guy that I want. Subtle things that you notice, but that takes time as a scout to
learn it.
For Barry, prospect readiness is simply a direct statement that communicates personal desire to
begin a professional career: “I’m gonna sign, draft me.” Compared to a calculated process of
“signability” negotiations, Barry explained that, in his experiences, prospects who communicate
a clear willingness to sign “are the ones that usually end up doing pretty good. That’s kind of the
last piece of the puzzle for me for makeup.” In the end, projecting a prospect’s fit and readiness
for rigor begins with the belief that “sometimes the best signs are the guys you don’t sign”
(Sam).
Potential employee pools associated with lottery selection are unpredictable, but despite
the breadth of this challenge scout participants emphasized the importance of forecasting
prospects’ organizational fit and readiness for rigor. Once drafted, prospects’ occupational
mobility is constrained, and leveraging fit requires less effort than discerning fit interpersonally.
In turn, all MLB organizational cultures and player development processes are unique, and the
determination of “good fit” potentially accelerates player retention and the realization of
performance expertise. Minor league baseball is an “awakening” for most first year
professionals, and scout participants underscored the importance of uncovering and informing
prospects’ understanding with regard to the impending life changes associated with living away
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from home as a professional baseball player. In the end, scouts attempt to project prospects’
readiness, fit, and resolve to pursue a professional baseball career, and, done effectively, scouts
accept the notion that not all prospects should sign, not all prospects are fully prepared to survive
minor league life, and good scouting is also measured by those prospects scouts refuse to sign.
Time to Develop
The second step in scouts’ performance projection matrix is “time to develop” –
specifically, how scouts factor and weigh developmental time when forecasting prospects’
potential for achieving performance expertise in two to five years. To this end, time to develop
is a decision-making component viewed through the lens of timelines and schedules.
With regard to timelines, Mack exclaimed that “we’re in such a hurry to do everything
now,” and he explained this haste results from the speed of information and cross-checkers’
desire to assemble their lists and visually evaluate prospects as quickly as possible. To that end,
Mack queried, “But, are you really seeing?” More specifically, Mack implied that a “time to
develop” perspective needs to be more firmly applied to cross-checkers’ evaluation lens:
But you know what? You go in there – I saw this kid pitch the other day. He was 84 to
87, but he went back and got an 89. Now, he’s 6’5”, and he’s 175, and there’s a lot of
room to fill out. The arm works, and he can spin a breaking ball.
The assumption of Mack’s message is futuristic and projective: that is, if 89 is the
current limit of the prospect’s capability, but in four months of development, conditioning, and
good weather 89 becomes the lower limit of a velocity range extending to 92 – when does a
scout’s evaluation rest on a static measure and when does one embrace increased performance
development over time? Joe detailed his questioning self-talk when he observed a prospect’s
positive tools and attempted to visualize the player’s future hitting power:
You’ve seen that kid hit a ball that jumped into the gap, and you’re like ‘you know what?
Two years, three years, or a year – what’s he gonna’ be like? With more strength, more
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bat speed – is that ball gonna’ jump into the gap and hit the wall? Is it gonna’ go outta’
the ball park?’
Along these lines, Jermaine devised a “non-static grade” for those players who need more time to
develop before draft selection. He adapts his evaluations and categorizes these prospects as
“follows,” or, more specifically, players he will continue to observe over time because signs of
potential professional tools and makeup are present. In a phrase, a static tools and makeup grade
is incomplete when forecasting “time to develop”.
I don’t like it when I go Tournament of Stars you’re putting NP’s on guys, non-prospects.
These are the hundred best high school guys in the country. They’re gonna play college
baseball. I ‘CP’ ‘em – I put college player on ‘em. They may not be a pro guy right now,
but three years down the road what are they gonna be?
In order to project expert performance, scouts must wrestle with the determinants of
potential performance and then compare these results with the determinants of prospects’ current
performances. Jermaine provided a reminder that talent development occurs on individual
timelines: “Some guys are late developers; some guys are early developers.” Said differently,
Sam emphasized that leadership is required to identify positive tools and makeup forecasted
against development as a function of time: “It takes a player, a scout, a coach to go ‘time to go
to work. There’s things to like. Let’s go.’ Because every kid has his own growing path.”
Growing path in this context is synonymous with time to develop, and although performance
prediction is the foremost goal of talent identification, predicting baseball expertise is the most
difficult and uncertain objective scouts face:
Everybody…like I said, the one guy might be a great player at 25, the other guy might be
a great player at 21, another guy might be a great player at 28. So, the hard part for us is
trying to figure out who they are, those players (Sam).
In sum, Sam petitioned “don’t give up on players;” he revealed that “sometimes we do it [give up
on players] too quickly;” and he acknowledged that today’s prospects “have it a little easier.”
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Deeper still, Sam championed the concept of time to develop as both an organizational charge
and a perpetual pursuit inherent within performance expertise:
Okay, this game’s not for everybody, so we have to continue to develop the player, the
mind, the person – all the time. You can’t stop. You can’t go ‘we gave him four million
dollars, he’s good.’ No, he’s not good. There’s stuff going on. So, if we do that and
scouts do their part, and player development does their part, front office does their part,
then we have a chance.
Time to develop also includes downsides. For example, Joe disclosed a conversation
with his organization’s President regarding a player with poor makeup, and, in Joe’s evaluation
of the prospect, “there’s not any better talent we’re gonna’ find.”
…and [Organization’s President] says ‘we can’t give enough time to that kid. He would
take away from all the other kids because he would take too much energy.’ I thought that
was really insightful. [Name], you know him being the President of the company, just
hearing the conversation, him saying ‘you know what, we can’t bite on this guy because
he would take too much energy from our staff, and it would hurt the organization in the
long run.’
In this case, time to develop projected to require time and resources beyond what an organization
was prepared to provide for one prospect. On the other hand, Sam pointed to professional
baseball’s mission “to grow kids up,” and he insisted “we don’t do that enough”. Sam shared a
general example to illustrate his appeal to “keep working with kids”:
We take a Latin kid 16 years old. We take ‘em outa’ their country. We bring ‘em over
here. The kid’s not very talkative. He doesn’t know English. We gotta’ teach him
English, and they go ‘he’s not a great makeup kid.’ Well, if you’re 16 years old, living in
a new country, doesn’t know how to speak the language, I don’t even know how you can
even come up with makeup. How do you do it?
At a deeper level, Sam associated time to develop with the depth of a prospect’s upside-down
bell curve – that is, the time required to psychologically adapt to the rigors of professional
baseball is a pivotal consideration in each prospect’s time to develop.
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Some guys don’t have a very deep upside-down bell curve. Some guys do. So we have
to figure out how to work through that, and in that process we’ve got to start building that
kid up, for the makeup – it’s there, it’s good, now we gotta’ get the rest of it outta’ him.
The zeal to identify and sign players can also interrupt the time needed to develop good
decisions. Sam confessed that scouts need to practice patience when evaluating prospects: “So,
sometimes we have such urgency, ‘I wanna’ sign this guy, sign this guy,’ and we miss
something.” In Sam’s viewpoint, practicing patience in this context requires restraining the drive
to comprehensively see everything in one day and instead allow prospects’ performances to
unfold at their natural pace of development:
But some guys, they want to push it. You know, it’s like I tell young scouts – young pro
scouts, young amateur scouts – they go to the ballpark and they go ‘I gotta’ see
everything.’ That makes you tired, one, because you can’t see it all. Sometimes you
gotta’ let it come to you, and then when it comes to you, you gotta’ go ‘I got it.’
Time to develop represents scouts’ most important and difficult responsibility –
specifically, scouts are called upon to project what type of player a prospect will become in two
to five years. In itself, time to develop forecasting is laden with questioning dilemmas: are we
really seeing? Did we allow the performance to “come to us”? At what point do we base our
evaluation on a static measure? In effect, projecting expert baseball performance weighs the
determinants of a prospect’s current capabilities against the forecasted determinants of his future
development within the understanding that each player has “his own growing path”.
Tools and Makeup Composite
The final step in scouts’ performance projection matrix is labeled “tools and makeup
composite,” and this phrase represents scouts’ integrated estimations of prospects’ physical and
psychological potential for performance expertise.

In effect, tools and makeup composite

describes the self-reflective acid tests scouts individually conduct to produce their prospect
projections.
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Tools and makeup composite initially frames a dichotomy between prospects’ current
and their yet unknown future performances. Barney described the judgment process as a “fine
line” and characterized the end result as “a combination, you gotta’ use all your resources to
come to a decision.” For several scout participants, the fulcrum for “use[ing] all your resources”
to make prospect judgments turns on the practice of asking questions of self.

This self-

questioning critically analyzes the ground truth of scouts’ prospect observations. For Sam,
questions to determine passion and commitment prevail: “I think we work too hard to find
makeup early instead of just going ‘does he play hard? Does he love to play? Does he have
intelligence to play?’” Sam’s initial focus on prospects’ “style of play” compared with Mack’s
avenue for justifying passion and commitment: “And I think it comes down to the work ethic, I
think it comes down to the body language, and I really think it comes down to ‘does this kid
really enjoy playing the game?’” For Justin the combined strength of prospects’ physical tools
and mental preparation are non-negotiable. However, Justin also emphasized the importance of
determining prospects’ deeper motivations for signing professionally: “…and you’re not signing
for the money – you’re signing for the love of the game.” Said differently, Wes’s inclinations
are also to sign the “composite” prospect package of tools and makeup: “I’d rather have a guy
with less ability and makeup than a guy with a lot of ability and no makeup.” In similar
instances, Mack’s question to self is designed to forecast player improvement: “And if you’re a
little short with a tool, do you have the makeup to, you know, to overcome that?” Further
explaining, Mack sees no “substitute for tools,” acknowledges that great tools do not imply great
makeup, but, in large measure, Mack seeks to identify prospects’ degrees of performance
improvement across observations: “I think a lot of it goes back to how you saw this guy before,
and is he different than what you saw before?”
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A decision-making dilemma surfaces when a prospect’s tools significantly exceed the
maturity of his makeup. That is, the presence of above average tools, particularly combined with
above average height, often surpass the importance of makeup in scouts’ decision-making
matrix.

For Jermaine, this prospect profile – with average to below average makeup –

professionally advances and survives: “The guy with all the big tools and the big body, the
makeup can be average, below average. He’s gonna’ get to that level because of that body and
those tools.” Fundamentally, scouts’ decision-making begins with the imperative of average
tools, or, as Manny declared: “If they don’t have an average tool they’re not going to get
drafted. You’re not going into the minor leagues.” However, Sam acknowledged makeup
accountability for above average tool players in scouting culture comes with greater permission:
“And the extreme tooled-up guy who can really play, he does get a little bit of a pass.”
From a draft room perspective, Jermaine illustrated scouts’ tendency to pardon makeup
and give judgment priority to tools and size: “It’s amazing when you break down or have your
draft meeting. ‘How big’s this guy?

What’s his tools?’ You talk about makeup, but it

sometimes gets overlooked. It’s sad, but it gets overlooked.” In lieu of overlooked, Sam implied
that makeup is often deferred in the presence of great tools: “You know if you got great tools
you can have bad makeup, if you got great tools. Because the guys go ‘hey, just run him out
there, let him play, we’ll deal with it’.” In sum, scout participants described a step-wise decision
matrix that, in descending order, most values tools and size in the higher draft rounds, and as
tools and size decrease in later round selections makeup is more highly valued. Sam explained,
“if you’re an average player you can’t have bad makeup,” and, Jermaine described late round
draft choices as below average tools with above average makeup: “and then you get to the
bottom end of it the guy’s below average tools and got great makeup.”
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Later round draft selections who become good players represent, in Jermaine’s
perspective, the litmus test to “determine the guys who can scout.” That is, top prospects are
evident to all and limited in number, but the genius of scouting in Jermaine’s estimation is seen
in scouts who consistently identify: “Who are the guys that are in-between, that are gonna’ be
really good players? That’s where the little things come into play again.” For Mack, scouts
identify the “little things” when they answer the question: “What does this kid have that can
help us win?” Winning – or individually succeeding – in baseball comes with low percentages
of attainment, and Barney described how this reality forces scouts to ask questions of self when
projecting prospects’ tools and makeup composite:
Baseball’s the type of game where you can come in and see a kid one day and he can be
fantastic, and the next day he strikes out four times. So whata’ you got? Which one do
you have? Do you have the great player or the guy that didn’t make contact today?
Observing tools in the absence of baseball skill execution prompts scouts to ask the question: “do
you have the great player?” Reinforced and described in a different way, Jermaine outlined the
learning-centered and psychological ability questions he asks of himself in these situations:
…but the guy that’s throwing 92 that can’t get anybody out, or the guy that’s a 6.4 runner
that can’t steal bases – why? Why can’t they do that? Is it something internally –
internal clock? Do they have that fear of failure as opposed to “okay, I’m gonna steal
some bases, I’m gonna be thrown out, but I’m gonna be successful enough”?
In assessing tools and makeup composite, two principles prevail for Sam: (1) “evaluate
the situation;” and, (2) visualize a prospect’s development as a consequence of his makeup.
Evaluating the situation requires a view from above – in Sam’s description: “So, sometimes we
have to step back, and it’s all right in front of us like I said before, it’s all there.” Stepping back
signifies a pause, a self-reflection, an opportunity to objectively evaluate the prospect, and the
result, in Sam’s viewpoint, ensures “we have a better grasp of what we’re getting, what we’re
bringing in.” Secondly, scouts’ most difficult task in projecting tools and makeup composite is,
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as Sam detailed, justifying future performance expertise as a consequence of tools and makeup:
“’this guy can do it because he has this makeup. He can handle failures. He can do all these
things.’” Described differently, Manny believes ascertaining makeup correlates with the
frequency of prospect engagement: “what I determined was the only way you can determine
makeup is to be around them more than anybody else.” Comparatively, Joe is confident building
prospect relationships is the route to identify attributes of deliberate practice: “So that’s why the
personal relationships we build with the players is important – so you know what kind of desire
they have.” In the end, quantitative measures, in Manny’s outlook, only encapsulate a portion of
expert performance projection:
You’re gonna’ have these numbers and all these things you can point to that may be a
tipping point whether you take a guy or don’t take a guy, but you’re still going to have to
see a guy. You’re still going to have to find out.
As scouts approach their decision threshold on prospects, Sam confessed: “a tipping
point for me is just not to fail.” A veteran of nearly 30 seasons, Sam transparently confessed:
“there’s still guys I miss. I go ‘how did I miss that? What did I miss?’” Sam also explained that
sometimes we do not have opportunity to view or we do not fully absorb key indicators of
prospect talent: “Sometimes you don’t see it, but you gotta’ ask the question, ‘what did I miss?
What did I not see?’” While “not wanting to fail” drives Sam to consistently ask himself – “Why
does this guy have the ability to be good?” – Bart underscored the critical importance of making
timely, definitive decisions, even if they later prove to be wrong: “What do you think? – Tell
them. Don’t ride the fence, they’d rather you be wrong than ride the fence.” For Barry,
uncertainty is a signal to eliminate a prospect: “if you’re on the fence you should probably back
off and let somebody else take him.” In related terms, Sam alluded to the relevance of decisionmaking instinct and timing. Makeup can be indiscriminate and inconclusive despite our best
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research efforts. Occasionally makeup circumstantially unfolds before us; periodically, makeup
is realized at the crossroad of minor league life: “Then you gotta’ go, and sometimes makeup
comes to you, sometimes after you sign a guy – it’s not before.”
Projecting expert performers starts with spending most of your time with the prospects
you most desire and have the best opportunity to draft and sign. In Sam’s definition, basic
scouting boils down to determining: “Who do you really want? Make sure you know those
guys. Make sure you do your work.” For today’s scouts, Jeb stated the observation and analysis
involved in making player projections are increasingly comprehensive and quantitative –
requiring richer textural descriptions of tools and makeup and the statistical validation of game
intelligence:
It used to be strengths and weaknesses, a little physical description, and it’s changed over
the years now. Now it’s about on base percentage, and how his approach is. Does he
take pitches? Does he have a plan at the plate?
In this vein, hitting a baseball is often referred to as one of the most difficult of all sport
skills, and several scout participants also underscored the overwhelming importance of
identifying hitting talent. In brief and for some scouts, hitters with strong tools and makeup
composites have draft selection preference. Joe revealed, “number one, it’s gonna’ be the hit
guy,” or, more explicitly: “So, but if you can hit, and he’s got makeup – the will, the desire to do
it – he’s gonna’ go above that guy on the list that I thought ‘I don’t know if he’s gonna’ hit’.
That guy goes above.” For Jeb, tools and makeup composite for hitters represents a case study
projection that hinges on the strength of the prospect’s makeup:
So, you kind of look at it like – here’s the best case: the kid can lose ten to fifteen
pounds, lean up, trim up, get some more mobility, he could be what I think he is. Now, if
he doesn’t have the work ethic and makeup and family background and all that good stuff
that goes into who the kid is, he may not reach his ceiling.
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Jeb’s case example illustrated draft selection potential contingent upon a prospect’s makeup
capacity for talent development. Manny also emphasized two convictions specific to projecting
hitting prospects:

(1) consistent hitters advance to the Major Leagues; and, (2) makeup

determines hitting prowess and supersedes swing fundamentals.
You’ve still gotta’ figure it out – this guy’s gonna hit. Why’s he gonna’ hit? Because he
can hit. He’s gonna’ hit because he can hit. And that will – if he stays healthy – that will
move him to the Major Leagues if somebody can hit, okay? To say somebody’s not
gonna’ hit, I’ve been burned on that one before. You say, ‘well, this guy’s never gonna’
hit. He’s too long. He’s too this, too that.’ Again, it goes back to makeup. It goes back
to what their background is. Work ethic, what he has done in the past. All those things
determine if somebody’s going to hit.
In contrast, Sam described a case example of above average tools, deficient ambition, and
elimination from draft consideration:
And you start watching the kid and see some things: you didn’t see love, you didn’t see
passion for the game. He was just a tooled-up guy that played. So for me, I go, ‘I’m
out.’ I don’t want that guy.
In this case, absent makeup created talent development doubt in the presence of above average
tools.
Tools and makeup composite challenges scouts to use all their resources to project expert
performers, and the prevailing acid test scouts employ is questions of self. More clearly, scout
participants focused on prospects’ style of play, love of the game, and game intelligence. While
“good” makeup is optimal, the tendencies of scouts’ reveals that it is not always required – or
rather, it is overlooked or deferred – in the presence of above average tools. In contrast, scouting
“genius” is bestowed upon those who pay attention to the “little things” and consistently identify
prospects that are “in-between.” In-between in this context describes prospects who will achieve
future performance expertise when that reality is not clearly observed in their present
performances. In the end, tools and makeup composite occurs when scouts “step back” and
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critically analyze the ground truth of their prospect observations and relationships. Done well,
tools and makeup composite evaluates each prospect’s situation and projects talent development
and performance expertise as a consequence of the integration of tools and makeup. I now turn
to player selection, the fifth theme that surfaced in my study.
Player Selection
The First Year Player Draft concludes an annual decision-making process – by lottery
selection – when 30 MLB franchises choose prospects in an effort to increase their yield of
Major League players and more solidly position their organizations for long-term competitive
success. This talent identification operation rests heavily on area scouts – those who work
remotely with limited local oversight to identify, research, project, and assemble a “draft list”
from within their respective geographical territories. In turn, “player selection” represents the
final stage of the taste for talent progression among professional baseball scouts, and, at the area
scout level, this stage is comprised of two elements: (1) information gathering; and, (2) the
influence of guess, gut, and instinct.
Information Gathering
The process of how professional baseball scouts identify tools, define player attributes,
and make decisions to identify or eliminate prospects is lengthy, arduous, and characterized by
perpetual assessment activity. In describing the final stage of this process – player selection – a
majority of veteran scout participants portrayed the effects of organizational change, the
heightened emphasis on prospect information gathering, an experiential divide within today’s
scouting departments, and an inclination for doubt and a loss of empowerment. In a lengthy
disclosure, Manny described how these factors over time challenged his personal sense of
mission and purpose within the framework of making player selections:
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…because I really felt why I got out of it…why I got outta’ scouting the first time – I
backed into it the second time – I felt like I was sitting in my car and just driving my life
away, and that all the information I had I was giving it to the team I was working for –
but I wasn’t making an impact. You know? I wasn’t…the impact that I wanted to make.
I wasn’t…even as a cross-checker – I cross-checked for my last year – even in the draft
room – because I’d been in the draft room a bunch – I really didn’t have a whole….The
only way you really have a say is if you’re the scouting director or the owner. That’s
really only when you have a say who you’re taking, who you want, who you’re going to
get. So that was a little bit frustrating, but I think the biggest thing was I really just felt
like I spent my whole life in the car. You know, driving, driving, from field, to field, to
field. I mean, I’d sit there and think about the game. I’d think about how I do things, but
I really didn’t have a chance to get it out.
Jeb described MLB organizational change today as a movement toward formal business
practices, a “highly educated GM,” and a climate where “presidents of the ball club get involved
with the draft”: “It’s no longer the baseball people that played, coached, that didn’t make it as
players like it used to be.” Jermaine depicted this change as “hard,” and he conveyed a lack of
confidence in the quality of player assessment among today’s young scouts: “…so many clubs
hiring young guys who didn’t play, didn’t coach, office guys that are going out evaluating, and
they’re missing a lot that’s important.” Wes conveyed similar doubt and disconnect with today’s
young scouts and candidly opinioned: “there’s a lot scouts today that shouldn’t be scouting.
They’re not baseball people, man.” Baseball people for Wes symbolize a lifelong commitment
and calling to working in the game, and he questioned the sense of mission within new scouting
personnel: “I do not think a lot of these guys have the same passion, commitment, sense of
urgency, desire, and they’re taking a job looking for something else.”
For Ted, today’s beginning scouts lack a depth of visual knowledge and comparative
recall: “They’re using a young group and these guys haven’t seen a decade-long group of
players come through.” Frame of reference represents a non-negotiable fundamental absolute for
Barney, and he rests his hope of on-going employability on this conviction: “They have no
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reference. They have no reference. Hopefully that’s why they’ll keep guys like us around
because you have to have that.”
MLB organizations incur high talent identification and development costs coupled with
low odds of prospect advancement, and structural changes within organizations reflect an
intensified philosophical commitment to information gathering and empirical decision making.
This philosophical change altered the performance expectations of area scouts, diffused their
decision making impact, and tempered their emotional investment in the talent identification
process. For Manny, this paradigm shift toward increased information gathering helps crosscheckers and scouting supervisors “quantify” and “feel better about their decision.” Jermaine
views the role of area scouts today as “information gatherers” who provide a data pool for the
“higher up’s” to make decisions based on statistical analysis: “All we’re doing is providing them
with as much information as possible.” For Ted, these management alterations reinforce an
over-focus on quantifiable measurements, not all of which lead to good decisions: “They’re
throwing 95, and what’s happened is they’re using these gun times, and it’s guys throwing 95,
but these guys throwing 95 are getting hit hard.” The end result for Manny is a diminished voice
and emotional distancing for area scouts in player selection decisions: “I really think it’s
changed where you really don’t have that much emotion because you’re just an information
gatherer as an area scout.”
Area scouts find the players, conduct the research, and their draft list represents the
product of their seasonal work. In effect, area scouts serve as field researchers and
recommending buyers for the best future performers in their geographical areas. However, the
First Year Player Draft unfolds by lottery selection with front office personnel making the final
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selection decisions. This process prompts some scouts to speculate about the substance and
rationale of their organization’s final choices:
As area scouts we don’t make those final decisions, so you wonder on the other side of it,
when this guy’s tools across the board are 50’s, do we take that guy because he’s got
great makeup in the 15th round as opposed to taking that guy that’s got 55’s across the
board whose makeup is a little shaky in the seventh or eighth round?
Jermaine’s reflections above question the decision weights organizations ascribe both to tools
and to makeup. Specifically, when tools are average or better does an organization value
stronger makeup or higher tool grades – both of which are subjective measures of taste. In
Jermaine’s experiences, tools receive the higher preference: “It’s always, ‘can he play?’” If he
can play the makeup part will take care of itself somehow. That’s scary – especially when we’re
talking millions of dollars.”
Area scouts’ speculative uncertainty “on the other side” of their organization’s decision
making process potentially taints the integrity of the draft lists they submit. Ted stated that area
scouts have to “hustle” to get players, specifically: “He’s putting’ in a lot of players, and if you
put in too many that aint’ the way it’s supposed to be done, but that’s what guys will do to get
players.” Stated differently, Justin shared similar experiences: “But I see a lot of guys that they
want to get eight to 10 guys regardless if they like ‘em or not.” Deeper still, Ted claimed, in
some organizations, area scouts’ diminished voice and draft selection empowerment invites
evaluation fraud: “…the amateur scout has to lie to get players. He’s got to build his players
up.” From a different organizational perspective, Wes also underscored the presence of this
unintended trend:
I’m under the impression that a lot of ‘em don’t want to do the work. Some of ‘em may
not do the work. That doesn’t mean that we don’t spend time trying to find out, but
sometimes – and I hate to admit this – some area scouts don’t tell the truth.
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On the other hand, Justin testified that his personal approach is “don’t be selfish, don’t just want
numbers.” Rather, Justin adopts a strategic approach to the selection strength of his draft list:
“But out of my fifty guys, there’s probably five that will fit.” In addition, although Justin
embraces an organizational teamwork approach to draft selections, he is also cognizant of the
presence of narrow focused scouts within organizations:
If I get three it’s outstanding, but when we start talking about another player and if I’m
listening to that player and know my player, if I think their player’s better I say that
player’s better. But everyone is not on the same page as that. There’s a lot of selfish
people in the world when it comes to players.
Scout participants described their roles as information gatherers within franchises that
increasingly adopt formal business practices and embrace quantifiable measures of talent. In
turn, the increasingly high financial stakes associated with MLB prompted the hiring of a new
wave of younger, highly educated scouts with limited baseball playing experiences, sparking
veteran scouts’ mistrust of their commitment, visual knowledge, integrity, and frame of
reference. These organizational, assessment, and personnel shifts triggered a degree of
uncertainty within veteran professional baseball scouts while intensifying their information
gathering expectations and decreasing their voice of influence.
Guess, Gut, and Instinct
The final element of “player selection decisions” is represented by “guess, gut, and
instinct.” When scout participants described how they determine which prospects to assign to
their draft list, rather than share formulaic systems participants leaned on the ownership of their
individual baseball experiences – in a phrase, their taste for talent.
Gary defined a “good scout” as one who takes possession of the feelings he experiences
in his visual observations of prospects: “I think if a scout is gonna’ be good, if he sees a player
and has a good feel about him, you gotta’ stick with your gut.” Extending upon this “feeling,”
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Gary described the physical signals he experiences when viewing what he believes to be a future
Major League player:
But for me I know if I see a player it’s almost like an excitement I get in my body, in my
belly, and when I get that that’s the guy, that’s a Big Leaguer to me, and I don’t care what
anybody’s gonna’ say about that guy.
In contrast, Barry conveyed an antiseptic and pragmatic approach to instinctive prospect
decision-making: “It’s still irrelevant what the player is, what you think of the player. You can
check a bunch of boxes but at the end of the day you kinda go on your instincts and library.”
In an age when statistical metrics and quantifiable talent measurements influence final
draft selections, nearly half of all scout participants emphasized the efficacy of their decision
making instincts. For Joe, projecting first year success for a new signee is an opinion one cannot
fully support with evidence: “The ability to compete at the Rookie Ball level – it’s, it’s a guess.”
Said differently, Ted likened assembling a draft list to a hitter anticipating a pitcher’s next pitch
based on previous patterns: “I would say that part of the time that you’re doing this, part of it is
guessing. You’re guessing, you’re guessing.” However, Ted also emphasized that guesses are
not made in the absence of observation and research, but experiential preferences – or tastes –
frequently prevail:
You’re putting the other stuff together with the tools, but you’re really on a hunch a lot of
the time. Sometimes we’ll sit there at night, and I’ll sit there and look at this report, and
I’m going ‘I just got a feeling, just a feeling, that this guy is gonna’ be a player.’ So I’ll
write that guy up to where I think he’s gonna’ be a player, and it’s really – that’s
guessing, but it’s a hunch. With everything I’ve seen from him, and like I said I’m only
getting to see a few games from the guy. I’m not there seeing hundreds of games. We
can’t just sit on a player.
For Barry, draft list decisions are simple and unemotional: “You meet with ‘em in the winter,
and after 12 months you make your best guess.” Jermaine emphasized the individual nature of
personal taste and described prospect selection as something that is in “the eyes of the beholder”
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and in large measure a matter of “gut feel.” For Gary, individual taste is influenced by when and
where you see the prospect perform, as well as accepting the notion that “not everybody’s gonna’
see the guy good.” More specifically, Gary stated: “Around our business there’s a lot of
sometimes negativity because one scout maybe didn’t see him the way you did.”
Explaining what appears to be unexplainable is often described with the words guess, gut,
or instinct. To this end, Bart emphasized the prevalence and importance of “gut feel” and
“instinct” when making late round draft list selections, and he portrayed how the integration of a
scout’s full menu of experiences influence his ability to project performance expertise in the
midst of average tool grades:
He may be a 40 runner with a 40 arm – everything’s a 40 – but he played in the Big
Leagues, why? It’s your gut feel, it’s your instincts, it’s your frame of reference, what
you don’t see physically but you say ‘you know what though, he knows how to play the
game.’ He understands situations, where to position himself, he knows everything that’s
going on – his baseball IQ is good, and you say ‘how’s he do it?’
For Gary, instincts, in the absence of negative concerns or below average grades, tip the scales
and reinforce final decisions:
I pride myself in having pretty good instincts for the game, and I go – If there aren’t red
flags that I haven’t seen and I’m wavering one way or another I’m gonna go by my gut,
what I feel about that player. I don’t know if that’s right or not. I never have a problem
with it, but I feel that my instincts are good enough to know that.
In the absence of an affirmed theoretical framework for baseball talent identification, scout
participants described their decisions to identify or eliminate Major League prospects as a
function of taste. Gary described his first impression reactions when he observes a potential
Major League prospect: “we’ve all seen a guy, ‘man that’s the guy’ – if that happens, stick with
it. Go with your first gut instinct. Are ya’ gonna’ be right all the time? No, but you’re gonna’
feel good about it.”
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CHAPTER FIVE: TASTES FOR TALENT ANALYSIS
Veteran professional scouts in my study candidly described how they define talent,
psychological makeup, and make decisions to identify or eliminate baseball prospects.
Consistent with phenomenological methodology, themes emerged from my participant
interviews and resulted in a three-stage talent identification model for baseball prospects.
Within this talent identification model, the process for determining prospect attributes is
influenced by scout dispositions and begins with field observation through a sequence of three
actions: (1) grading tools and experiencing physicality; (2) recognizing confident movements;
and, (3) employing comparative recall.
If visual talent recognition results in the identification of average Major League tools (or
better), the second stage – prospect research – commences. The three-part methodology of this
stage includes homework questions, make-up reasoning, and the evaluation of three valued
makeup traits: (1) competitive adaptability; (2) extra effort; and, (3) instinct and intellect.
Preceding player selection decisions, the final stage of baseball talent identification aims
to project prospects’ probability for achieving performance expertise in the context of a threepart decision matrix that evaluates: (1) fit and readiness for rigor; (2) time to develop; and, (3)
tools and makeup composite.
Through their reflexive narratives, my participants described how they uncover clues
with their eyes and reflectively interpret what others may not see for the purpose of defining
baseball talent and making decisions. As I analyzed these narratives through the theoretical lens
of reflective knowledge (Schon, 1983), talent development (Bloom, 1985; Csikszentmihalyi et
al., 1993), and performance expertise (Ericsson, 1993; 1996; 1998; 2007, June; 2009), I
discovered three components that form the framework of scouts’ tastes for true talent: (1)
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scouts’ dispositional mindset and comparative recall influences their visual knowledge; (2)
scouts value the makeup traits of competitive adaptability, extra effort, instinct and intellect; and,
(3) scouts’ player selection decisions incorporate visual knowledge, valued makeup traits, and
the influence of guess, gut, and instinct.
In my analysis, I theoretically interpret the three findings that form the organizational
structure of scouts’ tastes for true talent. As I outline these three elements, I illustrate how the
theory of reflective knowledge (Schon, 1983) explains scouts’ comparative recall, their
“instinct” for making player selection decisions, and prospects’ “feel” for playing baseball. I
also clarify how talent development (Bloom, 1985; Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993) and
performance expertise (Ericsson, 1993; 1996; 1998; 2007, June; 2009) theories help interpret
scouts’ dispositional mindsets and the three psychological makeup traits scouts most value in
prospects.
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Visual Knowledge
Veteran scout participants in this study revealed two dispositional classifications that
affect the process of visible talent identification. I labeled these mental inclinations open
consideration and narrow mindset, and the nature of these outlooks direct the vision, the
interpretations, and the performance forecasts scouts incorporate into their comprehensive
process of talent identification and player selection.
In Bloom’s (1985) Developing Talented Young People, Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993)
Talented Teenagers, and J. Anders Ericsson’s (1993; 1996; 1998; 2007, June; 2009) research
detailing the pre-determinates of performance expertise, each body of work accentuated the
potential for perpetual talent development within healthy individuals in the presence of
supportive networks and challenging developmental opportunities. In addition, Bloom (1985)
and Ericsson (2007, June) comparably mapped the longitudinal stages of talent development, and
Schon (1983) explained how reflective questions broaden the scope of practitioner’s visual
knowledge.
In the section labeled “dispositional mindsets” I compare and contrast the tendencies
scout participants disclosed through their open and narrow interpretations of visible talent
identification in baseball prospects. Scout participants also disclosed that their historical recall
of memorable prospects operates as a comparative reference for grading baseball tools and
identifying confident movements. Scouts correlate prospects’ attributes with reference points
found in their personal, experiential catalogue of visual knowledge. In the segment identified
“comparative recall,” I applied Schon’s (1983) concepts of repertoire, expert “know-how,” and
interpretive inquiry to outline the role scout participants’ personal prospect catalogue plays in the
process of visibly identifying baseball talent.
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Dispositional Mindsets
Time honored beliefs in “natural talent” approximate scout participants’ reports of
narrow mindset inclinations that heavily focus on genetic height, baseball tool deficiencies, fixed
performance ceilings, and measurable tools. In contrast, scouts who embraced an open
consideration of a wide array of potential prospects exhibited dispositions that closely paralleled
the theoretical principles and effects associated with talent development through cumulative
training and deliberate practice.
Bloom’s (1985) retrospective study conveyed belief in the existence of large societal
talent pools – “developed or neglected” (p. 5) – and his perspective aligns with scouts’ depiction
of a “wide funnel” mindset (i.e. open consideration) that, applied to prospect potential and
visible talent identification, enlarges the field of prospects evaluated. He (Bloom, 1985)
explored how the developmental effects of “environmental conditions” (p. 5) propel and
transform participants into world class performers, and he determined that “no one reached the
limits of learning in a talent field on his or her own” (p. 509).
Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) questioned whether talented teenagers escape our
detection, and they determined that inadequate support networks and the lack of challenging
developmental opportunities represent the chief external obstructions to talent discovery. For
Ericsson (1993), environmental determinism prevails, and the three factors that derail the
optimization of deliberate practice are training resources, individual motivation, and imbalanced
effort.
For scouts, an open consideration disposition breaks away from the exclusive search for
polished physical tools and instead embraces a mindset focused on identifying positive baseball
abilities capable of development. Comparatively, Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues’ (1993)
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three-part definition of talent began with the determination that talent is a combination of both
heritable abilities and performance development. Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) also refuted the
popular belief that natural talent, when present, will always surface and never fail to escape our
notice or discovery. Scout participants characterized how narrow mindsets demonstrate an overreliance on visual knowledge that tends to “miss” undersized prospects or prospects still within
their developmental progression. Specifically, narrow mindset talent identification exhibits an
over-focus on tall players with above average footspeed, power, and/or throwing velocity, and
this narrowly focused disposition limits the scope of scouts’ evaluations to fewer prospects.
Investigated from another angle, Ericsson (1998) questioned whether the absence of
natural talent in healthy humans veritably prevents the achievement of performance expertise.
Ericsson (2007, June) refuted the anecdotal and intuitive explanations that point to natural talent
as the primary explanation for expert performance, and instead he empirically determined that
healthy individuals can effectively become performance experts through a longitudinal process
of deliberate practice.
Similar to Ericsson’s inquiry, scouts’ open consideration of visual evaluations is also
influenced by self-reflective questions that ponder the source and environmental conditions
necessary for talent to surface. Some scouts reported that asking the questions “why?” and
“how?” increase their visual clarity when a prospect’s baseball tools are not quantifiably
consonant with the talents of current Major League players. Scouts who adopt open
consideration mindsets identify prospect strengths and then employ adaptive and projective
thinking across multiple prospect evaluations.
Schon (1983) submitted that when knowing-in-practice becomes overly routine and
repetitive practitioners are prone to stop posing the question, “what if?” (p. 145). However, the
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stimulus for initiating “reflection-in-action hinges on the experience of surprise” (Schon, 1983,
p. 56), and a majority of participants revealed that previous evaluation failures triggered a sense
of humility, reflective analysis, and interpretative research of prospects’ psychological makeup.
Nearly all scout participants disclosed how embracing the imminent reality of talent
identification failure reinforces the importance of perpetually asking questions.
Bloom’s (1985) retrospective investigation of expert practitioners uncovered dynamic,
stepwise stages of talent development devoid of hereditary direction. These patterns portrayed
the developmental stages of initiation (early years), development (middle years), and perfection
(later years) over a 10-15 year period and established credence for “potential” talent as a function
of continuous learning and training opportunities. Analogously, Ericsson’s (2007) empirical
premise embraced the positive effects of cumulative training and demonstrated that, “experts
continually engage in deliberate practice” (p. 12) over a period of 10 years and 10,000 hours.
Closely paralleling Bloom (1985), Ericsson (2009) framed the development of deliberate
practice as a continuum of three stages: (1) fundamental skill and feedback cue introduction; (2)
skill acquisition, automation, and continued practice; and, (3) constructive training challenges
designed to elevate performances to new heights. Open consideration scouts emphasized the
importance of projecting prospects’ “time to develop” (i.e. into an MLB player) and the patient
awareness that, much like Bloom’s and Ericsson’s stages of development, each player has “his
own growing path.”
Bloom’s (1985) investigation not only provided insights into how performance experts
learn and spend their time, but his summary analysis provided a foundational finding
underscoring the efficacy of cumulative training and open consideration: “what any person in
the world can learn, almost all persons can learn if provided with appropriate prior and current
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conditions of learning” (p. 4). However, scouts with narrow mindsets exhibit an inattentiveness
to Bloom’s (1985) conclusion and routinely eliminate – or say “no” to - prospects when average
Major League talent is not immediately and visually confirmed.
Open mindset scouts seek to identify player strengths in their search to discover “who’s
special?” Special in this context refers to prospects whose baseball performances surpass their
tool grades and position them to become Major League players. In addition, “special” closely
aligns with the psychological effects that elevate performance as a result of deliberate practice
(Ericsson et al., 2009), specifically: (a) refined mental comprehension of the game; (b)
heightened anticipation of key stimuli; and, (c) advanced cognitive clarity leading to exceptional
response speed.
For Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) talent represents a social label of approval. That is,
talent exists when an identified attribute has value to (i.e. cultural domain) and achieves a
meaningful performance benchmark for the evaluator (i.e. social field). Scouts acknowledged
that prospect height, running speed, and pitching velocity represent preferential, socially
approved focal points for visible talent identification. However, scouts portrayed narrow
mindsets as vulnerable to costly mistakes due to an over-reliance on static measurements.
Conversely, open consideration scouts voiced constructive criticism regarding this tendency and
differentiated themselves via their commitment to an “open mind.” That is, open consideration
scouts forecast the potential effects of cumulative training over time, while static assessments of
socially accepted physical abilities (e.g. size, speed, velocity) tend to overly influence narrow
mindset scouts’ talent identification decisions.
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Comparative Recall
Within the process of visible talent identification, tool grades capture both subjective and
quantifiable ability measurements while confident movements signal the presence of
psychological attributes. All scout participants, however, described their use of comparative
recall as a means to correlate, communicate, and conceptualize these elements of visible talent
identification through their experiential memories.
Participants unanimously indicated a reciprocal link between their sight and their
experiential instincts and at the center of this connection resides what scouts refer to as a
“catalogue” of baseball experiences. A scout’s mental catalogue acts as his visual library of
meaningful baseball prospect evaluation, player development, and performance experiences.
In effect, scouts’ individual tastes for talent are a distinctive reflection of their personal
baseball histories. This catalogue – or, comparative recall – functions as an ever-present
prospect comparison tool as well as an ever-expanding experiential data base. In addition, the
depth of a scout’s long-term memory also serves as a criterion for confidence when scouts make
player projections and judgments.
Comparative recall – or employing comparison players from history – also operates as a
communication devise when scouts compose scouting reports and/or discuss a prospect’s tools
and makeup with their peers or direct reports. Scouts revere the efficacy of vivid long-term
baseball memories, and employing the use of stories and comparison players is a common form
of opinion and information interchange among scouts.
A function of experience, the depth and the quality of scouts’ comparative recall
influences the range, flexibility, and adaptability of their talent identification lens. All scout
participants ascribed some percentage of their prospect judgment decisions to comparison, and,
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for most, comparative recall behaves as a questioning prompt that results in deeper reflection
and analysis.
Open consideration scouts freely disclosed their memorable prospect “misses” and how
those experiences enlarged their evaluative perspectives and generated new reflective habits and
scouting instincts. In effect, their observational funnels widened as a result of talent
identification mistakes and thereby expanded the odds and effectiveness of their prospect
discovery.
Schon (1983) analyzed the systemic complexity of “knowing-in-action” manifested by
experienced practitioners whom he defined as “specialist[s] who encounter certain types of
situations again and again” (p. 60). Area scouts clearly fit within Schon’s (1983) definition of
expert practitioners, and he defined knowing-in-action as a tacit, often unexplainable, form of
situational knowledge born of reflection-in-action (i.e. reflection in the flow of practice) and
reflection-on-action (i.e. after action reflection). This knowledge emanates from and is found “in
our action” (Schon, 1983, p. 49), and this form of expertise characterizes the “art” practitioners
exhibit in situations that require adaptation. These situations transform the perspective of the
practitioner into the mind of a researcher, not in the traditional sense “of established theory and
technique” (Schon, 1983, p. 68), but rather from the vantage of interpreting the action and
developing a new conceptual explanation of that specific situation.
Schon (1983) explained practitioners personally engage with and across all three levels of
action: (1) the results of action; (2) the specific action; and, (3) the intuition inherent within the
action. Within this process, practitioner’s reflective self-talk engages their memorable recall “of
examples, images, understandings, actions” (Schon, 1983, p. 138). That is, what scouts label
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their “catalogue” Schon terms “repertoire,” and this repertoire serves as a guide or case
“precedent” for discerning meaning from uncommon and/or unique situations.
Although uncommon or unique, Schon (1983) theorized that expert practitioners are not
helplessly acting with a blank slate. Rather, the experienced practitioner, comparable to veteran
professional baseball scouts, is able to “see unfamiliar situations as familiar ones” and “to have a
feel for problems that do not fit existing ones” (p. 140) by engaging their comparative recall or
“repertoire.” In effect, veteran scouts, performing as thinking-in-action practitioners,
demonstrate an interdependent connection between their sight and their experiential instinct
through comparative recall.
In the subsequent section, I analyze the psychological attributes, or what scouts term
“makeup,” that are most valued by those who evaluate prospective professional baseball players.
Employing Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) “complex systems” of two-dimensional thinking,
Ericsson’s (1993; 1996; 1998; 2007, June; 2009) theory of deliberate practice, and Schon’s
(1983) conceptual interpretation of “spontaneous, intuitive performance,” I theoretically frame
the valued makeup traits reported within my participant narratives.
Valued Makeup Traits
Scout participants depicted field observation and prospect research as the first two stages
of the baseball talent identification process. Veteran scouts also stressed both the importance
and the interdependency of physical tools and psychological makeup, and in the final step of
prospect research participants identified the components of their three most valued makeup traits.
I classified these traits competitive adaptability, extra effort, instinct and intellect, and in this
section I analyze how scouts discover and define these makeup attributes by applying the

177

theories of Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993), Ericsson (1993; 1996; 1998; 2007, June; 2009), and
Schon (1983).
Competitive Adaptability
Scouts accentuated the merits of and their preferences for evaluating baseball talent when
prospects experience failure or adversity. In moments of challenge, scouts’ opportunities to
observe prospects’ psychological makeup are intensified and made increasingly clear. These
critical moments allow scouts to observe and to reflect upon what comes next, and they serve as
tests to witness the presence and maturation of prospects’ competitive adaptability.
Competitive failure or adversity in baseball calls for players’ adaptive responses,
advancing their opportunities for improvisation, adjustment, and strategic creativity in the
moment. All participants disclosed case episodes of prospects’ responses to competitive failure
and how they reflectively envisioned prospects’ self-talk when interpreting their adaptive
action(s) in game situations.
All scouts underscored the frequent failure inherent to the game of baseball. This reality,
scouts disclosed, emphasizes the perpetual necessity for effective coping as well as personal
acceptance of the statistical frequencies of baseball failure and success. In effect, scouts painted
word pictures and replayed experiential stories of what adaptation to the competitive ebb and
flow of baseball should and should not look like in prospects’ actions. Participants reported that
effective adaptive responses by prospects in competitive settings signal their understanding of
the essence of the game and its inherent rigors.
Competitive rigor challenges the presence and persistence of prospects’ passion for the
game. Participants underscored the indispensability of prospects’ “love of the game” when
attempting to forecast their survival through the player development process. However, passion

178

by itself is inadequate for prospect selection and advancement, and nearly all scouts underscored
the importance of forgetting as a cornerstone of coping and confidence. That is, forgetting
failures and critics is requisite for the development of confidence. Adaptability is evident in
prospects when they confidently find ways to competitively self-correct, to reinvent, to
persevere, and to overcome.
Csikszentimihalyi et al. (1993) investigated teenagers’ commitment to becoming elite in
their chosen disciplines and how this is actualized through their “daily experiences and selfperceptions” (p. 48). Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues’ (1993) methodology for investigating
commitment emanated from the flow model of peak performance and their belief that talent
development is fueled by optimal experiences.
Optimal experiences are realized when performers are completely immersed in the flow
of training and performance, oblivious to all extraneous personal and environmental stimuli.
Aligned with scouts’ definition of competitive adaptability, flow correlates with a quiet mind and
the ability to forget. Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) findings noted the reciprocal relationship
between “psychological complexity” and optimal experiences. They characterized a complex
mindset as two-dimensional thinking that perpetually navigates the polarities of constancy and
change. This complex reality parallels the psychological challenges experienced within baseball,
a game failure.
Flow involves and requires the embrace of challenge in pursuit of peak performance.
Similarly, baseball is laden with both the challenges and the adaptations inherent to a game
characterized by low percentages of professional advancement. Competitive failure in baseball
creates opportunities for adaptive responses. Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) emphasized that
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performance skills do not remain static among talented performers. Rather, complex mindsets,
“while cohesive and stable” (p. 13), remain agile “to adapt and change when necessary” (p. 13).
For Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993) talent development is directly proportional to
psychological complexity, and this attribute represents their primary lens for assessing talent
potential in exceptional teenage performers. Akin to scouts’ definition of competitive
adaptability, psychological complexity correlates with a baseball prospect’s constancy in pursuit
of peak performance while simultaneously embracing challenge and change.
Extra Effort
I applied the term extra effort to describe the uncommon drive and sense of purpose
scouts reported searching for in prospects. Scouts depicted extra effort being clearly visible in
prospects’ style of play and their commitment to focused training and preparation. Specifically,
scouts identified extra effort through prospects’ concentrated, purposeful exertion to improve
performance - to learn, to work, and to understand the game. Some scouts underscored how the
presence of this prospect attribute positively infects the work habits and performance
development of other team members.
For all scouts, extra effort represents a key impetus for ascribing confidence in prospects’
future realization of physical potential. Its antithesis – laziness, lack of purpose, indifference –
serves as a cautionary sign for scouts to consider the elimination of prospects from selection.
However, the presence of prospects’ exceptional physical tools periodically engenders
two talent identification dilemmas for some scouts: (1) above average tools can subordinate the
consideration of extra effort when making prospect selections; and, (2) as a learned behavior,
extra effort is oftentimes underdeveloped and lacking in reinforcement among prospects with
precocious physical abilities.
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Some scouts ascribed unfulfilled potential to prospects’ deficient comprehension of
professional baseball’s performance development expectations. Participants did not
unanimously view physical talent as the primary impediment to Major League advancement.
Rather, most participants described prospects’ ineffective learning, incomplete understanding,
and insufficient passion of and for baseball as critical roadblocks to talent development and
performance expertise.
Espousing the interdependence of effort and ability, all participants described and
acknowledged the importance of motivation and learning in the development of performance
expertise. These attributes visibly reflect prospects’ “pride” in the game and are clearly
demonstrated to scouts through prospects’ consistent pre-game preparations, training habits, and
competitive behaviors.
Ericsson described what it takes to become an expert performer through his discoveries
of deliberate practice. He (Ericsson et al., 2007, June) defined performance expertise as
“reproducibly superior performance” (p. 9), and his (Ericsson, 2007) findings revealed that
“experts continually engage in deliberate practice” (p. 12). Ericsson (1998) differentiated skill
development and routine skill repetition (1993; 2007, June) from deliberate practice. He
(Ericsson, 1993; 2007, June) defined deliberate practice as pre-meditated, structured training that
includes constructive criticism, detailed feedback, and adaptive performance challenges
conducted on the perimeter of a performer’s current level of skill capabilities. Scouts’ leading
goal is predicting performance expertise, and all participants detailed their preference for
prospects who exhibit the traits of deliberate practice.
In the absence of resource and effort restraints, performance improvement motivates
performers to sustain deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993). The desire for performance
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improvement fuels a performer’s will to exert extra effort through the rigors associated with
deliberate practice. As a result, deliberate practice and its “challenges that demand concentration
and effort” (Ericsson et al., 2009, p. 213) neutralize the “arrested development” (Ericsson, 2007)
associated with the “automaticity” endemic to the routine practice of pre-existing skills. Applied
to baseball, all scouts reported the desire to identify prospects’ consistent tool and makeup
improvements across multiple observations over a longitudinal period of time.
Instinct and Intellect
Scout participants spoke to baseball instinct and intellect using words and phrases such as
“internalizing the game,” “feel,” “baseball player,” “getting it,” and “baseball rat.” Their
references pointed to how baseball players intuitively understand their movements, decisions,
and actions within the situational contexts of the game. In this regard, a prospect’s baseball
intuition – his identification of perceptual signals, his anticipation of movements and patterns,
and his reactionary speed to game action – theoretically aligns with the byproducts of deliberate
practice and represents the inverse of automaticity (Ericsson, 1993; 1996; 1998; 2007, June;
2009).
Prospects demonstrate an absence of baseball instinct and intellect for scouts when they
fail to know how to “read” baseball cues, tendencies, movements, and patterns in ways that fully
utilize their physical tools. All scouts reported an affinity for prospects that adapt and elevate
their performance in response to the competition and the game situation. Participants described
episodes of prospects that showcased instinct and intellect by inventing ways to succeed at
baseball in the moment, and the most memorable illustrations of this attribute occurred when the
result of the game hung in the balance.
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Scouts described how the development of baseball instinct and intellect in a prospect is
not guaranteed. They explained how the speed and the breadth of this attribute’s maturation – if
it unfolds – positively influences the path of a prospect’s upward advancement within the minor
league system. Participants also accounted how baseball instinct and intellect do not inherently
develop in parallel timing with prospects’ physical baseball tools. Prospects with baseball
instinct and intellect know how to read perceptual cues, play by feel, and “think” with their
muscles, and prospects’ deficiencies in this attribute impede their full development of baseball
potential.
Schon (1983) described “intuitive performance” as practitioner “know-how” intelligently
revealed in action. This situational intellect is developed through experience and reflection, and
it is exhibited within practitioners’ spontaneous, tacit perception of and response to phenomena.
Schon’s (1983) framework for “intuitive performance” parallels scouts’ descriptions of prospects
that have spontaneous, intuitive “feel” for their competitive baseball movements, timing,
decisions, and situational adjustments.
Nearly all participants described the importance of prospects’ ability to “synthesize” the
game, to turn fundamental into feeling and effectively “read” baseball’s stimuli in action.
Similarly, Ericsson’s (1998) performance expertise research detected the development of
“predictive perceptual cues” (p. 414) in subjects who practice deliberately. As a result of
performance experts’ deliberate practice, Ericsson (1998) also identified the maturation of
“physiological adaptations” (p. 413) that advance performers’ cue recognition, anticipation, and
response speed (Ericsson et al., 2009). These results reflect the key player development goals of
minor league baseball and Major League scouting departments.
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For Schon (1983), spontaneous movement, signal recognition, and decision-making are
distinctive characteristics of knowing-in-action. A practitioner’s repertoire serves as a lens for
detecting variances in action. In pursuit of desirable results, reflective practitioners respond to
phenomena and adapt their action(s). Situations that require rapid responses bring together
“feel” (for phenomena) and skill (in action) to produce artistic, adaptive responses. Scout
participants described prospects with instinct and intellect as those who monitor their
performances, make technical adjustments, and “show ya’ a little bit more.”
All scout participants highlighted the value of prospects’ ability to play intelligent
baseball and indicated this is a requirement for Major League players. This baseball intelligence
for scouts is exhibited by “guys that really, really know what they’re doing on the field.”
One of the developmental effects of deliberate practice is the enhanced mental acuity
performers embody in their ability to “monitor their performances through continued
improvements” (Ericsson, 1998, p. 414). Ericsson et al. (2009) stated explanations of
performance expertise will remain unclear to the extent uncertainty persists with regard to “how
elite performers develop the complex cognitive mechanisms” (p. 204) that accelerate
performance expertise. For Schon (1983) and scout participants, this complexity is both
answered and described as tacit intuition personified by adaptive performances. In the final
section, I analyze how participants process their scouting observations and engagements and
discern their decisions to identify and eliminate Major League prospects.
Player Selection
Professional baseball organizations are increasingly pressed to clarify, defend, and
quantify their prospect identification and selection methods in today’s high compensation
climate. While incapable of clearly perceiving from prospects’ pre-draft performances,
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organizations and scouts perpetually work to discover and differentiate prospects who will
become future expert performers. Franchises that incrementally increase their draft yield of
Major League players will more effectively utilize their talent identification and development
resources and position their franchise for competitive greatness.
Player selection represents the final stage of area scouts’ systems for appraising their
tastes for true talent - or, more directly, for answering the two-part question of how scouts define
talent and make prospect decisions. Participants identified the distinctive effects of “guess, gut,
and instinct” in their decision making cognitions and I analyzed this application through the lens
of Schon’s (1983) theory of reflective knowledge.
The work life of an area scout is characterized by perpetual prospect assessments. This
occupational role historically embodied lifelong commitment across a high percentage of scouts.
Yet participants portrayed today’s organizational climate as encumbered with a proliferation of
quantifiable talent measures compiled and analyzed by a cadre of youthful, educated scouting
personnel devoid of personal competitive baseball experiences. These experiential deficiencies
triggered sentiments of mistrust within participant narratives. Scouts detailed the intensification
of organizations’ information gathering expectations and subordinated regard for their
interpretative voice.
Despite organizations’ sharpened reliance on statistically-based prospect decisions,
scouts fully owned the efficacy of their personal instincts and comparative recall. While
requisite tools are primary and makeup traits highly valued, forecasting performance
development two to five years in the future is incapable of complete empirical support. Some
scouts described future performance projections as a “guess,” or, more clearly, an informed
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guess based on a prospect’s performance patterns aligned with and compared to scouts’
comparative recall.
For all scouts, taste is personal and represents a form of visual knowledge that often
ignites emotional convictions. Some participants described this knowledge and emotion as “gut
feel.” Scouts reported gut feel also necessitates the cognitive understanding peers and
supervisors will not glean the same knowledge from the same prospect through their visual
evaluations.
Scouts utilized the term “instinct,” in part, to explain what is often unexplainable. All
participants referred to the importance of employing their resources to select and project
prospects – their frame of reference, visual tool grades and impressions, makeup assessment, and
reflective thoughts. Several scouts bestowed high praise on their peers who understand the
essence of each prospect’s personal situation and identify the “little things” that fuel performance
development. In sum, participants defined instinct as a one’s taste for true talent emanating from
comparative recall and resulting in a decision to identify or eliminate a prospect.
For Schon (1983), expert practitioner’s knowing-in-action unfolds without intimate
awareness or pre-planning. In most instances, uncertainty or surprise prompts practitioner
experimentation, manifested as exploration, move-, or hypothesis-testing (Schon, 1983).
Practitioners replay and/or “feel” the action as a movie in their mind to search for new
understandings and/or adaptations that yield better results (Schon, 1983). This reflective
experimentation creates “a new theory of the unique case” (Schon, 1983, p. 68), and this new
theory expands both a practitioner’s repertoire and instinct. Across nearly all narratives, scout
participants shared stories of “missed” evaluations that triggered surprise, their reflection-inaction, the creation of new understanding, and an expanded repertoire.
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Participants described narrow mindset scouts’ tendencies to “miss” prospects. Narrow
mindsets ignore the reflective prompts of uncertainty and surprise, embrace the thoughtlessness
of routine, and hold firmly to the standards of baseball’s technical rationality. Technical
rationality supplants reflection in practice and stymies instinct (Schon, 1983). Comparatively,
open consideration scouts “frame the experiment” (Schon, p. 1983, p. 63) and employ the
“Method of Difference” (p. 142). For Schon (1983), some version of the Method of Difference
is indispensable to reflection-in-action in order for experimental reasoning to occur.
Experimental inferences tap practitioners’ repertoires and further expand the acuity of their
intuition (Schon, 1983).
Schon (1983) highlighted the efficacy of “virtual worlds,” and he defined these as a
choreographed mental model “of the real world of practice” (p. 157). Virtual worlds determine
the rigors of practitioners’ reflective experimentation and influence their ability to artistically,
intuitively perform (Schon, 1983). Experienced practitioners employ virtual worlds to slow the
pace of action and employ “accurate rehearsals” (Schon, 1983, p. 159) to make adjustments
and/or solve problems.
Scouts reported facing decision-making dilemmas when prospects’ tools significantly
exceed the maturity of their makeup and vice versa. In assessing tools and makeup, some scouts
identified two principles: (1) situational evaluation; and, (2) visualization of prospect
development through the lens of makeup. Similar to Schon’s (1983) employment of virtual
worlds, participants underscored the value of stepping back and reflectively slowing the action to
intuitively evaluate each prospect.
Schon (1983) analyzed the management of organizational life, pointing to the reflectionin-action similarities of practitioners while also identifying the “special features of its own” (p.
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242). Management done well reflects upon the “phenomenon of organizational life” (Schon,
1983, p. 242) as both the setting and the substance of knowing-in-action. Managers’ repertoires
are influenced by their organizational histories, and organizational structure and culture (i.e.
“learning system”) affect adaptability and the reinforcement or constraint of reflection-in-action
(Schon, 1983). Arrested reflection-in-action impedes the development and employment of
instinct (Schon, 1983). In near unanimity, scout participants outlined the experiential divide that
prompts doubt and loss of empowerment in today’s scouting departments. In lieu of decisionmaking instinct, today’s scouting departments more heavily rely upon quantifiable measures and
technical demonstrations of baseball talent to identify and eliminate prospects.
Only a small fraction of athletic talent research investigates talent identification judgment
through the lens of scouts and coaches. This study explored and analyzed how veteran
professional baseball scouts make meaning of what they see, how they interpret prospects’
mindsets, and how they make player selection decisions. My analysis of veteran professional
scouts’ reflexive interviews revealed that tastes for baseball talent is explained in three ways.
One, scouts’ dispositional mindset and comparative recall influence their visual knowledge
when defining physical talent. Two, baseball scouts value the psychological makeup traits of
competitive adaptability, extra effort, instinct and intellect. Three, while scouts’ player selection
decisions incorporate visual knowledge and valued makeup traits, their final judgments are
influenced by guess, gut, and instinct.
Concluding Analysis
Expert performers think and train differently than non-experts, and baseball scouts play
an influential role in defining talent and deciding who gets to play professional baseball.
According to my study, scouts’ mindset influences comparative recall and visual knowledge.
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Open consideration scouts paralleled talent development theorists’ (Bloom, 1985;
Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993; Ericsson, 1993; 1996; 1998; 2007, June; 2009) belief in large
societal talent pools, the importance of support networks, the developmental stages of talent
development, and the positive transformational effects of challenging opportunities. Scouts with
this mindset identify the performance strengths displayed by prospects, employ adaptive thinking
(Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993; Schon, 1993), and their previous evaluation failures trigger
reflective analyses. Veteran scouts, performing as thinking-in-action practitioners, demonstrated
an interdependent link between their sight and their experiential instinct through their
comparative recall (repertoire).
Second, veteran scouts stressed the positive interdependency of physical tools and
psychological makeup, and they disclosed their three most valued makeup traits – competitive
adaptability, extra effort, instinct and intellect. Prospects demonstrate competitive adaptability
when they confidently find ways to self-correct, and psychological complexity (Csikszentmihayli
et al., 1993) correlates with prospects’ constancy in pursuit of peak performance while
navigating challenge and change. Scouts’ descriptions of extra effort approximated Ericsson’s
(1993; 2007, June) definition of deliberate practice represented as structured, pre-meditated
training with constructive feedback and adaptive performance challenges. Prospects with
baseball instinct and intellect exhibit an intuitive “feel” for their competitive movements, timing,
and situational decisions (Schon, 1983), augmented by the anticipatory, cue recognition, and
reactionary speed byproducts of deliberate practice (Ericsson, 1993; 1996; 1998; 2007, June).
Third, scouts’ prospect judgments employ visual knowledge and valued makeup traits
channeled by guess, gut, and instinct. Today’s MLB scouting departments increasingly rely
upon statistical and technical demonstrations of tools and makeup in lieu of scouting intuition,
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and these forms of technical rationality hinder reflection and confound instinct (Schon, 1983).
Evaluation “misses” trigger surprise for open consideration scouts, mobilizing reflection-inaction, new understanding and expanded repertoires (Schon, 1983). Scouts’ taste for talent is a
personal, often emotional, form of visual knowledge that reflectively considers prospects’ talent
and makeup when making intuitive player selection decisions (Schon, 1983).
This study explored talent identification knowledge and interpretative decision-making
through the reflections and mindsets of veteran professional baseball scouts. Talent
identification for these scouts is a matter of taste, advised by mindset and comparative recall,
influenced by prospects’ makeup, and guided by guess, gut, and instinct.
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CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this qualitative inquiry, veteran professional scouts reflexively and transparently
disclosed how they define baseball talent, value psychological makeup, and make player
selections. The analysis of my participants’ views of their scouting experiences, insights, and
methods yielded three findings that frame the components of scouts’ tastes for talent: (1) one’s
dispositional mindset influences comparative recall and visual knowledge; (2) the makeup traits
of competitive adaptability, extra effort, instinct and intellect are highly valued; and, (3) guess,
gut, and instinct integrated with visual knowledge and valued makeup traits direct scouts’ player
selections.
The discovery of baseball talent is often more implicit than clearly defined, and my
participants’ narratives exemplified how professional baseball scouts interpret the logic of their
perceptual knowledge to identify talent and make prospect judgments. My inductive reasoning
and interpretative analysis of veteran scouts’ experiential memories and talent identification
methods position me to propose a “checklist” of recommendations for effective professional
baseball scouting. In this chapter, I examine the pivotal findings in my analysis to recommend
talent identification benchmarks for those who assess baseball talent and decide who gets to play.
I also evaluate the limitations of my study while suggesting targets and topics for future research.
Recommendations for Effective Professional Baseball Scouting
The search for professional baseball talent includes high player development costs and
low odds for Major League advancement. The purpose of this study is to understand how scouts
identify the player talents and attributes fundamental to the development of baseball performance
expertise and make selections.
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In describing the processes of scouting, participants frequently made the statement, “you
just check the boxes.” Scouts’ meaning behind this expression implied a systemic and evaluative
question: Does the prospect display average Major League tools and impressions of makeup that
forecast future performance expertise? The “boxes” in this case are: (1) quantitative grades and
measurements for all five tools; and, (2) qualitative makeup assessments from on-field actions
and off-field research.
In response to my data identification and analysis, I present six “check the box”
recommendations that identify the necessities of effective professional baseball scouting in an
effort to increase organizations’ yield of Major League players: (1) “Like players, because
somebody has to play.” (2) Distress illuminates – does what comes next adaptively flow? (3)
Own your vision, recall, and instinct. (4) Perpetually ask two questions: why and what if? (5)
“You can’t work with laziness.” (6) Meaning of Baseball Talent Identification = the sum of
measurements, movements, makeup, myths, and misses.
“Like Players, Because Somebody has to Play”
From January to June, area scouts’ time is in scant supply, and their accuracy identifying
prospects that develop and advance to the Major Leagues is influenced by the quantity and
quality of evaluation time they invest in individual prospects. Not every prospect receives the
same amount of evaluation time. Participants reported that genetic height and measureable tools
elevate scouts’ talent identification confidence.
Although confidence is elevated, scouts’ also disclosed that the tendency to over-focus on
measurement occludes signs of negative makeup and this disposition is endemic to narrow
mindset scouts. Narrow mindsets frequently define height and specific baseball tools (e.g.
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running speed, throwing velocity) as “natural abilities” with fixed capacities for development
and expertise.
While narrow mindset scouts economize their time by frequently saying “no” (i.e.
eliminating) to short prospects (e.g. under 6’0”) and/or those whose visual demonstrations of
measurable tools currently falls below Major League average, they frequently miss seeing the
self-sabotaging effects of inadequate makeup and the synergy of exceptional makeup in
developing players who will later achieve baseball expertise. Narrow mindsets get stuck in static
standards and deluded by preferential forms of baseball performance. When scouts “like”
players they believe “everybody on the field is a prospect until they show you that they’re not.”
A disposition that “likes players” passionately embraces a strengths-based search for talent, a
pragmatic curiosity, and an understanding that the full meaning of baseball expertise is not
subject to quantifiable measurements.
Scouts’ dispositional mindset influences their visual knowledge. Visual knowledge is the
source of comparative recall and both constructs influence prospect selection decisions.
Whether identifying baseball talent on a tryout field with 100 prospects or screening job
candidate resumes in a same size applicant pool, an open mindset that “likes players” is focused
on identifying signs of strengths and makeup. The appearance of the performance or a static
measure will not convey the full capacity for performance expertise in the moment.
Distress Illuminates – Does What Comes Next Adaptively Flow?
Baseball is a game of error and low percentages of success. Participants described
distress in baseball as slumps, failures, adversities, and competitive challenges. Nearly all
participants characterized these moments as an opportunity to experience “your best day of
scouting for the year.” When scouts witness prospects’ distress they can visually identify what
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comes next. Distress reveals makeup and catalyzes opportunities to evaluate prospects’ adaptive
responses, improvisation, confidence, and strategic creativity in the moment.
Adaptive responses represent new ways to deliver better results that differ from
performers’ existing “know-how” (Schon, 1983). In the absence of distress performers can rely
on the automaticity of their current skills and the stability of their repertoire. However, distress
challenges confidence, introduces instability to habits, and incentivizes the need for change in
the moment.
High-level, competitive baseball inherently includes clear goals, perpetual feedback,
ever-present challenge, and tests players’ capabilities. These conditions represent the
antecedents to flow experiences (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993). Flow encounters motivate
performers to pursue performance improvement so they can more frequently repeat the success
of their flow experiences, and this feedback loop fuels the development of performance expertise
(Csikszentmihalyi et al, 1993).

Flow is never static, and it perpetually negotiates the

interdependent opposites of constancy and change – that is, flow is both stable and adaptable
(Csikszenmihalyi et al., 1993).
Identifying what prospects do next in moments of baseball distress provides scouts with
unparalleled opportunities to evaluate adaptability and flow. Adaptability requires reflection,
promotes the expansion of instinct, and deepens a prospect’s understanding of the essence of the
game (Schon, 1983). Flow is present when prospects play the game instinctively well on
automatic pilot with a quiet mind (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993). Prospects who frequently
adapt and perform in the “flow” of the game predict to consistently improve and achieve
performance expertise at levels that “exceed their tools.”
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Own Your Vision, Recall, and Instinct
Scouting is one part observational, and scouts’ visual knowledge is reciprocally related to
their comparative recall and baseball instincts. Several participants disclosed that it is the
hopeful stimulation of their visual knowledge – identifying “a guy,” a prospect with Major
League tools – that emotionally propels them to baseball fields daily.
Scouts’ comparative recall (repertoire) is defined as their personal, experiential library of
prospect case studies. When they visually identify “a guy,” they compare their visual prospect
appraisal to their memorable recall of both successful and unsuccessful prospects. Participants
reported this reflective comparison either identifies or eliminates the prospect for further
consideration.
The depth of scouts’ experiential recall influences the span of the visual talent cues they
recognize. For the reflective scout, comparing visual knowledge in action with memorable recall
triggers reflection-in-action and/or reflection-on-action (Schon, 1983). Scout participants
reported that visual identification of Major League tools, confirmed by memorable recall
comparison, ignites a sense of visual ownership. These spontaneous, cognitive processes explain
why scouts see what they see and how they develop individual tastes for talent.
Taking exclusive possession of one’s baseball vision, recall, and instinct lays the
foundation for a diagnostic, reflective mindset. What scouts see (visual identification) triggers
comparisons to what they saw in the past (repertoire), and the meaning they extract from
uncertain, surprising, or unique visual cues correlates with similar cues found in their repertoire
(Schon, 1983). When uncertain, surprising, or unique visual cues do not equate with a scout’s
repertoire, reflection-in-action leads to experimentation (Schon, 1983). Experimentation is
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necessary for making inductive inferences and is exploratory, move-testing, or hypothesis-testing
(Schon, 1983).
Historically, scouting knowledge is primarily transactional – passed on from one to
another. However, discovering prospects requires fervor to uncover performance cues and
reflectively experiment with what others may not see or consider. Taking ownership of one’s
vision, recall, and intuition paves the way for making experimentation that stretches one’s
inductive inferences beyond their current level of competence.
Perpetually Ask Two Questions: Why and What If?
As a result of my personal coaching experiences, my introduction to this study included
the written statement: “Scouts do not talk about misses or why draft selections, assumedly
capable of advancing to the Major Leagues, do not make it” (p. 12). My introductory statement
proved incorrect. All scout participants shared insights they learned from their analysis of
“missed” prospect evaluations. Participants emphasized the truth that scouts will “miss” on
prospects when identifying talent and making player judgments. More importantly, my
participant data underscored the utility of perpetually asking the question, “why?” as a method
and remedy for clarifying scouts’ observations and interpretations.
When describing player selection “misses,” scouts shared their desire not to fail and how
this pursuit humbly drives them to ask the question, “why?” Habitually asking this question
develops a reflective mind and widens scouts’ “funnel” (i.e. open consideration) for prospect
evaluations.
Prospect judgment is influenced by comparative recall, and evaluation “misses” become
components of scouts’ recall (repertoire). This frame of reference prompts comparative
questions when current prospects approximate some of the traits of previous prospect “misses.”
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This comparative conversation induces scouts’ deeper analysis as they attempt to forecast a
prospect’s future performance capabilities by asking the question “why?”
All scouts also disclosed the importance of homework questions, or, more clearly, the
value of engaging in conversation with prospects and their support network. This process is
investigative, conversational, and relational. It requires that scouts take the time and ask tough
questions. The purpose of these questions is to answer the “why?” behind the situational specific
makeup of each individual prospect.
Routine blocks the need for reflection and is exhibited as automaticity (Schon, 1983).
However, Schon (1983) described how uncertainty and surprise lead to self-reflection and
intuitive adjustments within expert practitioners. These intuitive adjustments represent what is
often referred to as an artistic response (Schon, 1983). Expert baseball performers make similar
artistic adjustments when performing.
I believe scouts also periodically make artistic judgments. Specifically, participants
described their affinities for an undersized player, for a player with below average tools and
above average makeup, or for a player in a performance slump who continues to adaptively
compete. When scouts reflect-in-action they conduct “what if?” research to reflectively explore
the professional baseball possibilities of what they see (Schon, 1983). Participants referred to
stepping back in these instances; pausing to self-reflect and critically evaluate the prospect.
Pausing sustains reflection and helps limit scouts from getting lost in the action of group-think or
“one-off” evaluations (Schon, 1983).
As scouts perpetually ask the questions “why?” and “what if?” they increasingly engage
in self-reflective conversations (Schon, 1983). These conversations expand their repertoire, finefocus their visual knowledge in new ways, and increase their baseball instincts. Elevated
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instincts accelerate scouts’ visual cue recognition (Ericsson et al., 2009) and the accuracy and
speed of their player judgments (Schon, 1983).
“You Can’t Work With Laziness”
Participants defined the valued makeup trait “extra effort” as uncommon drive and
purpose. Conversely, laziness represents a diminished desire to exert extra effort and achieve.
Participant narratives, when relating prospect stories, frequently reinforced the interdependency
of effort and ability as a critical component of talent development. Within those narratives, some
scouts described how a prospect’s extra effort in the presence of average to below average Major
League tools intensified his interest. On the other hand, some participants’ accounts described
how they walked away from above average Major League tools because laziness prevailed in the
prospects’ makeup. Still others replayed how they hoped that drafting a prospect would
“change” the makeup of his achievement motivation and drive.
Paul Snyder, former Atlanta Braves Scouting Director, consistently queried his scouts:
“Which players are going to seek their level?” (Shanks, 2005, p. 338). “Level” in this context
referred to prospects’ forecasted potential based primarily on measurable physical tools.
Paraphrased simply, Ericsson began a stage of his work with the theoretical question: If you
train hard enough, can you make yourself into a great performer? (Ericsson, 1998).
Some scout participants detailed how they identified unfulfilled potential in prospects’
performances. In these case narratives scouts identified how coaches and support networks
reinforced prospects’ performance results instead of their training effort, work ethic, and desire
to improve. In these instances, scouts correlated prospects’ failure “to seek their level” as a
result of ineffective learning, incomplete understanding, and insufficient passion.
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Scout participants associated passion for the game as a fundamental ingredient for
sustained performance improvement. Ericsson et al. (1993) found that performers are motivated
to deliberately practice because they believe their efforts directly impact their performance
improvements. We “can’t work with laziness” because it reflects the duality of diminished
passion for the game and the absence of the effort required to sustain deliberate practice, and this
combination will not result in performance expertise. If the strength of a prospect’s makeup
predicts his retention through the minor league player system, then an absence of extra effort
forecasts questionable persistence and risky investment.
Meaning of Baseball Talent Identification = Sum of Measurements, Movements, Makeup,
Myths, and Misses
This segment represents the final talent identification benchmark for effective
professional baseball scouting, and it centers on the concept of meaning. Meaning is difficult to
measure. This study positioned me in the field as a data gathering agent to collect veteran
scouts’ viewpoints and to interpret the meaning of their talent identification and decision-making
experiences.
Participants spoke to MLB organizations’ intensified demand for prospect data measures.
Tool grades are one part quantitative (e.g. running speed, spin rate, throwing velocity) and one
part subjective (e.g. fielding, pitching delivery and mechanics) as well as the comparative
product of recall. Despite individual perceptual differences, tool grades standardize physical
baseball skill measures. They represent the minimum entry requirements for professional
baseball consideration, and participants disclosed most prospects are quickly eliminated based
upon their tool grades.
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Measurement can also be performance related. Beane’s (Lewis, 2004) analysis found
that all heights and sizes of prospects have the capacity to exhibit high OBP. He disregarded
heavy emphases on sight-based and projective scouting methods in exchange for measures of
statistical validation of what a prospect “has done” (Lewis, 2004, p. 38). Beane (Lewis, 2004)
employed specific statistical measures in scouting because they substantiate the simultaneous
presence of skills and makeup.
The talent account does not assure the presence of psychological makeup. However,
participants described how prospects’ on-field movements reveal confidence, maturity,
leadership, and desire. Confident movements also demonstrate prospects’ understanding and
“feel” for their performances; their recognition of the game’s response cues; and the intellect to
know when and how to elevate or adapt their performance based on the situational demands. In
many instances, scout narratives depicted examples of prospects’ confident movements as
reflections of artistic improvisation, knowledge of self, and knowledge of baseball.
Participants affirmed the absence of a standardized definition for “makeup” within the
scouting ranks while underscoring the interdependent relationship of tools and makeup in the
pursuit of performance expertise. For scouts, makeup reflects a prospect’s mindset and
determines his readiness for talent development. Participants described makeup as both a
catalyst and a determinant for performance expertise. They emphasized makeup is not quickly
determined; it contains both synergistic and sabotaging properties; and, it is both individual and
situational specific. Using Schon’s (1983) concept of creating virtual worlds, makeup is about
scouts’ minds getting inside prospects’ minds to identify “psychological complexity”
(Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993) and the “complex cognitive mechanisms” (Ericsson et al., 2009,
p. 204) that form the foundation for achieving expertise.
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My review of literature and participant narratives both pass along the perimeter of several
myths. I define the term myth in the context of baseball talent identification as notions, ideas, or
concepts that are empirically incomplete. That is, we are unable to clearly define and completely
substantiate their cause and effect application to baseball. These concepts range from empirical
debates regarding nature and nurture to determining an empirical definition of the makeup
components baseball expertise requires. In near unanimity, scout participants emphasized the
importance of doing your own work and perpetually asking questions. I interpret the words
between scouts’ lines as a charge to those who search for baseball talent to demystify, to find
truth, and to make meaning from what we see in every possible way.
Most scout participants disclosed the impact prospect identification “misses” had on their
reflective thoughts, visual knowledge, and instinct. Within scouts’ narratives of lessons learned
existed humble statements emphasizing the uncertainty of baseball talent identification. Scouts
underscored the inherent failure associated with identifying baseball talent and forecasting
expertise. In effect, scouts are incapable of complete knowledge in this endeavor, but when they
embraced the realities of “misses” their repertoires deepened and their instincts sharpened.
Scout participants frequently made the statement “use all your resources” when
describing “how” they make prospect judgments. However, scouts did not detail what a
standardized list of resources looks like. Rather, participants reported that meaning is the sum
measure of the components contained within measurements, movements, makeup, myths, and
misses. In the end, scouts’ vision of prospects’ future performance is determined by their
resource information, instincts, and their best estimate at that moment.
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Limitations of this Study and Recommendations for Future Research
I conducted this study within a narrowly defined population of veteran professional
baseball scouts. While this population displayed “well-stocked memory banks” (Kerrane, 1999,
p. 324), my study did not include the potentially contrasting and performance-based perspectives
of newer members of the professional scouting ranks. My population only included long-tenured
baseball scouts and recruiters who navigated many years of service. Not all scouts become long
tenured, and my data does not include the potentially valuable insights of those scouts who do
not persist or are not retained. My interview time with each participant included only one long
interview and scouts’ responsive replies at that time. It is challenging to condense decades of
experiential insights into one visit, and participant disclosures are potentially expanded and
enriched across multiple interviews. Last, as recently as 2000 I served as a collegiate head
baseball coach and recruiter. In several instances, participants represented competing colleagues
from my past professional life. While my role today contains no competing elements, I enjoyed
access to this population as the result of trust and credibility from a former body of work.
Conducting this study with an investigator who has alternative or no prior baseball experiences
will potentially yield a different mixture of narrative responses. In the subsequent paragraphs, I
recommend several targets and topics for future baseball talent identification research.
This study investigated visual knowledge through the eyes of veteran professional
baseball scouts. Although prior qualitative investigations of this type are rare within professional
athletics, I submit the potential merits of similar explorations conducted within the scouting
ranks of the NFL, NBA, and NHL. While sporting skills differ across the organizations, the
value of makeup likely prevails, and the economic pressures of each professional body are of
similar intensity and magnitude.
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Much of what we know about professional baseball scouts’ talent identification and
decision-making methods and intuitions is tacit. However, I enjoyed lengthy, transparent, and
candid interviews across several participants. This study is about them, and they have a story to
tell. In this context, I propose a qualitative investigation that employs video to capture the
insights and perspectives of veteran scouts. These individuals are qualitative researchers of long
standing. Video analysis will deepen our scope and understanding of visual knowledge and
intuition while also preserving the historical personas of this area of practice.
Instinct is chiefly unexpressed within expert practitioners (Schon, 1983), and the topic of
this study aptly applies to an in-depth case study design that explores the visual knowledge and
intuitions of professional baseball scouts. While time-intensive, the potential merits of the
results have application to better understanding the clues, as disclosed by expert practitioners, to
baseball performance expertise.
Participants yearned to evaluate prospects in situations of challenge, struggle, or
adversity. Prospects’ responses in the moment underscored scouts’ affinity for the traits of
adaptability and artistic improvisation. Scouts noted these traits reflect knowledge of self and
the essence of the game. I propose a qualitative investigation of “adaptability” within Major
League players. A deeper understanding of this construct will help identify the traits that
perhaps most powerfully predict performance excellence, and this knowledge will potentially
adjust the visual cues talent scouts seek to identify.
Conclusion
My personal scouting experiences inspired this exploration into the insights of veteran
professional baseball scouts to learn how their tastes for talent and attributional definitions
advise and inform their player selection decisions. In general, this study contributes to the talent
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identification, performance expertise, and reflective practitioner knowledge bases through the
interpretative eyes and experiential narratives of veteran professional baseball scouts. More
specifically, this study discloses the interdependencies associated with professional scouts’
visual knowledge, comparative recall, and baseball instincts while providing explicit definitions
for the psychological makeup traits they value most in prospects.
Deciding who gets to play – or determining “who to hire” – is a critical responsibility
within any team, organization, business, or profession that aspires to attain success through
performance and leadership. Talent identification is a determinative operation, and the
composition and capability of talent and potential are considered to be either an asset or a
liability. Potential is defined as something that is yet to occur or mature to its fullest capacity
while simultaneously underscoring belief in the possibility of development and growth.
Whether one’s focal point is the high financial stakes climates of professional baseball or
business, today’s competitive enterprises reflect levels of ever-increasing complexity, heightened
performance expectations, and narrowing margins of accepted talent identification error. Within
these complex and challenging environments, the efficacy of competitive adaptability, extra
effort in the midst of challenge, and intuitive performance are intensified. This intensification
sharpens our awareness and scrutiny of talent scouts’ dispositions and the psychological makeup
of prospective performers and leaders. The object of effective scouting and hiring is to make
good decisions – to widen our visual mindset and to reflectively discover potential expert
performers. This study clarifies the visual, reflective, and intuitive components of sight-based
baseball scouting, and these elements, integrated with prospects’ statistical and performance
measurements, plausibly augment and fortify the accuracy of individuals’ and organizations’
tastes for talent identification.
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Appendix A: Script for Participant Recruitment E-mail

Dear [First Name],
I scouted the Mid-Atlantic region as an NCAA I baseball coach from 1983-2000. For my dissertation, I am
conducting a study to explore how professional baseball scouts define talent, determine potential, and
make prospect decisions.
My purpose in writing today is to invite you to participate in this study. I selected you as a potential
participant because you are a veteran scout, and your experiences, instincts, and intuitions about
baseball talent identification are valued.
The focus of my study is to explore how professional baseball scouts make meaning of what they see
and forecast potential. My research method is both simple and flexible.
If you agree to participate, I will travel to conduct an in-person interview with you at a date, time, site,
and location of your choosing and convenience. The interview will include five open-ended questions
and projects to last 75-120 minutes. The in-person interview will be audio-taped, and you will have
opportunity to review, modify, and/or delete any of your responses. Participation in this study is
voluntary, confidential, and your name will not be used or recorded.
No payment or cost is involved with your participation in this study.
I hope you will participate in this valuable exploration, and I will reconnect with you in 5-7 days to
discuss the possibility of scheduling a date/time to visit in-person, answer any questions you may have,
and outline additional details.
Many Thanks,
Scott
D. Scott Gines
University of St. Thomas (MN) doctoral student
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Appendix B: Participant In-Person Interview Reminder E-mail

Dear [First Name],
This is simply a quick reminder of our upcoming meeting [date, time, location]. I look forward to
connecting with you in-person.
Our in-person interview will last 75-120 minutes and consist of five open-ended questions about how
you identify baseball talent and make prospect decisions. At the beginning of our time together, I will
provide you with a brief consent form, answer any questions you may have, and supply you with a
mutually signed copy.
Your responses to the five interview questions will be reflective, and to help you prepare in advance
simply consider two themes based on your experiences: (1) how you define and value baseball talent
and makeup; and, (2) your philosophy for judging potential and making prospect decisions.
I look forward to seeing you in person [date, time, location]. Should you need to contact me while
traveling, my mobile number is 304-786-0216.
Many Thanks,
Scott
D. Scott Gines
University of St. Thomas (MN) doctoral student
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Appendix C: Review Typed Transcript E-mail

Dear [First Name],
Thank you again for your time and willingness to serve as a participant in my study. Attached to this
email is a typed transcript of our in-person interview on [date]. Please review the transcript to verify its
accuracy, confirm your acceptance of its contents, and/or to share any corrections or modifications you
may desire.
Thank You in Advance,
Scott
D. Scott Gines
University of St. Thomas (MN) doctoral student

214

Appendix D: In-Person Interview Questions
The in-person interview will be a fluid process, and I will introduce/re-introduce myself to each
participant and allow each participant to do the same. This mutual introduction/re-introduction will
focus on sharing career movements and professional roles to establish a setting of ease, common
ground, and trust.
General Background Questions
A.

Professional Baseball
1. Did you have the opportunity to play professional baseball?
If yes, how many years did you play?
2. How many years have you/did you worked/work in professional baseball scouting and in
what roles?
B. College Baseball
1. Did you have the opportunity to play college baseball?
2. Did/do you coach college baseball?
If yes, how many years and at what level(s)?
Open-Ended Interview Questions
A.

The First Year Player Draft is a decision-making process, and the ultimate goal is accurate
performance prediction.
-

B.

(1) From your experiences, when you see a prospect how do you visually recognize physical
talent?
Probes:
^ I’m curious, how do you compare “seeing” talent to “describing” talent?

Scouts search for prospects with great physical talent and psychological makeup, but this
complete package doesn’t always develop simultaneously in prospects.
Said another way, all prospects with draft-able physical talent don’t always demonstrate
exceptional makeup, and some prospects with exceptional baseball makeup aren’t great
athletes physically.
-

C.

(2) From your experiences, how do you use your baseball mindset - your intuitions, instincts,
and experiences - to interpret prospects’ psychological makeup?
Probes:
^ I’m curious, how do you weigh the value of a prospect’s makeup compared to his physical
tools?
^ Comparing players who make it to the Major Leagues and those who don’t, do you find
any differences between how these two groups think and train?
^ Have you determined any psychological attributes you believe are critical to expert
baseball performance?

As a scout, you spend extensive time in the field making observations and notes – and
identifying talent and predicting potential are both difficult and critical in professional sport.
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-

(3) How do you make meaning of everything you see and hear in the field and forecast a
prospect’s future performance?
Probes:
^ From your experiences, when you compare a prospect’s present talent to future potential
what key things do you look for or what questions do you ask yourself?

D. How do you decide to identify or eliminate a prospect?
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Appendix E: Consent Form

Tastes for True Talent: How Professional Baseball Scouts Define Talent and Decide Who Gets
to Play

IRBNet Tracking Number 876236-1
You are invited to participate in a research study about how professional baseball scouts define
talent, determine potential, and make prospect decisions. You were selected as a possible
participant because you are a veteran in the craft of baseball scouting. You are eligible to
participate in this study because you served at least four years as an MLB area scout, and you have
10 or more years of baseball scouting experience at the professional and/or college levels. The
following information is provided in order to help you make an informed decision whether or not
you would like to participate. Please read this form and ask any questions you may have before
agreeing to be in the study.
This study is being conducted by Scott Gines, supervised by University of St. Thomas professor Dr.
Thomas Fish from the College of Education, Leadership and Counseling. This study was approved
by the Institutional Review Board at the University of St. Thomas.
Background Information
The purpose of this study is to explore how professional baseball scouts make meaning of what
they see and how they forecast potential. My research method is simple, flexible, and designed to
give professional baseball scouts an opportunity to explain their insights, instincts and decision
making processes. I will travel to conduct an in-person interview with veteran baseball scouts and
ask five open-ended questions. With the interview data, I will interpret how professional baseball
scouts define talent and potential when identifying or eliminating potential Major League
prospects.
Procedures
If you agree to participate in this study, I will ask you to do the following things: I will travel to
conduct separate individual in-person interviews (lasting 75-120 minutes) with eight to 12 veteran
scouts. The in-person interviews will be audio-taped, and I will personally transcribe the audio text
of each interview. After I transcribe a participant’s interview each participant will have
opportunity to review, modify, and/or delete their responses via e-mail. Each participant will
electronically receive his transcribed interview in two segments separated by a minimum of 24
hours. The first electronic file sent for review will contain the participant's narrative responses to
questions two and four, and the second email will include the participant's narrative responses to
questions one, three, and five. Participation in this study is voluntary, confidential, and names of
participants will not be used or recorded.
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Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study
This study does not include known or foreseeable social or economic risks. Every effort will be
made to maintain confidentiality; however, it is remotely possible that some participant responses
and/or stories may be recognizable to other professional scouts or collegiate baseball coaches.
As the sole investigator, the actual names of the participants and their assigned pseudonym will be
stored as objects in my memory.
Participants in this study will receive no direct benefits.
Compensation
No payment or cost is involved with participation in this study.
Privacy
Your privacy will be protected while you participate in this study. Individual in-person interviews
will be conducted at a date, time, setting, and location of your choosing and convenience.
Confidentiality
The records of this study will be kept confidential. The types of records I will create include an
audio recording and transcript of each participant’s interview. This data will be stored
electronically in two password protected computers that require double authentication. Audiotaped, written narrative data, and all physical data will be stored in a locked filing drawer in my
professional office, and, while traveling, all audio-taped and physical data will remain in my
briefcase and on my person or securely locked in my hotel room safe. The data will be part of the
principal investigator’s (Scott Gines) dissertation, planned for completion in 2016. The dissertation
will only use pseudonyms, and audio recordings will be destroyed within seven days of my
successful dissertation defense. If I later publish an empirical study, professional article, and/or
book involving the data and/or results of this study, I will not include information that will make it
possible to identify you. All signed consent forms will be kept for a minimum of three years upon
completion of the study. Institutional Review Board officials at the University of St. Thomas reserve
the right to inspect all research records to ensure compliance.
Voluntary Nature of the Study
Your participation whether or not to participate in this study is entirely voluntary. There are no
penalties or consequences if you choose not to participate. If you decide to participate, you are free
to withdraw at any time up until the completed e-mail review and return of your interview
transcript. Should you decide to withdraw upon review of your interview transcript the data
collected about you will be deleted and shredded. You can withdraw by contacting me by phone,
text, or email. You are also free to skip any questions I may ask.
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Contacts and Questions
My name is Scott Gines You may ask any questions you have now and any time during or after the
research procedures. If you have questions later, you may contact me at 304-786-0216 or
scott.gines@tamuk.edu. You may also contact my dissertation chair, Dr. Thomas Fish, at 651-4529102 or tlfish@stthomas.edu. You may also contact the University of St. Thomas Institutional
Review Board at 651-962-6035 or muen0526@stthomas.edu with any questions or concerns.
Statement of Consent
I have had a conversation with the researcher about this study and have read the above
information. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I consent to participate in the
study. I am at least 18 years of age. I give permission to be audio recorded during this study.
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.

_______________________________________________________________

________________

Signature of Study Participant

Date

_______________________________________________________________
Print Name of Study Participant
_______________________________________________________________

________________

Signature of Researcher

Date
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